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Abstract 
 
What are the mechanisms behind the advance of financial actors, instruments, and models 
into the field of social policy design and delivery? Over the past couple of decades, the 
state’s function as provider of welfare and safety nets against various forms of socio-
economic risk has been transformed not just by privatisation or downsizing, but also by 
the advent of alternative forms of social policy delivery. One example of the latter is social 
impact investment, a form of investing in social programmes with the intent of pursuing 
social (and environmental) impact alongside financial return, and yielding innovative 
financial instruments such as social impact bonds, social stocks, or community bonds. 
The emergence of this field is generally seen as an outcome of the broader process of 
financialisation. From this perspective, both financial return and social policy objectives 
can be achieved via the straightforward implementation of existing financial instruments 
and methodologies. However, the very process of implicating existing financial 
technologies in the sphere of the pursuit of social outcomes generates its own set of 
dynamics. This study focuses on these dynamics from the perspective of the valuation 
processes underpinning the emergence of social impact investment. It argues that as 
finance engulfs this field, it engages in a valuation process of fashioning and delineating 
a hybridised form of value – blended value – supporting its advance, which is distinctly 
separate, though not independent, from financial value creation. The result of this process 
is the concomitant proliferation of non-financial spaces of valuation, which come not to 
replace, but to accompany and support financialisation. In order to make this argument, it 
looks at the case of the valuation processes undergirding the launch of the world’s first 
social impact bond in 2010 in the UK. Besides providing an empirical account of the 
latter, it also makes a theoretical contribution to the literature on financialisation by 
deepening the understanding of the manner in which financial actors, instruments, and 
markets advance in non-financial realms.  
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Introduction 
 
1. The financialisation of social policy  
 
This thesis seeks to understand the mechanisms and forces behind the spread of 
financialisation to areas usually relegated to the state’s role as a welfare provider. 
Specifically, it looks at the emergence of novel financial instruments such as Social 
Impact Bonds (SIBs) – originally created by governmental institutions or enterprises with 
the intent of addressing social issues or achieving social policy objectives – as an instance 
of financialisation and a pathway to understanding the mechanisms behind the advance 
and expansion of finance. It seeks to develop a framework that would link the growing 
importance of financial instruments, benchmarks, actors, and markets – something 
generally subsumed under the name of financialisation – to the administration of specific 
populations or social classes by state agencies. As such, it proposes a perspective that 
forges a dialogue between two different scholarships: first, the emerging literature on 
financialisation, which looks at the growing importance and spread of finance in society 
at large; second, the just-nascent scholarship on valuation, which considers the socio-
technical practices in which the value (or values) of something is (or are) established, 
assessed, negotiated, provoked, maintained, constructed, and/or contested.  
SIBs first made their appearance in the UK in 2010 as a new financial instrument that was 
designed specifically with the intent of overcoming budgetary constraints in an era of 
austerity. SIBs are a contract with the public sector in which social investors provide 
upfront capital for organisations like social enterprises in order to undertake social 
programmes that are of interest to a particular government, with the latter paying the 
investors a specific return usually at the end of the programme and based on the outcome 
received. This instrument spanned traditionally separate categories of state, market, and 
civil society, and summoned actors from each field while at the same time gravitating 
around the goal of tapping into capital markets and the wealth of private financial actors 
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in order to fund social programmes. Even before the evaluation of the efficiency or indeed 
feasibility of the novel instrument was published, SIBs proved to be an irresistible 
proposal for other governments around the world as well, so much so that in the first half 
of 2017 there already were 74 specimens across 18 countries and 5 continents. What, then, 
explains the precipitation and wholeheartedness with which they were adopted in such 
diverse corners of the world? What do these instruments and the phenomenon of their 
emergence and proliferation stand for? The usual answer to these questions is that we are 
witnessing here a process of financialisation – the creation new frontiers for capital 
accumulation through the advance of finance into non-financial spaces. Financial 
instruments, benchmarks, actors, and markets expand and engulf various dimensions of 
social existence and reduce them to opportunities for the extraction of financial value. 
While the financialisation proposition is, by and large, a fair description of the state of 
play, this is not the whole story.  
The main argument put forth is that the financialisation befalling the field of social policy 
occurs not so much through absorption into a financial logic, but rather through the 
proliferation of non-financial spaces of valuation. The creation, promotion, and 
institutionalisation of the social impact investment market results not in a reduction of 
other forms of value to financial value, but rather in the emergence and spread of novel 
types of values. SIBs do represent an innovative financial instrument, but the values that 
they encapsulate cannot simply be reduced to financial values; on the contrary, their very 
emergence is undergirded by the creation of hybridised forms of value that are not merely 
iterations of financial forms of value but singularities and novelties in their own right.  
The main contention this thesis will be attempting to make is to show how the emergence 
of a market in innovative financial instruments, which in this case fund social policy 
programmes, does not necessarily imply the absolute integration of non-financial spaces 
into financial dynamics and does not necessarily preclude the development and 
consolidation of other value forms as part of this process of financialisation. Financial 
innovation, therefore, can be accompanied and even supported by alternate and multiple 
forms of value created for this goal. The latter, it will be showed, preserve the specificity 
and unicity of non-financial sites and create possibilities for actors operating in the field 
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to pursue, to varying degrees, one category alongside the other. Against the conventional 
narrative, then, a case will be put forth that SIBs show how financialisation may occur via 
the creation of non-financial forms of valuation.  
Specifically, this thesis finds that the financialisation of social policy design and delivery 
was accomplished via a valuation process occurring in three phases: an initial, exploratory 
part comprised of negotiation and selection, where the meaning and purpose of a new 
value form – blended value – was negotiated, followed by the selection of a dimension of 
social reality where the new value form would be created – the realm of ex-offender 
rehabilitation; a systematising part consisting of ordering and abstraction, where ordering 
the interaction of actors participating in the creation of the new value form through an 
SIB was decided upon, after which the methods for abstracting and accounting for value 
creation were established, in order to provide evidential data; and, finally, a public act of 
standardisation, which included the creation of classifications, benchmarks, and 
performance indicators in an accessible, homogeneous, and transparent fashion, followed 
by a political act of institutionalisation through the adoption of national and international 
acts for entrenchment and promotion of blended value and social impact investment. This 
valuation work resulted thus in the creation, promotion, and institutionalisation of blended 
value – the mutual pursuit of social and financial value creation – which would become 
the foundational and generative force tying the field of social impact investment together.  
The consequence is that, through the pursuit of blended value creation, capital 
accumulation can indeed advance in non-financial domains, but only whilst being 
concomitant and in an intimate relation with particular types and degrees of social value 
creation (e.g. reduction in ex-prisoner re-offending, increased employment, improved 
educational attainment, bettering of health status, reduction in homelessness). Social 
entrepreneurs operating within impact investment programmes can thus pursue the 
augmentation of social value to various degrees: sometimes they are completely 
unimpeded by financial actors, at times they need to negotiate with the latter, whilst other 
times they might find themselves following strictly the instructions of the project funders. 
Either way, the thesis contends that financial return is predicated on the specific 
performance of essential social indicators, which in turn renders the whole process the 
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financialisation of social policy design and delivery dependent on the dynamics of these 
non-financial elements. The twin contributions that result from this insight are a 
theoretical one about some of the potential mechanisms underlying the process of 
financialisation, and an empirical one about the creation and establishment, through 
engaging in valuation work, of blended value as a foundation for a financialised social 
policy sector: social impact investment.  
This chapter continues as follows: the next section provides a historical outlook at the 
expanding market for SIBs, before moving on to outlining the research aims, questions, 
and limits. This is succeeded by a discussion of the methodology chosen for this study 
and, finally, by an outline of investigation.  
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2. SIBs: The state of play 
 
SIBs are the most talked about instrument stemming from the slow and sprawling 
emergence of the social impact investment market. Whilst the latter has been around for 
more than a decade, until the coming of age of SIBs it had developed under the sign of 
uncertainty and as a result of isolated and unrelated investor initiatives, and thus had 
lacked a clear impetus and direction that might have entrenched it as a legitimate and 
popular investment strategy. This also prevented it from developing supporting 
institutions like rating agencies, secondary markets, or dedicated funds, and robbed it of 
the potential for development. It is not the same case with SIBs, whose first iteration was 
explicitly designed as the state of the art in social investment and for the purpose of 
creating a track record and laying the groundwork for a proper social investment market. 
Ever since their launch in 2010, SIBs have rapidly grown in popularity, and what is 
impressive is not just their number, their value, or the increasing span of the social areas 
they target, but also the fact that they have been adopted by a great majority of the varieties 
of capitalism of the contemporary global economy, and they have thus proved not to be a 
mere Anglo-Saxon singularity explainable through local-cultural factors like austerity or 
the finance-led economy model but a rather global phenomenon. 
SIBs are therefore the most representative and popular instrument of the social impact 
investment market. As of July 2017, there were 74 SIBs across the world, with 32 projects 
underway in the UK, addressing workforce development, housing / homelessness, child 
and family welfare, education and early years, criminal justice, and health (Social 
Finance, 2017). So far, SIBs have raised $278 million (see Figure 1). The first SIB was 
the Peterborough Prison SIB, launched in 2010 and created with the intention of reducing 
reoffending by short-sentence prisoners from Peterborough Prison. A detailed analysis of 
the first SIB will be provided later on, but suffice it to say here that it was meant to be a 
pilot project, a demonstrative initiative through which the government attracted traditional 
actors that funded social projects such as charities, philanthropic institutions, and 
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endowments, and partnered with them in order to make the case for SIBs to private 
investment firms or individuals, or, more generally, to the capital markets.  
 
Figure 1. SIBs Worldwide. Source: Social Finance UK. Author's calculations. 
In mid-2014, the Peterborough Prison SIB was still a work in progress, but at the first 
assessment in early 2014, it reduced re-offending by 8.4%, which was below the 10% 
threshold that would have triggered early payments (only one cohort out of two was 
assessed at that time). However, the news was taken as a positive signal, given that the 
overall threshold is 7.5%, which means that the target would have most likely be met and 
payments to investors would have been fulfilled. That said, in 2013, the Ministry of Justice 
announced a major revamp to its offender rehabilitation programme, sending mixed 
signals to the people involved in the SIB project, given that both addressed the same issue. 
On the 13th of March 2014, the Rehabilitation Bill received Royal Assent. The 
accompanying news article published on the government website read: “the new law 
means that, for the first-time, virtually all offenders will receive at least 12-month’s 
supervision in the community on release from custody” (HM Government, 2014). That 
effectively rendered the Peterborough Pilot SIB superfluous, and led Social Finance to 
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publish a press release on the 24th of April stating that, while they believe the SIB was 
successful in achieving its goals for that far, the service will continue to be funded but 
under different arrangements, and that the third and fourth cohort will not yield any 
outcome payments (Social Finance, 2014). In other words, the first SIB’s lifespan was cut 
short by massive governmental overhaul. Nevertheless, at the same time, the SIB market 
was being promoted in the UK through various policies and events, and SIBs were being 
launched increasingly throughout the world. The frustration regarding the unravelling of 
the first SIB caused only mild and temporary jitters in the SIB environment, and did not 
prevent it from expanding and reaching other corners of the globe. The resistance and 
potency of the SIB phenomenon in spite of some hiccups is telling enough of the appeal 
of this innovative financial arrangement.  
The commissioner for 14 out of the 32 bonds currently in operation in the UK was the 
Department of Work and Pensions, the largest government department in the UK, dealing 
with welfare and pension policy. The second largest commissioner is the Cabinet Office 
Social Outcomes Fund (13), followed closely by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (7), Ministry of Justice (5), and others (Social Finance, 2017). Most 
of the programmes funded are concerned with workforce development (14) and housing 
/ homelessness (9). The structures of all these bonds are slightly or even radically 
different, depending, as mentioned above, on the actors involved, sources of finance, 
methods of delivery, area of operation, etc.  
As of July 2017, there were 42 SIBs in 18 countries outside the UK1 - with the lion’s share 
in the US (14), the Netherlands (7), and Canada (3). Disregarding the fact that there are 
70+ more SIBs under development, these 42 in operation bring the grand total of live SIBs 
to 74. While in the first two years after the launch of the Peterborough Prison SIB only 
one other bond was created, the number increased to 14 in 2012, gradually growing to 22 
in 2013, 36 in 2014, and 66 in 2016. The fact that the number of live SIBs reached 36 in 
2014, even before the first essential assessment of the performance of the Peterborough 
                                                 
1 SIBs are called Pay for Success Bonds in the US and Social Benefit Bonds in Australia. For the purposes 
of this thesis, they will all be called Social Impact Bonds, unless in instances where a specific geographic 
difference is relevant for the analysis and the regional name will be employed.  
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SIB and of the viability of SIBs in general, attests both to the eagerness of governments 
around the world to create such bonds and to the popularity among a myriad of 
international actors to fund the initiative. The readiness of governments to forgo detailed 
evaluations of the risks and implications of using SIBs after enough empirical data would 
become available means that there is an underlying trend that has to be explained. 
SIBs in operation around the world can be broadly divided in eight distinct categories (see 
Figure 2), depending on the social policy objective that the SIB is meant to address (Social 
Finance, 2017): by far, the most common category is the one dealing with workforce 
development (28), tackling an endemic issue in the countries that employed such SIBs 
and especially in the wake of the financial crisis in Europe, when these countries have 
seen youth unemployment (under-25s) soar to historic records (Guardian, 2013b). The 
second most common category is dealing with housing and homelessness, with 13 other 
SIBs, while the third category is the one addressing child and family welfare, with 9 SIBs. 
The other categories are: education and early years (8), health (7), environment and 
sustainability (1), and adults with complex needs (1).  
 
Figure 2. SIBs issue area. Source: Social Finance (2017) 
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In addition to SIBs in developed countries, the model is being adopted in the developing 
world as well, and the social policy that the bonds address is expected to expand to include 
more region-specific issues such as poverty alleviation and health. Indeed, Social Finance, 
an NGO promoting and supporting the social investment market and SIBs, already 
announced in 2014 that it was working on developing two projects that it calls 
Development Impact Bonds (DIBs), one meant to reduce sleeping sickness in Uganda (a 
disease that threatens nine million people), and one meant to conserve the rhino 
population across the south of Africa, in order to safeguard biodiversity and contribute to 
economic development in the region. Similar to SIBs, DIBs only trigger payments if the 
policy outcomes are achieved, and funding comes from domestic or international donors 
and the budget of the state(s) in question, or a combination of both. Furthermore, the Inter-
American Development Bank has announced the creation of a ‘SIB facility’ and the 
provision of $5.3 million in funding for the development of a SIB market that would serve 
specific regional social policy objectives.  
SIBs in the developed world have managed to attract more than $278 million of 
investment from various actors. The US has seen the largest transactions to date: $13.5 
million in the New York State, and $18 million in Massachusetts, with the consequent 
projects operating in the area of prisoner rehabilitation. Also important to note here is that 
the US has managed to attract funding from investment banks such as Goldman Sachs 
and to get Bank of America Merrill Lynch to act as a private placement agent (thus on 
behalf of private investors), as compared to the UK where initial interest has come mainly 
from philanthropic organisations (though that coincided with government strategy too). 
Subsequently, in the UK, investment has come mostly through social investment funds (a 
private fund with social impact purpose but also seeking return on capital committed). 
Australia is an interesting case, given that investment has come through private ancillary 
funds (a form of private charitable trust, that may or may not seek returns on investment, 
or indeed, may operate only on donations, but that is also fully tax deductible on any 
income earned), but capital has notably also come from institutional investors for both 
Australian SIBs, which is a milestone in achieving the proposed rationale for SIBs – 
attracting a broad range of capital market actors, creating a track-record with large 
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institutional investors, and eventually encouraging the emergence of a secondary market 
for social investment.  
SIBs are thus part of the social impact investment market, and as such they are a recent 
phenomenon, much more recent that the advent of the social investment market itself. The 
reason why the focus of this thesis is on SIBs and not the wider market for impact 
investment is that it is the former that has attempted to provide credibility, legitimacy, and 
track record to the latter, especially by sanctioning a new value form in the guise of 
‘blended value’: a combination of reaping financial rewards while creating social impact 
(Emerson, 2003). SIBs do constitute a case of financialisation, at least in so far as they 
themselves represent an innovative financial instrument – a sort of a fixed-term bond with 
equity-like returns (in other words, predicated on performance). They also entail the 
advance of financial actors like investment funds, high net worth individuals, profit-
oriented charities and philanthropies, venture capitalists, etc. into the social policy field. 
These actors are already socialised within the spheres of financial markets, and as such 
they bring financial expertise and access to financial flows and circuits. And while the 
explicit aim of not only financial actors but also of other proponents of the social 
investment market like think tanks, governments, charities, etc. is to create secondary 
markets for SIBs in order to provide investors with exit options and thus increase the 
appeal of investing in them, it is quite clear that what we are seeing is a case of the making 
of a new asset class and the financialisation of at least part of the social policy design and 
delivery field. The aforementioned popularity together with the sustained efforts from the 
part of governments and non-governmental actors makes for a fertile case study to cast a 
fresh eye at the process of financialisation and tease out its workings. 
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3. Research aims 
 
The main aim of this thesis, as mentioned, is to analyse how financial actors and activities 
penetrate non-financial spaces, particularly, in this case, social policy design and delivery. 
This thesis has as its basic premise the fact that it is important to look at these aspects in 
order to overcome a dichotomy circulated by some social activists between finance and 
welfare: because the welfare state has traditionally been framed as providing an 
institutional safety net against market vagaries, finance – the purported realm of pure 
monetary flows – naturally appears as the most ‘complete’ market of all, thus the antipode 
of welfare. This dichotomy is being challenged by the rise of SIBs, a phenomenon whose 
novelty has prevented it, so far, from making its way into the social imaginary. By 
employing financial innovations such as SIBs, which are the result of this process of 
financialisation, as tools for administering social groups, these instruments can reveal 
salient transformations in the practice of government and its relationship with the financial 
realm.  
In order to spell out the consequences of this research programme for political economy 
more generally, this thesis will not only explain the function and reach of financial 
instruments like SIBs, but will also look at the mechanics – or conditions of possibility – 
behind their creation. Given that social policy is usually understood to be the remit of the 
state, this implies looking at the financial system from the vantage point of state-affiliated 
entities that are involved in the creation of social policy as well as the means to achieve 
its objectives. That said, this thesis uses a methodology that seeks to go beyond 
conventional historiography and discuss the emergence of novel instruments and practices 
by looking at the process of worth attribution which was foundational for creation of the 
aforementioned blended value on which the social impact investment market was 
constructed. The argument is that this results in a more holistic approach that considers 
meta-aspects as well (calculative technologies, discourses and ideologies, the formations 
of specific knowledge, cross-societal interaction, governance, etc.).  
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It is important to mention that this research steers clear of making normative judgements 
of whether or not the state utilising financial markets in order to achieve its goals is a 
positive or negative aspect. For instance, it is hard to deny that the expansion of markets 
for mortgages and the ultimate creation of the mortgage-backed security (MBS) has had 
beneficial consequences in making housing affordable or even possible for a great deal a 
people in the US and, to some extent, beyond. At the same time, the ensuing ballooning 
of markets in MBS and their integration in more arcane financial instruments such as 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), CDO squared, or synthetic CDOs, together with 
the expanding demand for extending ever more mortgages in order to satisfy the appetite 
for high-yielding assets, led to the creation of a market in mortgages beyond the limits of 
sustainability which eventually burst and led to the credit crunch of 2007-8 (A. Milne, 
2009; Schwartz, 2009; Tett, 2010). This tension between origin and consequence, as 
mentioned above, led people like Volcker to claim that the creation of a by-now almost 
ancient instrument, the ATM, was the peak of financial innovation and was more valuable 
than any of the aforementioned financial novelties. The issue with that statement is that 
there was nothing inherently programmed in the creation of the MBS that would have 
implacably led it to have the effects it had during the crash of 2008, and that in between 
the two points in time, a cornucopia of both inherent potentialities but, most of all, 
exogenous factors – actors, institutions, ideas, politics etc. – worked in tandem to produce 
the sort of consequences we have seen during the financial crisis. These factors cannot be 
simply ignored or brushed aside – they have to be explained. This research is thus a work 
of genealogy that attempts to link elements evolving in time with causal explanations for 
their emergence and development. To the extent that such a project can be devoid of 
normative judgements, this research will attempt to strictly subscribe to that standard.  
In light of the above, the research question can be formulated as follows:  
What are the mechanisms of financialisation of social policy design and delivery? 
As will be explained below, drawing on various insights from the scholarships on 
financialisation, social studies of finance, and valuation studies, this study will attempt to 
answer this question by looking at it through the lens of the process of value creation and 
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worth-attribution in the field of social investment. The assumption here is that, like any 
other economic activity, social investment and the financial instruments it yields are 
concerned with the creation of a particular type of value which comes to define the field 
as such. In this case, it is not only about the quantity of value created, but about the quality, 
or, in other words, about the kind of value, as an ideal type (Cahnman, 1965), that is 
involved in this context. Some examples of conventional ideal types of value include 
artistic value, moral value, religious value, and, of course, financial value. The important 
thing to note here is that, whilst it may be easy to intuit and identify the kind of value that 
is present in a specific situation, this does not mean that that value is self-explanatory. 
Rather, as it will be explained later on, any identifiable presence of value hides an 
underlying process of value creation: not just in the quantitative sense, but, as argued 
above, in a qualitative sense. Any value, in other words, is the expression of a process of 
value construction, and this process involves, as pointed out by the emergent scholarship 
of valuation studies (Beckert & Aspers, 2010; Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013; Kjellberg & 
Mallard, 2013; Muniesa, 2011), the mobilisation of a socio-technical infrastructure 
supporting it. It is this infrastructure that explains the emergence of a new phenomenon 
like that of social investment. Therefore, this thesis will adopt a valuation framework – 
on which more below – in tackling the subject at hand. 
The choice of words ‘socio-technical infrastructure’ is not arbitrary: it is meant to 
emphasise that the valuation processes occurring here are composed, as elsewhere, of an 
inter-relational dimension, employing a particular set of tools, and unfolding as a process 
or ‘in action’. This pragmatist understanding of the worth attribution (Dewey, 1939) 
process reveals that it passes through a few stages: more exploratory at first, more 
systematising mid-process, and potentially political towards the end. These stages could 
even overlap at the margins, but what is important is that they contribute to rendering a 
new value form legitimate, public, accessible, and eventually appealing. Applying this to 
the field of social investment, this thesis thus aims to show that the process of 
financialisation of social policy occurs via six stages, which can be divided into three parts 
depending on their nature: 
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1. A more exploratory part comprised of negotiation and selection, where the 
meaning and purpose of a new value form is negotiated, followed by the 
selection of a slice of social reality where the new value form should be adopted, 
implemented, or circulated. 
The creation of the value form on which the social impact investment market rests 
required, at first, significant brainstorming regarding the manner in which it should 
present itself and the area(s) in which it could be created, applied, or evidenced. These 
first steps required a great deal of discussion and debate between various stakeholders, 
and in this respect the field benefitted from emerging changes in the area of public policy. 
Indeed, the literature on public administration (Hood, 1991; Flynn, 2001; Hughes, 2003; 
S. Osborne, 2006, 2010) has long pointed that there has been a discontinuity in the practice 
of administering public policy and that several succeeding frameworks can be identified: 
around the 1970s, the old hierarchical model was replaced by the new public management 
model, which has increasingly been destabilised around the beginning of the new 
millennium, leading to the emergence of what some call the new public governance 
(NPG) model (S. Osborne, 2010). While the debates surrounding the accuracy of the NPG 
model continue within the public administration literature, it will be shown that the 
initiative to create blended value benefitted from the infusion of network-like modes of 
interaction which ensued NPG reforms. In this, cross-societal platforms managed to 
negotiate the nature of the new value form and decide upon and select the area and 
instrument that would serve as a target for its development – the Peterborough Prison SIB.   
2. A more systematising part consisting of ordering and abstraction, where 
ordering the interaction of actors participating in the creation of the new value 
form is decided upon, after which the methods for abstracting the value creation 
are established, in order to provide evidential data.  
The development of SIBs required the creation of a blueprint for actor interaction, and the 
manner in which this was done was by building on the same patterns set up by the NPG 
reforms. As such, it will be shown that an SIB programme was deemed to be more 
inclusive of the majority of the stakeholders, including the target population of the social 
projects delivered, and at the same time more democratic, in that the ordering of actors 
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did not preclude, but on the contrary encourage the creation of feedback loops and 
continuous assessment. Furthermore, a fundamental element that was perceived as crucial 
to the construction of SIBs, not least because financial return was predicated on it, was 
the creation of means of abstracting data from value creation. Furthermore, this was 
doubly important, because one of the stated rationales for SIBs is that they make possible 
preventative programmes, something that is purportedly beyond the abilities of cash-
strapped governments to address, and this requires efficient methods for accounting for 
value creation (Young Foundation, 2011).  
3. A public act of standardisation, which could include the creation of 
classifications, benchmarks, and performance indicators in an accessible, 
homogeneous, and transparent fashion, followed by an essentially political act 
of institutionalisation through the adoption of national and international acts or 
treaties for entrenchment and promotion of the new value form.  
Lastly, in order to nurture the appeal of SIBs and the social impact investment market 
more generally, a public-political act of standardisation and institutionalisation was 
undertaken. The necessity for these kinds of acts is explained not only by the attraction 
that accessibility and transparency bring, but also by the capacity they create to easily 
choose the most appropriate framework for constructing SIB programmes, as well as the 
ability to commensurate and rank various projects and channel funding in the most high-
yielding among them, something that is presumably appealing to social investors. What 
also helps here is that institutionalisation, in the case of the impact investment sector, was 
spearheaded and supported by the UK government, who not only entrenched the new 
value form in a British Public Act, but also fostered its global adoption through 
international political channels. When it comes to social impact investment, the state – 
particularly the British state – acts as an active actor, quintessential to the creation of 
blended value and the birth and growth of the field of impact investment, through the 
establishment of task-forces and networks of social action filled with actors drawn from 
across the social sector: government, business, charity, civil society, etc. (Nicholls, Paton, 
& Emerson, 2015), but also through essentially the hijacking of social investment into a 
political agenda. As such, the case of social investment acts to complement studies of 
financialisation which under-emphasise or indeed ignore the role of the state in the active 
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creation, promotion, and spread of financial instruments and markets. This is an important 
but overlooked pillar of the valuation processes through which financialisation occurs in 
the field of social investment.  
It is, therefore, the aim of this thesis to employ a valuation framework and show how the 
financialisation of social policy may occur via these avenues. This, it will be argued, can 
paint a more encompassing picture of financialisation as not simply a process of financial 
expansion engulfing state sectors, but as a process of co- or multi-production, involving 
a novel interaction structure, multi-polar input origins, and the creation of new calculative 
devices which resemble but are not identical to and go beyond traditional financial forms 
of valuation. This way, it can be shown that valuation processes characterising social 
value creation, far from resembling mainstream financial valuation, are governed by 
specific tools and practices that indeed allow ‘the social’ to be integrated into a logic of 
financial accumulation (thus financialisation), but only whilst creating and integrating 
non-financialised spaces of valuation.  
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4. Methodology 
 
This study uses qualitative methods to answer its main question and pursue its stated aims. 
Whereas quantitative methods seem to be quite self-explanatory in that they entail 
analysis of numerical data by employing statistical techniques, what exactly passes as 
qualitative appears to be identifiable only by contrast with the former. The absence of 
consensus and sufficient guidelines leads Klotz, for instance, to assert that “qualitative 
methods are somehow linked to meaning” (Klotz, 2011, p. 3). But this seems to point to 
the aim of a specific research rather than implying specific toolkits, as statistical analysis 
does for quantitative methods. Furthermore, Barkin points out that the term ‘qualitative 
methods’ is utilised most in pedagogical context, and there it suffers from many 
shortcomings, ranging from arbitrary selection and lack of consistency to marginalisation 
(Barkin, 2011). The divide between quantitative and qualitative not only does not hold 
(due to methods that are difficult to place, such as narrative game theory, network 
analysis, etc.), but is also politically charged (discrediting qualitative methods) and 
counter-productive. Prakash, on the other hand, while acknowledging these shortcomings, 
argues that we should keep utilising the term ‘qualitative methods’ as a working category 
that makes sense of a reality not easily graspable, and open it up to pluralist views and 
approaches (Prakash, 2011). 
With that caveat in mind, this study will use the lens of the valuation framework – as 
mentioned above and as detailed in a self-standing chapter below – to look at the 
emergence of state-sponsored financial instruments. The case of social impact bonds 
constitutes a fertile terrain for exploring this for two main reasons. First, it constitutes a 
new practice that sits at the border between ‘hostile worlds’ (Zelizer, 2000), that is, 
between the two value imperatives of doing good and doing well, which have to be 
somehow reconciled in order for it to function. Second, and related to the first one, the 
existing infrastructure for solving the dual value issue – for instance, valuation models 
and tools at the disposal of finance professionals – was not immediately applicable to the 
field, which opened up the possibility, or rather necessity, of having to elaborate a new 
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valuation infrastructure specifically designed to be suited for this field. Assuming this 
valuation framework, the methodological choice made here is to critically analyse and 
reconstruct the manner in which the socio-technical infrastructure of a new value form 
was developed in the case of SIBs, through following the aforementioned stages. 
Together, these would provide a rounded picture of the forces and process behind the 
emergence of this particular type of state-sponsored financial instruments, as well as the 
mechanics and conditions of possibility of their operation.  
In order to undertake this task, I have collected an assortment of sources, including policy 
documents, white papers, research evaluations from state-affiliated and external agencies, 
news pieces, third-sector reports, and secondary literature. The fact that there was an 
identifiable across the board enthusiasm for the idea of combining financial with social 
return, as well as significant state involvement in the process, means that the advance of 
the social investment sector and the launch of the first social impact bond was much 
mediatised and widely as well as publicly covered, making investigating the subject at 
hand and reconstructing its development relatively easily accessible. However, given its 
novelty, not many detailed attempts at putting the story together and tracing the birth of 
the social investment sector and the intermeshing of finance and social policy delivery it 
implied were made. This thesis comes to fill this gap.  
In order to identify all the potential publically available items documenting the period 
prior to the release of the first social impact bond and up to present, I have done a ProQuest 
search for all documents containing ‘social impact bonds’ between the 2000-2017. 
Employing a rapid review method, I have grouped the resulting documents by their 
originating source; the resulting sources were the following: governmental agencies (e.g. 
UK Ministry of Justice, Big Lottery Fund, The US National Advisory Board on Impact 
Investment), government-affiliated agencies dedicated to social finance (e.g. Social 
Finance UK/US, Big Society Capital, Council on Social Action, Social Investment Task 
Force, G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce), finance companies (e.g. Goldman Sachs, 
JP Morgan, Triodos Bank), charities, philanthropic organisations, and social enterprises 
(e.g. The Rand Corporation, The King’s Fund, Bridges Ventures, Social Enterprise UK, 
The Rockefeller Foundation,  New Philanthropy Capital, Roberts Enterprise Development 
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Fund, The Young Foundation), online resources for impact investing professionals 
(Impact Reporting and Investment Standards, Global Impact Investing Network, 
ImpactBase), third sector and NGOs (New Economics Foundation, Third Sector Research 
Centre), and academia, business schools, and other coverage (journal articles, blogs, news 
pieces, and research from sector-affiliated business schools, e.g. Harvard Business School 
Social Enterprise Initiative, Oxford Impact Investing Programme, and Cambridge 
Institute for Sustainability Leadership).   
In accord with the valuation framework, reconstructing the socio-technical infrastructure 
on which the financialisation of social policy delivery was founded and tracing the 
valuation process which supported it implied identifying the manner in which value was 
defined, discussed, and assessed in this setting, by utilising the aforementioned list of 
documents and sources. But beyond this, several other aspects were added, which rounded 
up the picture of the emergence of state-sponsored financial instruments and provided 
some context. Putting together all the information contained in the sources was done 
according to the abductive method (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012), which is a process 
typically guiding empirically-based theory construction that rejects the inductive method 
and relies on the fostering of surprises, puzzles, and anomalies, which are then reflected 
back onto existing scholarship and systematically-reviewed documentation. These 
approaches were thus complementary, and they worked to constantly inform each other 
and build both a diachronic narrative of the field of social impact investment as it is 
exemplified by SIBs and a synchronic explanation of the conditions of possibility of the 
financialisation of the field of social policy. 
Finally, a few considerations regarding the appropriateness of the chosen research design 
and methods to the argument made here are in order. The choice of the social impact 
investing sector in the UK, particularly SIBs, as a case study for investigating the 
processes behind the advance of financial forms of valuation in non-financial realms has 
been made on the grounds that it represents an explicit attempt to solve social issues not 
by appealing to cash-strapped government-funded programmes but by tapping into and 
catalysing the so-called ‘power of finance’ (Cameron, 2013). The latter is not taken to 
mean simply the monetary value of capital markets, but it is also supposed to comprise 
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financial methodologies, instruments, expertise, actors, imaginaries, and so on. By 
employing a combination of these in sectors usually relegated to branches of the state (in 
this case, social policy design and delivery), social impact investment becomes an avenue 
for financial forms of valuation to seep into non-financial(ised) realms. And while the 
practice of being attuned to social implications has indeed been a feature of financial 
investment under a form or another throughout history, it is only in the UK since the early 
2000s that this has become a state-sponsored strategy of actively pursuing positive social 
impact through for-profit investing with an eye for financial instruments such as SIBs to 
become truly transformative for the quest of pursuing of social policy objectives. These 
factors render the chosen case study a pertinent one for investigating the mechanisms 
behind financialisation.  
Furthermore, the manner in which this investigation has been undertaken – by utilising 
the valuation framework – also has a few advantages over other frameworks. As Chapter 
1 will discuss, much of the literature on financialisation is loath to explain the mechanisms 
behind its expansion. This has to do with methodological shortcomings, especially the 
fact that it construes financialisation as mostly a quantitative rather than a qualitative 
process – the expansion of financial profits, of financial debt, of share buy-backs, of 
derivatives, etc. In other words, financialisation, in these accounts, is simply ‘more of the 
same’. The advantage of a valuation framework is that it looks at the underlying 
infrastructure that makes this possible, and investigates the processes by which things that 
could not previously be inserted in financial circuits due to their cultural or social 
significance suddenly become amenable to be sources of capital accumulation or 
integration in financial dynamics. Moreover, given that it builds on insights coming from 
Actor Network Theory and Social Studies of Finance, it is particularly attuned to non-
human agency and thus takes into account dimensions such as materialities, values, 
relations, orders, systems, and so on, which it mobilises in order to unpack processes that 
are sometimes understood too narrowly or mechanistically. This means it can grasp the 
process of financialisation in a well-rounded and more encompassing manner than other 
frameworks. These features render the valuation framework a particularly fitting one for 
applying it to the case of the social investment sector and investigating how new facets of 
financialisation generate changes around the concept and practice of financial valuation.   
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5. Outline 
 
This introductory chapter has sought to set the scene for the subsequent investigation by 
outlining the main argument, providing a market context to the topic at hand, and 
describing the aims of this research. Finally, the choice of methodology which will be 
employed in the study was outlined and explained.  The first part will look at what is 
missed in conventional accounts of financialisation and will attempt to provide a blueprint 
for how some of these shortcomings could be remedied. Hence, the first chapter discusses 
the issue of financialisation. Since SIBs involve the use of financial instruments to fund 
social policy programmes and since this has generally been construed as an instance of 
financialisation, an investigation of the conventional understanding of the drivers of 
financialisation is warranted. Thus, this chapter will provide a review of how the latter is 
conceptualised by various strands of scholarship and what kind of perspectives have been 
developed upon the expansion and increasing presence of the financial sector in more and 
more aspects of daily life, as well as upon the institutional shift towards finance’s 
expansion.  
Financialisation has ramifications upon the social policy field as well, and some scholars 
have picked up on this aspect as well, particularly by focusing on social impact 
investment. The latter will be shown to constitute indeed a fertile case study for exploring 
the timely topic of the nexus between welfare, finance, and the state. That said, social 
investment is still an under-researched topic, with the few extant studies, as mentioned 
before, heavily skewed towards construing it indeed as an instance of financialisation, 
albeit mostly in the sense that financial expansion comes to engulf parts of social policy 
delivery, resulting in ‘more of the same’ rather than a singular phenomenon in and of 
itself. That constitutes a missed opportunity, because social investment is indeed 
illustrative of the mechanisms through which finance creates new horizons of capital 
accumulation, which are not self-explanatory and must be unpacked. As will be argued, 
financialisation advances via a specific socio-technical infrastructure underpinning the 
creation of a new value form, and nothing guarantees this infrastructure will be identical 
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in all instances in which financialisation is identifiable. This issue of value creation is 
missed by the literature analysing the financialisation of social policy. Thus, by adopting 
a valuation perspective, the infrastructure can be deconstructed and a more profound and 
detailed understanding of the drivers and channels of financialisation can be outlined.  
Moving forward, chapter two lays out the theoretical perspective of the thesis. Since many 
scholars simply assumed that financialisation equals the expansion of financial valuation 
upon non-financial spaces, an analysis of what this would look like is laid out. Mainstream 
approaches to financial valuation are thus discussed, as is the historical space which these 
are supposedly meant to engulf. With regards to the latter, financialisation had to contend 
with a space designated as ‘the social’, which was ‘discovered’ and integrated into the 
exercise of governing, but not simply as a naked mould, but as a space with specific 
qualities and regularities amenable to knowledge. Indeed, around the turn of the 19th 
century, a combination of grass-roots initiatives and top-down mobilisation gave birth to 
a form of knowledge that construed ‘the social’ as an entity with particular and immanent 
dynamics, which can be grasped through statistical knowledge and can be manipulated to 
suit various policy objectives. Tentative and early policies such as accident and 
unemployment insurance constitute not only the backbone of the welfare state but also 
the antecedent of applying quantitative methods and metrics upon the social in order to 
integrate it into a logic of evidence and change. The advance of finance came to face a 
dimension of the state that already displayed a significant degree of complexity and a 
multi-faceted nature characterised by specific regularities, tendencies, and risks. Financial 
forms of valuation prove to be insufficient a means for capturing the value dynamics 
involved here. 
Since many scholars of financialisation thus ignored the process of value creation that 
underpins the emergence of social investment and the financialisation of the field of social 
policy, a framework for investigating this process is developed in this chapter, particularly 
by formulating the specific steps that are undertaken in the valuation process underpinning 
the entrenchment of the impact investment. These are teased out, organised, and theorised 
from the approaches put forth by some authors coming from a background in economic 
sociology, economic anthropology, and social studies of finance, which emphasise the 
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valuation processes occurring in specific activities or domains as the source for 
understanding the manner in which particular types of values – be they aesthetic, moral, 
financial, etc. – are being constructed. Therefore, looking at the financialisation of social 
policy through this lens is the main conceptual choice of this thesis, and is outlined in this 
chapter.  
The second part constitutes the main result of the application of the theoretical framework 
upon the subject at hand. Three chapters are dedicated to deconstructing the valuation 
processes that made the financialisation of social policy possible, divided as per the 
outline mentioned in the research aims section: the exploratory stages: negotiation and 
selection; the systematising stages: ordering and abstraction; and the public-political 
stages: standardisation and institutionalisation. Taken together, these chapters provide an 
account of the financialisation of the social policy field that is inclusive of the worth 
attribution process and does not treat value in the field of social investment as simply 
given and measurable using the tools of mainstream financial valuation.  
Hence, chapter three looks at the first steps made by finance’s advance in the field of 
social policy design and delivery. Before everything else, the nature of the new value form 
that would constitute a new source of capital accumulation needed to be established. What 
was of particular importance here was the gradual but ostensibly inexorable opening up 
of public policy to new forms of interaction displaying network-like features, which in 
turn led to the creation of new valuation processes predicated not on centralised 
administration or competition, as was characteristic of Classical Public Administration 
and of New Public Management respectively, but on negotiation and selection, features 
which were stemming from New Public Governance reforms. Coupled with the 
introduction of inputs originating from cross-societal sectors, this led to the bestowal of 
power to new actors to have a say in matters of social value construction.   
In consequence, at the initiative of the UK New Labour Governments of 2000-2010, two 
government-sponsored task forces, The Social Investment Task Force (SITF) and The 
Council on Social Action (CoSA), were set up to lay the groundwork for the creation of 
a new market in social impact investment. Their particular remits, though, were different: 
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SITF was charged with nurturing trans-societal collaboration as a basis for the social 
investment field, while CoSA was tasked with catalysing social action throughout society. 
Despite that, they engaged with the issue of conceiving a dedicated value form for the 
market in a similar manner: by embarking on a dual process of negotiation and selection. 
SITF was more hesitant than CoSA, and while at first the tide was turning into the 
direction of considering social value creation to be best serviced by local community 
development, the resolution of the negotiation process pointed to co-production with the 
help of government agencies and global investors as better suited. CoSA, on the other 
hand, negotiated the meaning and scope of social action and concluded that the ‘one-to-
one’ formula maximises social action creation, but only when coupled with an innovative 
funding arrangement – the SIB. The two task forces then joined forces and embarked on 
a selection process, which was meant to designate a social area that would best be fitted 
for applying the new initiative and exemplifying the new anatomy and dynamics of the 
new value form. The selected target was thus agreed: youth reoffending. In 2010, together 
with the institutions and organisation that hailed from these task forces, HM Treasury and 
The Ministry of Justice launched the world’s first SIB at Peterborough Prison. The 
processes of negotiation and selection, therefore, were the preliminary steps in a valuation 
process that set the stage for the financialisation of social policy design and delivery in 
the UK.  
Chapter four looks at the systematising stages of the valuation process that led to the 
creation of blended value: ordering and abstraction. While at the time of the Pilot SIB’s 
launch there already were quite a few scattered social investment projects, these were very 
local and rather subdued, thus not transformative enough to shake up social policy as such. 
This is where the idea of SIBs came in, which were anointed with governmental support 
and were supposed to represent the state of the art in terms of social investment. So, in 
order for SIBs to become an entrenched practice, a blueprint for their operation was 
conceived. This involved outlining the steps for the ordering of the particular actors 
involved in a SIB arrangement and the manner in which they were supposed to interact, 
as well as devising methods for abstracting the quality of impact created, in order to link 
it to financial return and thus achieve blended value creation.  
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Mirroring New Public Governance reforms, the blueprints for SIBs are shown to display 
an array of trans-societal actors, ordered in a network-like fashion. Among the most 
important interaction patterns, horizontality, collaboration, and continuous feedback 
loops are perhaps the most important ones. These patterns are a sine qua non of the 
creation of blended value, which presumes an ideal of equal partnership between cross-
societal actors ahead of the social policy act and a democratic ethos of equal worth of all 
the inputs coming from stakeholders. That said, this chapter will also attempt to tease out 
how this ideal belied some hidden limitations and potential power imbalances. But despite 
that, SIBs still represented a novel arrangement which rests on multipolar inputs and 
networked feedback mechanisms.  
Given the complexity of the ordering of SIBs and of the flow of inputs that go into social 
value creation, a need for accountability surfaced. This translated into the adoption of a 
mechanism for abstraction, which involved a conceptual delineation of the field of impact 
investment from that of the sister field of socially responsible investment (SRI) and a 
conceptual clarification of the notion of ‘impact’ together with the elaboration of methods 
for its quantification. The distinction between the two fields will be shown to turn on the 
approach to social value creation: whereas SRI negatively screens pernicious investments 
and creates value indirectly through positive externalities, impact investment actively 
engages with social value generation. Connected with this is the fact that while both are 
mission-driven, it is only the second that possesses a real metrological universe to measure 
impact and create transparency and accountability. Furthermore, it is only the second that 
is truly institutionally innovative, in that it is accompanied by the creation of novel 
organisations, instruments, and markets like social enterprises, SIBs, and social stock 
exchanges. Conceptual delineation was therefore foundational to the market itself, but so 
was conceptual clarification. That said, at first the latter did not result in an unambiguous 
description of the notion of ‘impact’, but rather in a working definition that nonetheless 
allowed for sufficient flexibility to make social investment programmes operational. It 
was only in 2012-2013, as this chapter will show, that a more rigorous and quasi-binding 
definition was provided.  
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Last but not least, this abstraction processes resulted in the creation of a host of metrics 
and frameworks for calculating social value creation, though at this stage they were rather 
fraught with a specific degree of uncertainty and contingency, not least due to their sheer 
number, their selection process, and their continuous and opaque mushrooming. Despite 
that, they were crucial for tying financial returns to social impact and thus attracting 
investors to fund and leverage social programmes. Furthermore, they are essential for 
understanding the process of the financialisation of the social policy field, as metrics are 
not simply picked from a financial repertoire or replicated identically; rather, they are 
created endogenously and they encapsulate social value creation, not financial. In other 
words, they are indeed created as finance advances in the field of social policy, but they 
are not the same so the tools of mainstream financial valuation. They are, on the contrary, 
hybrid spaces of abstraction, which represent, crystallise, and preserve social value. In 
order to illustrate this, this chapter also takes a look at Social Return on Investment 
(SROI), perhaps the most popular and encompassing calculative framework.  
Chapter five tackles the last two stages in the valuation process that led to the creation of 
blended value as the foundation of the social investment market and thus of the 
financialisation of the field of social policy: standardisation and institutionalisation. These 
two were the last two steps that were separating impact investment from becoming a truly 
transformative public policy practice as well as a legitimate market in itself. The first had 
to do with the standardisation of metrics, the latter with the institutionalisation of impact 
investment through law and through international bodies.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the rather haphazard mushrooming of metric 
frameworks hindered rather than aided the market in its expansion, which was indeed 
growing, but at a decreasing rate. One of the reasons for this was the fact that it did so 
without a sufficient degree of transparency, accountability, and commensurability. In 
order to surpass these limitations, investors pleaded for the standardisation of the 
collection of social value evidence and of the performance of social enterprises in their 
endeavours. This chapter will show that as a result, two such vehicles were created: a 
reporting standard (IRIS) and a ranking system (GIIRS). The first was meant to solve the 
problem of commensurability of social programmes, the second of rating of social 
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enterprises. Together, IRIS and GIIRS contributed in dispelling the heterogeneity of 
metrics and increasing their transparency and accessibility via online depositors and 
organisations tasked with making them available.  
Once standardisation was completed, the scene was set for the institutionalisation of the 
social investment market and its foundational blended value form, which occurred 
through the launch of the Peterborough Prison SIB. This was perceived as necessary for 
creating credibility and track record, and anointing the social investment market as a 
viable and appealing strategy for capital accumulation. But instead of consisting in a 
simple market launch, this chapter will show that the SIB project got essentially hijacked 
and embedded into a political programme – The Big Society Agenda. The latter was part 
of the Conservative – Lib Dem Coalition that came to power as a result of the 2010 
election in the UK. Though benefitting from a decade of NPG reforms put into place by 
the outgoing New Labour Government, this agenda was meant to be in direct 
contradistinction with the latter and rested on a revamped understanding of the role of the 
state in society. The ethos of social investment displayed many similarities and it was 
especially fitting with the desire of the Coalition to usher in an ‘age of austerity’, and was 
therefore made part and parcel of The Big Society Agenda. Thus the institutionalisation 
of social investment received an ideological push, and it resulted not only in the much 
mediatised launch of the Pilot SIB, but also in the signing into law of the Public Services 
(Social Value) Act of March 2012, which required anyone commissioning public services 
to conform to the principles and thrust of the blended value proposition.  
This chapter will also show how institutionalisation did not stop in the British arena, but 
also took a global turn, when, at the G8 summit in 2013, the UK Prime Minister 
announced three more developments: a tax break for social investments, a Social Stock 
Exchange, and local community funding. At the same time, another platform was 
announced, The Social Impact Investment Task Force (SIITF), whose remit was to extend 
the global scope and depth of the social investment market. This was succeeded, in August 
2015, by The Global Social Impact Investment Steering Group (GSIISG), which opened 
to countries beyond the G8. Consequently, social investment gradually made its way on 
the global political-economic agenda and was institutionalised as a legitimate practice of 
42 
 
capital accumulation through social value creation. Last but not least, this chapter also 
provides a more detailed analysis of the Pilot SIB, as this was indeed one of the turning 
points in the valuation work undertaken over a period of around a decade. 
The last chapter is the conclusion, which reflects upon the findings and examines to what 
extent they have answered the research question and have satisfied the aims of the study. 
Secondly, it discusses how the research has contributed to wider debates about states and 
markets, finance and welfare, financial innovation, and others. The issue of 
financialisation occurring via the creation and proliferation of hybrid spaces of valuation 
is singled out as one of the most important findings that goes against the conventional 
financialisation narrative. That said, some other insights are also teased out. Finally, the 
study draws to a close by attempting to provide some suggestions for how to take this 
research further. 
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1. The advent of finance  
 
1. Introduction 
 
As this thesis comes to light, the shadow of the greatest financial crisis modern capitalism 
has experienced since the 1930s still looms in the background. A decade has passed since 
the money market credit crunch of August 2007 and the full-blown meltdown of the 
following year, and studies analysing the origins and the consequences of the crisis have 
not stopped pouring in. The economic meltdown itself constituted also a crisis at an 
epistemological level, best epitomised by the answer received by HM The Queen of 
England asking at a visit to the London School of Economics in November 2008 how 
come no economist saw the credit crunch coming: it “was principally a failure of the 
collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to 
understand the risks to the system as a whole” (in Harvey, 2011, p. 235).  
The widespread narrative of complexity in the finance industry nonetheless provided a 
strong theoretical challenge to the neoclassical understanding of crises as exogenous 
shocks to an otherwise equilibrium-based and self-correcting system (Datz, 2013), and 
helped bring into the limelight various heterodox perspectives on the workings of the 
financial system and its institutional structure. Above all, it surfaced that by the time the 
real estate bubble reached its apex in 2006, there had been profound changes in the 
economic conduct of non-financial enterprises, banks and households. The manner in 
which these entities had become entangled in the financial sector, together with the 
predominance and increasing weight of the financial services in economic activities 
overall, were unprecedented.  
These changes, most evident in US society but transcending borders, have been put 
together under the umbrella term financialisation. Even though it is a contested concept, 
the debates regarding financialisation are telling of the increasing importance finance 
plays across the board, and thus a discussion of the ways it has been employed in the 
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relevant literature is conducive to a better understanding of not only of the sort of analysis 
it fostered, but also of the aspects various approaches have been able to grasp and 
emphasise as well as of the gaps that are still to be filled. This section thus first takes a 
brief look at the institutional and historical structure that constituted the backbone upon 
which financialisation came to develop, moving afterwards to the theoretical perspectives 
that this phenomenon stirred. Finally, welfare and social policy are brought back on the 
agenda, noting on the one hand the increasing interest in the link between the two, but 
also, on the other hand, the lack of sufficient literature and deep engagement with it and 
especially with the related phenomenon of social impact investment.  
In order to assess what the case of social impact investment reveals about the mechanisms 
of the expansion of finance into non-financial spaces, an approach to financialisation is 
required. Increasingly, financialisation has come to the fore as one of the most important 
political-economic developments of the past half a century. Depending on the 
interpretation, the expansion of finance is seen to have produced wide-ranging 
consequences, whether beneficial or detrimental, from the economic sector itself to the 
daily psychic life of people. Unsurprisingly, scholarship on the phenomenon has been 
gathering pace, though the process of keeping up with the developments is easier said than 
done. The field of social policy or welfare more generally is a case in point: there are not 
too many studies dedicated to untangling the mechanisms and dynamics through which 
finance expands in this area, though a few can be identified and will be discussed below. 
More often than not, the connection is made indirectly, through the channel of 
neoliberalism or neoliberalisation, and it ends up consolidating a seeming dichotomy 
between finance and welfare: neoliberalism, with its moral adherence to the principles of 
individual and market responsibility, has an inherent aversion to any form of state-centred 
direction or action; social policy is an example of the latter, therefore it should be 
abolished through privatisation; privatisation, and the subsequent integration into market 
dynamics, creates money flows, which can then be integrated in financial circuits, creating 
thus avenues for financial accumulation (Fine, 2012). Finance, therefore, comes in to take 
the place which was traditionally the remit of state-funded programmes, but it does so 
with a vengeance, given that the potential consequences of neoliberalisation 
(unemployment, increasing unaffordability of education, the loss of healthcare insurance, 
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etc.) put another strain on what traditionally was social policy. But regardless of the 
verdict, this way of reasoning obscures the direct mechanisms through which finance 
seeps into and engulfs non-financial spaces like the social policy field. The ways in which 
social impact investment is construed in the literature, as will be detailed below, 
exemplifies this.  
Part of the problem is the idea of ‘financialisation’ itself. By and large, there is no 
agreement regarding what the term actually signifies, other than the self-evident fact that 
it is a process that has finance as its main actor and/or engine and that it applies to 
dimensions that are not inherent to what is traditionally understood as finance. The 
intermeshing between finance and social policy, and the emergence of social impact 
bonds, for example, could thus qualify as an instance of the financialisation of social 
policy. But to construe a relationship between finance and non-financial elements has not 
always been such an easy, or indeed easily conceivable, task. Therefore, this section will 
review the literature on financialisation and place the scope of this research within that 
body of literature, while at the same time providing a historiographical snapshot of this 
rise to prominence of finance and the conventional understanding of what foundations 
made financialisation possible, before finally turning to the manner in which the 
increasing intertwining of finance and the pursuit of social policy design and delivery is 
generally construed by the scholarship. This chapter finds that even though the literature 
on financialisation more generally is multifarious and divided, the (admittedly scarce) 
studies that look at social impact investing as a form of the financialisation of social policy 
design and delivery inevitably understand it as a form of creating new fronts for capital 
accumulation, but in doing so they disregard the mechanics behind this process and so 
dismiss the ramifications of this form of financialisation, assuming it is simply another 
instance of the advance of financial forms of valuation in non-financial realms. In other 
words, they assume away endogenous developments that complicate the story of the 
advent of social impact investment.   
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2. Financialisation. Precursors and debates 
 
1. Financialisation. Institutional and historical precursors 
 
The historical accounts of the transformation that the global economy suffered in the wake 
of the rise of finance are diverse, but most studies place the outset of financialisation in 
the US of the 1970s, amidst a context of perceived decline in American economic 
prowess2. Thus, the first OPEC embargo in 1973 that triggered price hikes in oil resulted 
in ballooning the costs for manufacturing and industrial production at the same time as 
channelling profits to oil firms and oil exporting countries. Aggressive competition from 
the newly rising powerhouses of commodity production, Germany and Japan, together 
with the post-World War II strengthening of labour power, which limited the capacity of 
firms to reduce wages, spelled the end to US industrial leadership. The aftermath of this 
situation – stagflation, that is, an environment of low growth and increased inflation – led 
to firm mobilisation for improving economic conditions through deregulation, tax reform, 
minimal state regulation, etc. The policies adopted have been subsumed under the 
aforementioned ideology of neoliberalism, though the coherence of a conscious 
ideological thrust on the part of US policy makers is contested (Peck, 2010; Tomaskovic-
Devey & Lin, 2011). Plausibly, though, heterogeneous actors ranging from academics and 
business lobbies to think tanks and politicians created a set of practices that were 
retrospectively noticeably pro-market (supporting the ability of firms to self-regulate in 
an environment devoid of or minimal in government oversight) and anti-state (Ban, 2016).  
                                                 
2 Most, if not all, historiographical studies identify the US as the birthplace of financialisation, and subsume 
the UK case under the homogenised umbrella experience of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, assuming the British 
course is for all intents and purposes similar, if not identical. That said, there are a few studies that emphasise 
distinctiveness, at least in so far as they underline the role of the City of London in this process (see, e.g., 
Burn, 2006; Lysandrou, Nesvetailova, & Palan, 2017; Mollan & Michie, 2012; Palan, 2015). This section 
will only review the first type of studies, as these are the ones that are most concerned with the drivers and 
sources of financialisation writ large.  
49 
 
Stagflation created difficulties in the US economy that were addressed by political 
authorities in two prevailing ways: deregulating domestic financial markets and reaching 
out to global capital markets for the funding of the fiscal crisis of the early 1980s 
(Krippner, 2012). What led to the adoption of the 1980 Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, generally considered one of the “most profound 
deregulatory actions” (Tomaskovic-Devey & Lin, 2011, p. 544) of the US Congress, is 
interpreted in two different fashions: one that has to do with immediate, pressing issues 
that the US government was facing and had to resolve – inflation – and another one that 
has to do with long term developments in the structure of US banking and finance sectors.  
With regards to the former perspective, the inflation-ridden environment of the 1960s and 
1970s was characterised by a generalised belief that market actors normally live in a 
credit-scarce economy, and that the role of policy makers is to redistribute capital to 
adequate sectors (Krippner, 2012). The problem with inflation was that it was diminishing 
the purchasing power and savings of households, which increasingly joined forces to, 
ironically, demand deregulation on interest rate ceilings and specifically the abolition of 
Regulation Q. Regulation Q was a legacy of the New Deal banking reforms, and it 
imposed maximum rates of interest on different types of time and savings deposits, mainly 
as a response to the perceived reckless lending practices leading up to the 1929 crisis and 
the belief that this had happened because of excessive bank competition for deposits 
(Galbraith, 2009). Given that the fair distribution of capital funds to competing social 
classes was coming under increasing pressure from households, small businesses, and 
agriculture, policymakers decided to abolish interest rate ceilings, in an attempt not to 
resolve the difficulties through control and planning, but to divert decision-making to an 
allegedly more effective process, that of the price mechanism (Krippner, 2012). This 
seemingly obscure development led to a domino effect ballooning of the financial sector 
and of credit flows within the economy, leading to a situation in which finance became 
more profitable than commodity production.  
With regards to the second perspective, the institutional developments that led up to the 
expansion of the financial sector are believed to stem, again ironically, from the 
contradictions that were embodied in the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which was meant to 
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put an end to speculative activities in the banking sector. The devastating consequences 
that bank clients suffered as a result of the profound involvement of banks in the securities 
markets in the lead-up to the Great Crash of 1929 led to the prohibition of deposit-taking 
banks from proprietary trading in the financial sector and to the separation between 
banking and finance. Banks were supposed to engage solely in deposit taking from the 
public and short-term lending to industrial and commercial firms through new entries in 
the account books (Minsky, 2008). Financial institutions were supposed to deal with 
funding long-term capital investment through first underwriting, then trading of bonds 
and stocks.  
This separation, though, rested on a misinterpretation of the central function of 
commercial banks, which was not, as it was implied in the Glass-Steagall Act, that of 
receiving household savings, but that of creating liquidity through the acceptance 
function, that is, creating liquidity for borrowers: “the fundamental banking activity is 
accepting, that is, guaranteeing that some party is creditworthy” (Minsky, 2008, p. 256). 
Extending a loan is structurally equivalent to buying a bond that the bank has accepted. 
Tensions appear, though, because commercial banks are not the only institutions that 
create liquidity; investment banks, similarly, create liquidity by underwriting obligations 
and distributing them in secondary markets that they sustain through their function as 
market makers (Mehrling, 2010). Therefore, Glass-Steagall provided the banks with a 
monopoly on the deposit taking, but not on liquidity creation, which was the central 
business of banking to boot, while it created for investment banks a monopoly in security 
dealing, which, through financial innovation, would gradually result in the functional 
equivalents of deposit taking and liquidity creation that were the abode of banking 
activities (Kregel, 2010). Thus, for instance, the emergence of corporate commercial 
paper as a cheap substitute for commercial loans, together with the rise of money market 
mutual funds as a substitute for retail deposits, constituted solid competitive 
disadvantages for commercial banks that, if they were not addressed, could have led to 
the collapse of the industry, as it had happened previously with the saving and loan 
industry crisis. Gradual deregulation, in this account, is a story of regulatory 
shortcomings, institutional innovation, and competitive disadvantages that were remedied 
by deregulation, which eventually resulted in bloated financial markets.  
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As the US war efforts were already drying up the exchequer’s funds, Reagan’s move 
towards a policy of trickle-down economics by decreasing taxes for the upper income 
layers had the effect of further deteriorating the fiscal position of the US and led to the 
looming perspective of a full-blown fiscal crisis (Canterbery, 2000). Because this 
increased inflationary pressures, Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker raised interest 
rates to a peak of 20% in 1981, leading to the so-called Volcker shock that depressed 
industrial activities irrevocably and channelled profit making activities increasingly 
towards finance (Krippner, 2012). Tight monetary policy tamed inflation, while high 
interest rates attracted a surprising amount of foreign capital into US financial markets 
that replenished the fiscal gap, swelled credit in the economy, fuelled a new debt-led 
consumption pattern, and beefed up profits for any entity involved in extending or 
intermediating capital (Epstein & Jayadev, 2005; Tomaskovic-Devey & Lin, 2011). These 
are then the institutional and historical parameters that set the scene for the advent of 
financialisation. A state of affairs characterised by pro-market policies coupled with an 
increased demand for deregulation created an environment, in the US of the 1970s-1980s, 
ripe for new opportunities for capital accumulation. But this does not explain why it was 
financialisation that was the outcome of this situation and not something different. The 
origin, drivers, and mechanisms behind this are still a matter of contention, as described 
next.  
 
2. Financialisation. Debate 
 
There are various ways in which financialisation has been discussed, but perhaps the most 
effective way of approaching the issue is to divide the different perspectives into two 
broad frameworks, depending on what scholars of financialisation see as the drivers and 
origin of financialisation: economic and non-economic perspectives. Economic lenses are 
generally more homogenous in emphasising financialisation as an inherent and epochal 
change in the history of capitalism, although some gradualist views can be identified here 
as well. An epochal change is generally perceived to be one in which small or big changes 
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in material conditions lead to major changes in institutional structures as well. For 
instance, the development of the monopolistic, joint stock enterprises on the backdrop of 
industrialisation, free trade, and the ensuing profitability crisis of 1890s (Duménil & Lévy, 
2011) can be contrasted with the expansion of transnational enterprises on the backdrop 
of the mass consumption and mass production industry, domestic, and international 
controls on finance and the long boom lasting until 1973-74 (Lapavitsas, 2013). The 
epochal view of financialisation is less a characteristic of heterodox perspectives, being 
more utilised in Marxist analyses. Non-economic perspectives, on the other hand, are 
much more eclectic and focused on the various, unexpected angles from which to 
conceptualise financialisation. 
 
Economic perspectives 
 
Among economic perspectives, the most extensive case for understanding financialisation 
as a new phase in capitalist development is put forth by scholars coming from a Marxist 
background. One of the first intimations of financialisation as an epochal change in the 
history of capitalism was presented by Baran and Sweezy in the Monthly Review 
magazine. Their conception was based on the premise that as capitalism evolves, 
monopolistic enterprises become prevalent, a phenomenon which increases working class 
exploitation and the accretion of surplus value, which further leads to a problematic 
situation in which the surplus thus created finds no outlet due to the scarcity of 
opportunities for profitable investment and the lack of demand from impoverished 
consumers (Baran & Sweezy, 1966). The rise of or turn to finance is explained, therefore, 
by the looming of the ‘surplus absorption’ issue that seeks a release that cannot be found 
in the sphere of production or of consumption. The stagnation beginning in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s provides the representative case for this theory: the emergence of large, 
monopolistic companies sitting on massive monetary reserves and with large productive 
capacities but virtually no demand could not find a solution to this predicament and thus 
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they turned to the financial sector to absorb the surpluses, leading to an epochal change 
in the history of capitalism from production to speculative circulation.  
The domain of speculative circulation is less specified, other than assuming that an inflow 
of capital creates conditions of asset price inflation and speculative psychology (Magdoff 
& Sweezy, 1987), which constitute the source of profits in the financial sector on the 
background of stagnation in the ‘real’ economy. The argument for financialisation 
brought forth by the authors of Monthly Review is thus rather laconic and abstract, 
aggregating in quite an indiscriminate way various actors involved in the process of 
financialisation (state, non-financial companies, financial organisations, consumers, 
foreign capital, etc.). That said, their focus on the relative rise of profits in the financial 
sphere as opposed to the ‘productive’ sphere as an expression of financialisation was 
prescient.  
A similar contribution coming from the Marxist scholarship that stresses the epochal 
nature of financialisation is Giovanni Arrighi’s work (2009, 2010). In line with the 
Monthly Review authors, he conceives of the rise of finance as a response of enterprises 
and governments to the stagnation crisis of the 1970s. In contrast to them, though, he 
builds his theory on the backbone of Braudel’s magisterial work on the history of 
capitalism (Braudel, 1992b, 1992c, 1992a), and sees financialisation not as a unique 
characteristic of contemporary capitalism, but as a periodic feature occurring since the 
outset of capitalism at the end of the Medieval Age and the consolidation of Italian city-
states. He opposes thus the progressive, linear understanding of the development of 
capitalism of the Monthly Review authors with a perspective that emphasises successive 
‘cycles of accumulation’ occurring in different geographical places and coinciding with 
the ebbing and flowing of the hegemonic power of the states involved in financialisation.  
The main dynamic that drives financialisation is a move away from the material expansion 
that undergirds hegemony – through long distance trade, commerce or commodity 
production – to a stage of financial expansion, in which profits accrue mainly through 
financial means or ‘speculative circulation’. The first stage of material expansion is 
generally supported by the breakthrough of an organisational innovation akin to the 
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process described by Schumpeter (1942), but the ensuing crisis is not explained by the 
issue of ‘surplus absorption’ as per the Monthly Review authors; on the contrary, it is 
increasing competition coming from a different pretender to the status of hegemonic 
power that causes stagnation and a move to finance. Financialisation is thus a symptom 
of a country’s decline and another country’s ascent. Genoa, the Netherlands, Britain, and 
the US are the representative cases that Arrighi talks about in testing his argument 
empirically. The Long Twentieth Century (Arrighi, 2010) ends with a discussion of the 
then contemporary cycle of accumulation, the seeming decline of the productive prowess 
of the US in the 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent turn to finance as a symptom of the 
waning of US hegemony. In the epilogue, Arrighi hints that Japan might come to replace 
the US, a thesis that he ultimately retracted with the publication of Adam Smith in Beijing 
(2009), which he dedicated to the rise of China.  
While Arrighi was mainly concerned with elaborating macro-historical arguments about 
financialisation and hegemony, Harvey (2005), Panitch and Gindin (2013), and Krippner 
(2012) took to the challenge of focusing on the contemporary US, following the 
theoretical model built by Arrighi. Thus, Harvey argued that the exhaustion of the 
productive capacities of the US led companies to turn to finance in search for profits, 
which ultimately undermined the hegemonic prowess of the American state due to 
massive global holdings of US debt, the military overhang, and economic stagnation 
(2005). On the contrary, Panitch and Gindin claim that globalisation and financial 
integration on an international level resulted in the reconsolidation of US hegemony due 
to, among others, the Americanisation of finance and the international crucial role of the 
dollar as a reserve currency (2013). None of the authors mentioned above, except perhaps 
for Krippner, analyse how it is that the financial sector is able to deliver profits in a context 
of overall stagnation. Krippner is sceptical regarding the long-term validity of the 
argument about the epochal change that financialisation represents in the development of 
capitalism, and focuses instead on the rise of finance in the US, which she links to the 
response of the state to the inauspicious conditions of the 1970s (2012). She consciously 
adopts Arrighi’s understanding of financialisation as the expansion of profit accrual 
through financial channels and is the first to engage in an empirical analysis of the 
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tradition started by the Monthly Review by proving the growing weight of financial profit 
of all financial together with non-financial enterprises.  
Another author whose recently published work attempted at specifically constructing a 
Marxist framework for understanding financialisation is Costas Lapavitsas (2013). He 
draws on Japanese Uno Marxist tradition as well as on the work of Hilferding, or rather, 
on an error that Lapavitsas identifies in his work. Hilferding claimed that as capitalism 
develops and companies expand, they tend to rely on more sophisticated and expensive 
capital investment. As they cannot fund these investments through their own capital, they 
turn to banks, which grow larger and wield more and more power over them. In fact, 
Lapavitsas claims, “since the end of the Second World War the requirements of 
investment in developed countries have been met increasingly through retained profits. 
This trend underpins financialisation” (Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 56). This observation leads 
Lapavitsas to focus his analysis not on the growing importance of the financial sector as 
such, but at the structural transformations in the conduct of banks, non-financial 
corporations, and households, which become ever more entangled in financial profits as 
sources for new forms of profit. That said, while the argument about structural 
transformations is salient, it is rather counter-intuitive to claim that financialisation has 
occurred through more capital investment and retained profits, and not through increased 
debt.  
These are just a few authors employing a Marxist lens in unpacking financialisation, but 
they are representative of the Marxist approach as a whole emphasising a relative decline 
in productive capacities, a relative increase in financial profit, the increasing accumulation 
of profits through financial channels, as well as a structural transformation in the 
behaviour of various social actors. While at first the main concern of Marxist discussions 
of financialisation were macro-historical arguments regarding the development of 
capitalism, recently their focus has shifted on more specified features of financialisation, 
while at the same time expanding in scope to include other actors besides corporations 
and the state such as households, banks, foreign actors etc. Some examples include: food 
politics (Clapp, 2014), land (Kaika & Ruggiero, 2016), the workplace (Thompson, 2013), 
or even the university (Engelen, Fernandez, & Hendrikse, 2014).  
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The non-Marxist economic literature on financialisation is quite eclectic and much more 
difficult to sum up under a few guiding lines. Perhaps one of the observable recurring 
features is the relative lack of structuralist arguments about the development of capitalism, 
though in some instances epochal arguments are implied. Generally, this literature is 
concerned with macro-questions and comes mainly from the Post-Keynesian camp. As 
such it draws its resources from Keynes’s analyses of the rentier as an ubiquitous entity 
in financialised capitalism. For Keynes, the rentier is a parasitical entity that merely 
extracts profit from the circulation of capital due to its scarcity (1973). The figure of the 
moneylender is then picked up by various other Post-Keynesian economists and discussed 
in diverse manners.  
For instance, Minsky, in his later work, became increasingly interested in what he called 
‘money manager capitalism’ (1996), a topic that has been tentatively elaborated by Wray 
(2009), but with no wide-ranging implications. On the other hand, Hager (2014) shows 
that public debt actually redistributes income from taxpayers to public creditors in such a 
manner that a clear-cut pattern of ownership emerges in the hands of the top one percent 
of US households, which revives the argument about the existence of a ‘bondholding 
class’. Toporowski built his asset price inflation theory on the idea that rentiers channelled 
their savings to the stock markets giving rise to institutional investors and asset bubbles 
(2002), which, in more abstract terms, consolidated “humanity as an appendage of asset 
markets” (2010, p. 91). The causation, therefore, does not run from stagnation in the 
productive economy to turn to finance; on the contrary, it is the expansion of financial 
markets that explains sluggish performance in the ‘real’ economy – a perspective that runs 
through many Post-Keynesian analyses of financialisation. Diminished investment leads 
also to stagnating or falling wages, which some Post-Keynesian authors claimed has 
fuelled a debt-led economic developmental model. Stockhammer (2009), for instance, 
argues that there has been a self-sustaining global division between a debt-led group of 
countries financing consumption by way of a real estate bubble (US, UK) and an export-
led group of countries based on competitive advantages due to domestic wage repression 
(Germany, China), an argument reminiscent of the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; but see also Schwartz, 2009).  
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Lastly, another argument – this time coming from a behavioural-economic perspective – 
has been particularly popular in the understanding of the bubble that was inflating in the 
US real estate markets and was underpinning the financialisation process. This 
perspective emphasised the seemingly irrational behaviour of the actors involved in those 
market activities. It has thus been argued that the financial crisis itself is a cause of the 
‘irrational exuberance’ of financial actors (Schiller, 2008) or of the ‘speculative mania’ 
that has been developing in the markets involved (Kindleberger, 2011).  
According to these theories, there are some more or less clearly identifiable behavioural 
stages in the escalation towards a bubble and subsequent economic collapse: optimistic 
prospects such as the state of the economy create an environment of euphoria, the euphoria 
drives up prices in, for instance, stocks or real estate; this creates the impression that they 
will continue to rise; as everyone is bidding up the prices, credit standards decline, which 
ultimately increase the fragility of the economy; with time, the basis of the economy 
degenerates and becomes more exposed to shocks; when an exogenous shock, such as 
pessimistic news about the state of the economy, eventually occurs, panic sets in and 
creates another self-fulfilling prophecy as everyone scrambles to dump assets considered 
toxic at increasingly fire-sale prices.  
This recurring mechanism is explicitly based on Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis (1992) which states that protracted periods of economic stability diminish the 
perception of risk and lead to a growth in lax lending practices, which increases instability 
and finally reveals the risk that has been accumulating in the economy, resulting in a 
period of debt deflation. It must be noted that even though this theory is rooted in 
behavioural studies, there is thus a tension between the psychological-individual and the 
economic-institutional dimensions of speculative manias. With regards to the matter at 
hand, it is worth mentioning that the historical reading of bubbles identified by 
Kindleberger becomes concentrated from the 1980s onwards – bubbles in real estate and 
stocks in Japan in 1985-89 and in several ASEAN countries in 1992-97, in foreign 
investment in 1990-99 in Mexico, in the dotcom sector in the US 1995-2000, in real estate 
in the US, Britain, Spain, Ireland, and Iceland in 2002-2007 – and suggests that there has 
been a potential expansion in speculative behaviour concurring thus with other analyses 
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which point to the rise of finance since the 1970s as a new stage in the historical and 
structural development of capitalism. That said, the growth in asset bubbles cannot solely 
be explained through an increase in speculative manias, because the latter must be 
explained as well.  
To sum up, the most extensive cases for understanding financialisation are usually put 
forth by scholars coming from Marxist backgrounds, and generally identify 
financialisation as a stage in the development of capitalism, arising either because of the 
falling rate of profits in the real economy or the need for surplus absorption, though there 
is also the Marxist perspective that financialisation is a cyclical capitalist event. The non-
Marxist literature is more diverse and generally less concerned with epochal arguments. 
It usually comes from a Post-Keynesian camp and it draws its inspiration, among others, 
from Keynes’s figure of the ‘rentier’, touching thus on topics such as institutional 
investing, asset price inflation, debt-led development models, speculative manias, and the 
financial instability hypothesis. The thread tying all these analyses is that there are 
important economic drivers that explain the shift in the economy from an industrial-based 
or industrial-led economy to one in which finance takes a leading role and stops fulfilling 
the role of serving the former as its main raison d'être.  
 
Non-economic perspectives  
 
The non-economic literature on financialisation comes from disciplines as diverse 
psychology, geography, cultural studies, or sociology. Some of these studies are 
concerned with how financial expansion profoundly transforms intimate experiences 
hitherto sheltered from pecuniary matters, while other studies focus, on the contrary, on 
how finance is deeply rooted in quasi-universal features of human nature and how 
financialisation has drawn its resources from those pools.  
One such perspective on financialisation that has been particularly popular comes from 
the discipline of sociology, in particular, from organisation studies. The main concern of 
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this literature is not to explain the dynamics of speculative bubbles or the expansion of 
finance per se, but to look at the changing behaviour of non-financial companies and their 
increasingly more complex involvement in the financial sector. One of the most 
resounding findings of this perspective is the issue of ‘maximising shareholder value’. 
This states that the only aim of a firm is or should be to increase the stock value of the 
owners of the firm (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). While the concept of the separation 
between ownership and management can be traced back to at least the East India 
Company in the 17th century (Lipton, 2009), the issue of measuring the success of a firm 
through the return on shareholder value is a recent phenomenon, fuelled by two 
interrelated developments. 
The first development is the reconceptualisation of the firm according to which a company 
is no longer a business that produces commodities, but a “bundle of assets deployed in 
order to maximise short-term earnings” (Fligstein, 2002, p. 129). The move from a “sales-
and-marketing” to a financial understanding of the firm was a result of aggressive antitrust 
policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (Fligstein, 1990) and the 
consequent emergence and consolidation in the US of the large conglomerates of the 
1950s and 1960s, which were viewed as ‘well-balanced stock portfolios’ of diversified 
assets (W. Espeland & Hirsch, 1990). The inflation of the 1970s, furthermore, bloated the 
price value of capital assets to levels higher than the market capitalisation value of the 
same companies, resulting in a situation in which buying an organisation and selling it 
further would imply larger profits than keeping it and relying only on its return on value. 
The resultant takeover and merger mania was only put to a halt when the Reagan 
administration relaxed antitrust regulations and firms became more concentrated on 
specific sectors, which did have the effect, nonetheless, of a more persistent preoccupation 
with the stock value so as to prevent hostile takeovers.  
The second development is the rise of asset management and institutional investors. If in 
the 1950s and 1960s, insurance companies and pension funds had been under legal 
restrictions on investing in stocks while mutual funds were playing little role in gathering 
household savings, in 1974, with the publication of The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act and its amendment in 1978, the prohibitions were lifted and pension funds 
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and insurance companies were thus allowed to direct their funds not only to company 
stocks but also to riskier instruments such as junk bonds and venture funds. This, together 
with the generalisation of the remuneration of management in the form of stock options 
(which implied that better return on equity is favourable not only to owners, but to 
mangers too), led to increased pressure on pumping up the value of corporate stocks and, 
ultimately, to institutional investors replacing household stockholding (Lazonick & 
O’Sullivan, 2000).  
Another strand of scholarship that has stemmed from sociology and has come to play an 
important role in the understanding of processes of financialisation is the social studies of 
finance. This and other disciplines that employ anthropological and ethnographical 
methodologies, together with the nascent interest in finance shown by cultural studies, 
have come to broaden the analytical space and open up finance to dimensions hitherto 
unexplored. In the words of Montgomerie, mainstream studies of financialisation describe 
it as “an elite process of a highly technical nature, whereby financial transactions take 
place on a massive scale by nameless and faceless actors, which states, and households, 
can merely observe at a distance and experience only after the fact” (2006, p. 302). This 
not only contributes to perpetuating the view that finance is an exact science that develops 
according to scientific progress, but it also hides the foundation on which finance relies 
and turns – the subjectivities, discourses, and practices of everyday life. It is only by 
“elevating the ontological status of the everyday” (Langley, 2008, p. 37), that one can 
make better sense of how finance is constructed at a grassroots level and in a more holistic 
manner.   
Beyond making finance ‘popular’(Erturk, Froud, Johal, Leaver, & Williams, 2007) and 
extending its power-sources deep within society (Seabrooke, 2006), two interrelated 
notions are crucial for this literature: performativity and subjectivity. Drawing on the work 
of Latour (1988) and Callon (1984) on actor network theory, the social studies of finance 
strand has emphasised how financial markets are not hard realities to be discovered, but 
entities that are performed by human and non-human actors. Economic models, for 
instance, are not simply describing economies, but are an integral part of their 
constitution. This leads MacKenzie to claim that when it comes to the derivatives market, 
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financial models are ‘an engine, not a camera’ (2008) – in other words, they do not 
(simply) reflect, they constitute. Other non-human actors contributing to the constitution 
and perpetual transformation of markets are of course technical equipment such as 
computer screens or communication channels.  
Performativity is linked to the other crucial aspect of this type of insights – subjectivity. 
This notion has to do with the fact that financialisation relies on the creation of specific 
identities, such as the ‘investor subject’ (Aitken, 2007). By drawing on governmentality 
studies (Foucault, 1991), this avenue of research built on the idea that neoliberal finance 
fashioned a particular type of subjectivity by “the calling up of self-disciplinary, 
responsible and entrepreneurial subjects in financial markets” (Langley & Leyshon, 2012, 
p. 369). This entrepreneurial subject was fashioned through various narratives in 
advertising campaigns, pop culture, etc., but also through policy initiatives of 
democratising finance (O’Malley, 2004).  
Among extant perspectives combining financialisation and subjectivity, Paul Langley has 
written one of the most comprehensive accounts on the issue of governing subjects and 
the relationship between global finance and everyday life (2008). By explicitly making 
reference to governmentality as an analytical perspective, Langley claims to show how 
global finance is not somewhere ‘out there’, segregated from the lay practices of quotidian 
existence, but is deeply intertwined with and indeed is made possible through the 
changing behaviour and subjectivity of the average individual. By linking saving and 
borrowing routines with capital markets through mutual funds, pension funds, and other 
similar institutions, he is able to show how ‘calculative tools’ and ‘performances of risk’, 
merged with ‘financial subject-positions’ and ‘self-discipline’, combine to constitute the 
global financial order. At the other end of this spectrum is also the function of imagination 
in responding to financial transformations, whereby, for instance, a specific type of 
recollection of past financial events bears on current efforts to resolve and diagnose 
present crises (Samman, 2014, 2015).  
Other authors, by drawing on the concept of ‘biopolitics’, have understood the process of 
the financialisation of everyday life as an instance of ‘biofinancialisation’, that is, utilising 
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biological and organic processes through, for instance, the creation of enhanced and 
impaired pension annuities (such as the smokers’ pension) for fashioning ‘biofinancial 
subjects’ and new horizons of capital accumulation (French & Kneale, 2012; Lilley & 
Papadopoulos, 2014). Similar arguments have been made with regards to the increasing 
‘socialisation of finance’, or in other words, the increasing penetration of financial 
markets, opportunities, and power into the core of social life (Seabrooke, 2006; Watson, 
2007). This can happen quite literally through bringing finance closer to the ‘common 
individual’ through growing financial popularisation, access, and inclusion (Hyman, 
2012), but it can also happen more indirectly through the disciplining nature of financial 
regulation bodies and initiatives which, though seemingly removed, arcane, and targeted 
at elite financial institutions, are nonetheless pervasive and effective at creating docile 
economies in the image of prevailing ideas (Vestergaard, 2008). 
Furthermore, cultural and social studies of finance, which usually employ ethnographic 
methodologies, have looked at how financial agency is constructed through the 
intermeshing of individuals, discourses, and devices, be it financial models (Mackenzie, 
2008), stock prices, financial contracts, performance indicators (Muniesa, 2014), banking 
culture (Ho, 2009), or stock and other markets more generally (Callon, 1998; Preda, 
2009). As insightful as these studies are about the world of finance, they usually pledge 
themselves to analysing finance as a field removed from society at large, and rarely do 
they draw any political implications from their analyses.    
All in all, these studies that emphasise non-economic drivers of financialisation open up 
the possibility of thinking through specific connections: the fact that, for instance, 
financial tools, methodologies, actors, markets, etc. provide opportunities for governing 
specific social groups; or that these initiatives rely on particular understandings of the 
dynamics and nature of the subject on which the intervention takes place; or that, more 
generally, financial accumulation can occur through the moulding of subjectivity.  
Taken together, economic and non-economic understandings of financialisation are thus 
vast and diverse, and it is difficult to pin down the common threads, though some similar 
features do stand out: the financial sector has expanded in the last decades through various 
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institutional and infrastructural mutations; there are inherent forces at work in the 
financial sector; it is a wider, psycho-social phenomenon; and it has led to new 
contradictions in society (money manager capitalism, debt-led model of growth, a surge 
in bubbles or the rise of the shareholder value ideology). Ultimately, what ties them 
together is that since about 1970, there have been major changes in various dimensions of 
human existence, with finance playing an increasingly more important role, not only as 
an isolated sector of the economy which employs ever more individuals and has an 
increasingly greater turnover, but as an all-embracing sector into which more social actors 
find themselves involved. The social policy field is an example of this process, though 
there is a noticeable paucity of perspectives on this link, and the few that can be identified 
generally lack a thorough explanation of the mechanisms behind the expansion of finance 
to this field. The next part outlines what is meant by this.   
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3. Welfare and social investment in an era of financialisation 
 
The literature on financialisation has also investigated this process in the field of social 
policy, though, it must be said, social impact investment was initially outside of its focus 
area and was thus not seen as an instance of financialisation. The literature on social 
investment was in fact confined to the reports produced by the organisations involved in 
the programmes, coupled with the papers coming from isolated research centres or labs 
in top-level universities following developments closely and often being involved in the 
programmes themselves. This literature was mostly concerned with the nuts and bolts of 
the social programmes’ operation, and generally adopted a functionalist approach with 
the intent of assessing or improving efficacy (e.g. Vanclay, 2003; Wood & Martin, 2006; 
Nicholls, 2008; Loxley, 2013; Warner, 2013; Nicholls, Paton, et al., 2015).  
More recently, the phenomenon of social investment made its way into non-professionally 
involved academic departments as well, with the lion’s share of research, in particular 
when it comes to emerging financial instruments such as social impact bonds, taking a 
critical view and seeing it as the result of a combination of the global entrenchment of 
austerity policies ensuing the global financial crisis and the advancement of the ideology 
of neoliberalisation, and, finally, the practice of financialisation (e.g. Joy & Shields, 2013; 
McHugh, Sinclair, Roy, Huckfield, & Donaldson, 2013; Bryan & Rafferty, 2014; 
Dowling & Harvie, 2014; Barman, 2015; Whitfield, 2015). These studies decry the 
narrative of the overburdened but underfunded post-crisis welfare state and see the rise of 
social finance as an attempt to create yet another ‘frontier of accumulation’, this time at 
the heart of the state’s traditional function of provider of social security and safety nets 
against market vagaries (Dowling, 2016). Worse still, this is perceived not simply as a 
product of a sustained assault from private actors, but as a state-sponsored initiative of 
dismantling the welfare state and promoting social finance as a more capable and efficient 
surrogate thereof, with politicians such as the former UK prime minister claiming that 
using the power of finance to tackle social problems has ‘transformative’ potential for 
society (Cameron, 2013).  
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Taken together, these accounts provide a great deal of insights regarding the multifarious 
ramifications and implications social finance has had upon the evolution of the welfare 
state in the Western hemisphere and indeed beyond. That being said, not a lot of emphasis 
has been placed on how this process of financialisation actually occurs. The first type of 
literature, coming from professionally-engaged sources, generally looks at the 
construction of particular social finance instruments or puts forth principles and ideal 
norms that should be governing the field, such as community development and 
empowerment (Vanclay, 2003), market transparency and standards (Wood & Martin, 
2006), early interventions with evidence based results (Loxley, 2013), or the idea of 
bringing rigour to social service interventions and private finance to public goods 
(Warner, 2013). When it comes to the actual functioning of the particular social finance 
programmes under development, these reports usually adopt a narrative-based analysis of 
the actors involved, actions undertaken, tools employed in measuring impact, and overall 
outcome. Engaging with the overarching implications for social policy and the conditions 
of possibility of the very existence of social finance programmes and instruments is 
beyond their scope.  
The latter is very much the mission of the second type of literature mentioned – the one 
coming from non-professionally involved academics. Many of these studies identify the 
emergence of social impact investment as an instance of the encroachment of 
financialisation in the field of social policy. Dowling and Harvie (2014), for instance, 
claim that social investment is part of the political economy of The Big Society agenda 
(discussed below), which tries to use market logics to ‘harness the social’ and solve three 
interrelated crises: the capitalist accumulation crisis (the global slump ensuing the 
financial crisis), the social reproduction crisis (unemployment, wage stagnation, 
inequality, etc.), and the fiscal crisis of the state (austerity and spending cuts). The launch 
of social investment promised to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the so-
called ‘age of austerity’ and introduce financial logics at the heart of social policy, thus 
creating profit-making possibilities for finance, providing subsistence services for 
disenfranchised populations, and privatising costly state programmes. Similarly, Joy and 
Shields (2013) construe the rise of social investment as an instance of financialisation, but 
they equate financialisation with marketisation, and specifically the marketisation of the 
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third sector (e.g. NGOs, charities, philanthropic organisations, and service deliverers). 
This occurs because of privatisation and the exposure to competitive pressures, which 
benefits large organisations at the expense of smaller ones, especially in lucrative areas 
such as hospitals or prisons where large profits can be expected. Furthermore, these 
organisations can have significant weight in the design of social policy, as well in its 
delivery. The result of financialisation in the field is the skewing of power towards these 
actors and the pushing away of mission-dedicated small entities in an environment where 
profit traditionally did not constitute an incentive. In a similar vein but delivering a more 
scathing critique, Whitfield claims that “social impact bonds are a mutation of 
privatisation” (2015, p. 9), in that they introduce a ‘venture capitalist model’ at the centre 
of social service delivery, with expected profits of 15-30% on programmes that are cherry-
picked for their ease of evidencing impact and that make social needs dependent on 
private markets.  
These perspectives are invaluable for their critical insights on the emergence of social 
investment. But rather than discussing the mechanisms behind the encroachment of 
finance in the field of social policy and the introduction of these services into the logic of 
financial accumulation, they mainly focus on the consequences financialisation has had 
upon the latter. That said, there are a couple of studies worth mentioning that tried to 
undertake precisely the task of unpacking the channels through which financialisation 
advances, and that provide the main direction of this thesis as well. One is Bryan and 
Rafferty (2014), who subscribe to the following meaning of the term ‘financialisation’: 
“not (or not just) that the finance sector is getting bigger, but that financial ways of 
calculating are becoming more pervasive socially” (2014, p. 891). Their contention is that 
critiques of the rise or resurgence of neoliberalism have focused too much on the issue of 
the quantitative expansion of markets, which has hampered their analysis from grasping 
the truly transformative nature of ‘financialised capitalism’. This consists not (only) in 
the extension of ownership over the means of production (through privatisation, 
deregulation, etc.), but (also) in the extension of the ownership of exposures to the 
performance of the means of production, without the actual ownership of the latter. This 
has been made possible by the creation and impressive spread of derivatives, which have 
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allowed an unbundling of contiguous ‘things’ into a set of components that can be traded 
separately.  
Just to take an example, it is well documented how during the financial crisis credit default 
swaps (CDS) were used not only as hedge against potential downturns in markets, but 
also as speculative tools for exposure to the performance of the housing market and of the 
financial instruments derived from it (Tett, 2010; Lewis, 2011). This was accomplished, 
for instance, through the unbundling of the price of the house from the actual ownership 
of the house itself, and through the isolated exposure of the price fluctuation risk. But 
prices are only the most common attribute being traded through derivatives; many other 
elements can be traded, be they stock market indices or indeed weather attributes (via 
temperature or precipitation indices). What this means is that the ‘calculative devices’ of 
derivatives can extend and encompass virtually any thinkable aspect, social life included. 
The overarching implication of this, as has been noted by Wigan (2009), is that derivatives 
construct an ‘artifice of indifference’, which expresses itself in the capacity of finance to 
(at least seemingly) uncouple itself from the ‘real economy’, and trade in the performance 
of the latter without having any actual stake in it.  
In the case of social investment, Bryan and Rafferty (2014) claim that financialisation has 
been advanced through the extension of the derivative logic to social programmes. 
Specifically, this is done through the unbundling of the social programme and the 
purchase of only the performance (in the case of social impact bonds, the social impact or 
outcome itself) and not the actual implementation of the service. Once a secondary market 
is created in the field, investors can also trade their exposure away, and all of this, again, 
without any ownership of the underlying social policies, state institutions, or service 
delivery. Their analysis of the rise of the social investment market is tentative and 
marginal, Bryan and Rafferty mainly focusing on the extension of the derivative logic 
more generally as an avenue for financialisation to advance on non-financial realms and 
to constitute new opportunities for capital accumulation. There is no purposeful 
investigation of what this advance of finance looks like, what instruments it employs, or 
to what constitutive epiphenomena it gives rise. That said, their argument is valuable in a 
wider sense, in that it provides a novel template for understanding financialisation not 
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(only) as the quantitative expansion of financial markets but (also) as the qualitative 
extension of financial ways of approaching non-financial entities.  
The other study that approaches the issue of the channels through which financialisation 
occurs is Chiapello (2014). Chiapello adopts a framework that stems from the SSF 
scholarship outlined above, and looks at financialisation as a phenomenon engulfing non-
financial valuation processes. She utilises impact investment as a case study, but makes a 
grander claim about the ‘financialisation of valuation’. By this, she means that “valuation 
processes equipped by models, instruments and representations belonging to the explicit 
knowledge underpinning the approach and practices of finance professionals” (2014, p. 
17) are proliferating and indeed ‘colonising’ spheres of social life that were hitherto 
somewhat removed or ring-fenced from this practice. This financialised knowledge-
practice complex has three main pillars that can be identified in the discourses of financial 
economics and mathematical finance, which also serve as channels through which 
financialised valuations are disseminated: market prices, calculation of net present value, 
and probability-based estimation. The main characteristic of these models is that they 
construe value from the subjective viewpoint of the financial investor, who is driven by 
what can be called ‘presentism’: an imperative to focus on short-termism by endowing 
present prices with information about the future which can be discounted and whose risks 
can be accounted for through statistical modelling and probability estimation based on 
parameters found in the recent past. This valuation ethos is what Chiapello identifies as 
spreading to non-financial activities, and she takes three case studies to illustrate it: artistic 
activities (as reflected in EU-level policies such as ‘The European Agenda for Culture’, 
‘Europe 2020 Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth’, or the ‘European 
Capital of Culture’), environmental policies (such as the Kyoto Protocol or the UN 
Economics of Ecosystem and Biodiversity initiative), and social organisations engaged in 
impact investment.  
With regards to the latter, Chiapello claims there is “a redefinition of the idea of donations 
and grants, which become investments that must have returns” (2014, p. 25) – not just 
financial, but also ‘social returns’. The invention of Social Return on Investment (SROI) 
is an example of this shift. SROI is a metric that works by meticulously calculating social 
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impact and expressing it in monetary terms, with the intent of quantifying social returns 
and rendering them commensurate for investors (Krlev, Münscher, & Mülbert, 2013). 
Social return, as a potential third valuation metric beyond risk and (financial) return, 
encapsulates the idea that impact investment could become an asset class in itself, with 
investors entering and exiting the market in conditions of perfect liquidity. Importantly, 
Chiapello argues, this stress on impact measurement should not be conflated with the 
demand for accountability or transparency, because as desirable as the latter are, it “does 
not mean that the only way to approach these questions is as an investor who seeks the 
best return, invests and divests as opportunities come up” (2014, p. 25). Nonetheless, that 
is precisely what is occurring: financialised forms of valuation are slowly creeping into 
the field of social policy. Thus, financialised valuation, as construed by Chiapello, is, in 
the case of social finance, a form of economisation (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009) of social 
impact and assetisation (Birch, 2016) of social policy.  
But while this account is justified in signalling the crucial stake of metrics and measures 
of social impact in sustaining the market for impact investments, it still presents a 
simplified version of the emergence and meaning of these socio-technical devices. This 
is due to the overly functionalist role assigned to these socio-technical devices, as simply 
useful prostheses that serve a supporting role in the process of the financialisation of 
valuation. This misses out, as will be argued below, on the essential fact that socio-
technical devices have a ‘life of their own’ and they crystallise particular types of values 
which may not be financial in nature at all. It essentially misses out on the entire 
multifaceted process of value creation or worth attribution. An in-depth investigation of 
these is required to elucidate this fact. Furthermore, Chiapello conflates too easily 
financial forms of valuation with the emergent forms of valuation present in the field of 
social investment. While these appear as the process of financialisation deepens, it is not 
at all clear that they must necessarily take financial forms. Even though they might support 
financialisation, this does not mean they are created in the same flesh; they might 
hybridise, and it is also an in-depth investigation that can reveal it. That said, as in the 
case above, Chiapello’s study is important as it opens up the possibility to look at 
financialisation as a phenomenon that encompasses valuation processes, and occurs thus 
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through the transfer of financial actors, methodologies, and instruments in non-financial 
fields. This will make the focus of the next chapter. 
But to sum up, recently, there have been an increasing number of studies looking at the 
encroachment of finance into the field of social policy. The ones that look specifically at 
social investment and SIBs identify them indeed as an instance of financialisation. That 
said, the manner in which their verdict is presented suggests that social investment itself 
is merely seen as a symptom of financialisation, not as an outright field in itself that needs 
explanation. In other words, what is lacking here is a more encompassing explanation of 
financialisation, one that goes beyond the idea that finance as an all-engulfing force that 
transforms any non-financial realm into its own image. This section has highlighted two 
studies that open a path for undertaking precisely this kind of analysis, though it is shown 
that they fail to provide it. The issue of the valuation processes at play that give birth to 
and support the social investment infrastructure are still unaccounted for.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to unpack the manner in which the advance and expansion of 
finance has been conceptualised by the various scholars that have tackled this issue. 
Financialisation is arguably one of the most important political-economic developments 
of the past half of century, and this has not gone unnoticed. Incensed by the financial crisis 
and the imperative of making sense not only of its origin and consequences, but also by 
the manner in which the latter could be mitigated or resolved, research has moved into the 
direction of unpacking the process of financialisation. But instead of converging on a 
single perspective, the scholarship on financialisation has been fundamentally divided on 
economic and non-economic lines, with the wedge dividing them turning mostly on the 
perspective of the drivers of financialisation.  
While the parameters for the advent of financialisation can arguably be construed as being 
comprised of pro-market policies and deregulation, nothing inherent to these two 
dimensions suggests that financialisation was the inevitable outcome, which implies that 
the phenomenon itself had to be explained. The two main perspectives outlined above 
provided many such explanations, themselves divided on further aspects: some were 
taking longer or epochal views, others were looking at short-term drivers; some 
emphasised cyclicality, others contingency; some looked at technological aspects, others 
at issues regarding subjectivity, and so on.  
One area that was inevitably taken up by the scholars researching financialisation was the 
field of social policy. This initiative was made all the more urgent, given the noticed strain 
inflicted on the latter by the widespread austerity policies adopted as an avenue for 
rebuilding public finances, credibility in front of capital markets, and indeed, as argued 
by some, the moral rectitude tarnished by years of ‘living beyond one’s means’. The 
paradox here was that while resources were retracted from the pot devoted, among others, 
to the pursuit of social policy objectives, other resources were made available for the 
bailout of financial institutions. And instead of this leading to a distrust of the latter, in 
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countries like the UK the reverse occurred: financialisation was construed as representing 
a viable solution to, if not replace, then at least complement state-delivered social policy. 
The concrete proposal came in the guise of social impact investment.  
Scholars of financialisation have picked up on this development, and they have 
conceptualised it in various ways. But while questions regarding ‘what’ happens and 
‘why’ are well-attended to when it comes to issue of welfare, social investment, and 
financialisation, the issue of ‘how’ this process occurs – or what are the infrastructure and 
mechanics that undergird the encroachment of finance within the social field – is under-
explored. What allows social policy to become “a source of wealth to be harnessed” 
(Dowling & Harvie, 2014, p. 881)? What is the foundation upon which “the language of 
finance appears to be gradually invading public policies” (Chiapello, 2014, p. 30) or the 
channels through which “financial ways of calculating are becoming more pervasive 
socially” (Bryan & Rafferty, 2014, p. 891)? In other words, what are the ways through 
which this process of financialisation actually takes place and renders social policy into a 
‘new frontier of accumulation’?  
This is an important question, because, among other things, social impact investment 
projects rely on particular understandings of how social value creation occurs in society. 
The financialisation paradigm would suggest that these processes are colonised by the 
financial sector, with financial actors or methodologies encroaching upon the mechanisms 
of social policy delivery. In reality, as will be explained below, while there is now a 
complex co-imbrication between finance and social policy which was hitherto absent, this 
does not occur in a simple linear or unidirectional manner. On the contrary, in the field of 
social investment, the intermeshing of finance and social policy results in the emergence 
of hybrid spaces, processes, and values, which cannot accurately be gauged solely as 
instances of financialisation.  
To illustrate this point, this thesis will adopt and develop a valuation approach – as 
explained below – to look at the financialisation of the social policy sector. The case made 
by Chiapello (2014) constitutes a fertile entry point for dissecting the relationship between 
financialisation and social policy, because measurement devices are far from being neutral 
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or objective tools for quantification (Diaz-Bone & Didier, 2016). On the contrary, they 
enclose an implicit social process of valuation – negotiation, selection, abstraction, 
ordering, standardisation, and institutionalisation – which, if reduced to the narrow 
instrumentality of the resulting metric, conceals the essentially socially constructed nature 
of the reality evidenced by the measurement device (W. N. Espeland & Stevens, 2008). 
In other words, any process of quantification hides an implicit process of qualification, 
and unpacking the former on these lines can tell a more complex and multifaceted story 
regarding the social mechanisms behind processes of financialisation and how they 
interact with hitherto non-financialised spaces and entities. The next chapter develops this 
approach.  
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From value to valuation: A framework of investigation 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As stated above, the preferred framework for critically analysing the subject at hand is the 
one provided by the emerging scholarship of valuation studies. With some notable 
exceptions, the literature on financialisation, especially the one focused on the social 
policy field, has long ignored the process of worth attribution, and this has resulted in 
incomplete accounts of the mechanics of financialisation and in inaccurate descriptions 
of the inherent value creation that is part and parcel of that process. This chapter unpacks 
the notion of valuation and describes how it can function as a theoretical lens through 
which various socio-economic phenomena can be investigated. In particular, this section 
discusses how recent concerns with the notion of ‘valuation’ can illuminate the 
relationship between financialisation and the pursuit of social policy delivery. Valuation, 
as a process of attribution of value or worth, can disclose how different actors or 
communities, organisations, institutions, states, cultures, etc. approach or gauge various 
objects, entities, or processes. By delving into the process of the attribution of value, the 
particular types of meanings with which specific things have been endowed can be 
exposed and opened up to analysis and discussion. In other words, in order to gauge the 
value of something, actors need to decide what counts in the assessment process. Various 
dimensions or qualities are available for this. Of course, there are more fundamental 
orders or regimes of worth, such as economic value (emphasises monetary gain), aesthetic 
value (emphasises the physical beauty of the object), or religious value (emphasises 
matters of faith and spirituality), which crystallise various qualities under one specific 
regime of value. The ready availability of these regimes of worth, together with their 
criteria for establishing whether or not a specific object fits into this or that regime, makes 
it easy to evaluate, for instance, a car, a sculpture, or someone’s behaviour around fasting 
periods.  
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However, what economic sociology has emphasised is that the choice of order of worth 
that actors make is not fixed and irreversible; on the contrary, some things that appeared 
natural in the past, such as paying money for child labour, or indeed the buying and selling 
of people, have largely disappeared or have become morally objectionable (Fourcade, 
2011). In other words, in these two examples, attributing a monetary value has become 
unacceptable or even unthinkable. Regimes of worth, thus, are dynamic and may change 
over time. And this can arise somewhat naturally and surreptitiously, or it can be part of 
an explicit social process of deliberation. Moreover, this does not preclude the possibility 
of the synchronic co-existence of a plurality of values, without an apparent cohesive 
regime of worth emerging as hegemonic. A painting, for instance, can be evaluated both 
through its economic and through its artistic value, and each of the two can sometimes 
successively become dominant in specific instances (Karpik, 2010). Of course,  some 
things might resist attempts of integration in unconventional or unfamiliar orders of worth 
and might be seemingly perennially separated in ‘hostile worlds’ (Zelizer, 2000), but the 
appearance of tensions is always a possibility, as the borders between different regimes 
of value are porous and changeable. This is especially visible in examples such as the 
market for donor organs, carbon trading, or compensation for oil spills (Fourcade, 2011).  
Furthermore, valuation is generally not simply done through the decision and choice of a 
single specific human actor, but it increasingly relies on the help of measuring devices, 
such as rankings, standards, ratios, benchmarks, or ratings, which are ‘objective’ tools 
that provide ready-made ordering criteria (Callon, 1998; W. N. Espeland & Sauder, 2007; 
Karpik, 2010), and which in extreme situations (for instance, high frequency trading or 
some automated services in healthcare settings that control resource allocation) could 
completely evade human involvement (Kjellberg & Mallard, 2013). Standard-sized 
containers, university rankings, oil benchmarks, national economic indices, etc. are not 
simply cold data, but are instruments employed in ordering the worth of things.  
While measuring devices are an increasingly important aspect of how valuation is 
undertaken, this does not mean that they are simply given or imposed extrinsically. 
Rather, behind their proliferation lies a complex social process of dialogue, debate, and 
contestation in the creation and selection of criteria of quality (Boltanski & Thevenot, 
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2006). In other words, the choice of which regime of worth is most relevant to a particular 
situation is not fixed, but socially moulded through an intricate and often unstable 
procedure. Aesthetic value, for example, has seen various criteria of artistic worth 
emerging, overlapping, and contesting one another between the end of the 19th century 
and the middle of the 20th, in the quest of establishing a single, undisputable hierarchy of 
aesthetic value. This process has ultimately resulted in the dissemination and parallel co-
existence of ‘art movements’, such as impressionism, expressionism, pointillism, futurism 
etc., without one single movement constituting the ultimate regime of worth (Karpik, 
2010).  
These insights are especially salient in the market of social investment, given that one of 
its explicit goals is to generate ‘blended return’: social together with financial (Emerson, 
2003; Nicholls, Paton, et al., 2015). How social value should be understood, and how to 
probe that social value or social impact has been achieved in a particular situation is 
something that the valuation perspective could illuminate. To claim that social investment 
and social impact bonds are a form of the financialisation of social policy delivery means 
to say that financialised valuations have colonised the spaces of social value, or, in other 
words, that  “valuation processes equipped by models, instruments, and representations 
belonging to the explicit knowledge underpinning the approach and practices of finance 
professionals” (Chiapello, 2014, p. 17) have invaded the space of social value creation. 
An analysis of the valuation processes occurring in the field of social investment, 
delivered below, will show to what extent this is the case.   
In order to analyse the valuation processes that underpin finance’s advance in the field of 
social policy design and delivery, this chapter will develop the guiding framework of the 
thesis, and is structured as follows: the opening section focuses on how the term 
‘valuation’ is generally understood in the finance industry and what kind of tools and 
models financial forms of valuation usually employ in the process of estimating value for 
business. It is shown how this contributes to a narrow understanding of the worth 
attribution process, not unlike the older subjective-objective binary under whose sway 
value was understood historically. In fact, this chapter will argue that even within financial 
practice the valuation process generally includes other taken-for-granted dimensions that 
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render the latter operational and without which it would not be possible. The second 
section focuses on the field upon which finance sets its web – social policy. It is shown 
that finance advances in this area in the shadow of a specific historical intimacy that can 
be identified between an area designated as ‘the social’ and a set of instruments designed 
to make that area graspable to knowledge and amenable to intervention. There is nothing 
self-explanatory about the former, and there is nothing necessary about the latter – both 
were indeed historical contingencies. Finance came to inhabit the place opened up by their 
linkage, but it thus had to contend with a reality that was already complex and 
multifaceted, and that was integrated into a logic of governing that ultimately led to the 
development of welfare states. This section will thus trace how that space, ‘the social’, 
which is ultimately the taken-for-granted basis of the social impact investment field itself, 
was ‘discovered’ and construed, and how it was finally adopted as a legitimate space to 
be the target of intervention and policy objectives. This discussion should give some clues 
regarding the intricate nature and immanent traits of the field that finance was trying to 
penetrate, and show how the latter proves insufficient a means for capturing the value 
dynamics involved there.  
Finally, the chapter proceeds to outline, by answering Dewey’s call for a flank movement 
in the study of value, how a renewed understanding of valuation as a worth attribution 
process can more thoroughly illuminate this relationship between financialisation and 
social policy design and delivery. And given that so far there have not been any attempts 
at providing a breakdown of the stages in a valuation process, this chapter surmises what 
these might be so that valuation can be construed as a legitimate framework for 
investigating the case of value creation. By utilising insights from economic anthropology 
and economic sociology, it finds that the valuation process can be understood as six-step 
sequence – going through negotiation, selection, ordering, abstraction, standardisation, 
and institutionalisation – occurring at three levels: exploratory, systematising, and 
political. This sets the scene for uncovering the valuation processes at work in the case of 
social impact investment.   
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2. The value of financial valuation  
 
On August the 9th 2007, BNP Paribas suspended three of its investment funds, which were 
composed of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), after their value plummeted by a 
fifth in the course of two weeks and liquidity dried out. The reasons cited for this course 
of action was that the CDOs, composed in their turn of tranches of mortgages and other 
debt obligations such as credit card receivables, student debt, car loans, phone contract 
debt, or even airplane leases, were too complex to gauge and were thus impossible to 
‘value’. This breakdown in the valuation process is generally considered to be the trigger 
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and an omen for the economic turmoil that was to come 
(Datz, 2013; A. Milne, 2009). Before this event, the profusion of financial instruments 
brought about by decades of financial innovation and auspicious market conditions did 
not constitute an issue as far as assessing the value of novel securities was concerned. 
Generous market liquidity reinforced the impression that the track-record that financial 
valuation accumulated in the market for structured products was testimony enough to the 
if not infallible, then at least optimistic and reliable nature of the ‘value discovery’ process 
of innovative financial instruments. This crystallised the view, and the associated practice 
alongside it, that the alphabet soup of structured products – ABS, MBS, CDO, CDO 
squared, etc. – was really composed of homogenous assets and all that was needed for 
investors to know was the type of security and the rating bestowed upon it by credit rating 
agencies, in order to be confident that value was correctly assessed. The events of 9th of 
August shattered this long-held illusion, and prices not only nosedived, but also began 
diverging within the same asset class, with tranches previously trading at similar prices 
determined by and large by their credit rating now displaying discrepancies of 10-20 
percent in value (A. Milne, 2009). Essentially, this exposed the deep issues underlying 
long-term and well-entrenched valuation practices.  
‘Valuation’, therefore, is a word that is far from unfamiliar in the financial community. In 
its narrower meaning, it signifies determining the price of something. In this sense, it 
follows a long line of thought, going from Adam Smith (2014) and Marx (1990) through 
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Veblen (1906) and Commons (1934) to Menger (1871), Jevons (1871), and Walras 
(1874), that was dedicated to uncovering the real source of value behind a commodity’s 
worth, so that it can most appropriately reflect that source in its value understood as price. 
But in this narrow view, this understanding of value ends up a victim of the same 
shortcomings to which this line of thought was subject: construing value in a mechanistic 
and binary way as either subjective or objective.  
The subjective or extrinsic understanding, resting on marginal analysis, rational choice, 
utility maximisation, and general equilibrium, generated a framework for understanding 
economic phenomena that emphasises market perfection and price discovery, and viewed 
anything that interferes with the ‘natural’ course of free markets as obstacles to perfecting 
that have to be removed. The objective or intrinsic view took its cue from the labour theory 
of value and generated research on processes of exploitation, alienation, value extraction, 
and accumulation by dispossession. Ultimately, the whole binary understanding of value 
as being generated either through subjective or objective mechanisms discarded anything 
else that was alien either to the cumulative space of rational and individual decision-
making or to the confined space of the factory site and industrial organisation as mere 
inconveniences or addenda to the real site of value creation. In these interpretations, the 
‘laws of the market’ or ‘market devices’ (Callon, 1998; Callon, Millo, & Muniesa, 2007) 
are secondary. As such, they can either perfect or pervert the market; they cannot 
constitute it. As a result, reflections on value and the process of creating, assessing, and 
comparing it were crippled by the traction that the subjective-objective value binary had 
on economic analyses. Value was considered to be a mechanic and static dimension that 
was either ingrained in the commodity by the labour expended on its production, or 
assigned by a particular rational and utility-maximising individual and transubstantiated 
into price in the mercantile arena.  
Similarly, a narrow understanding of financial valuation yields a skewed perspective that 
only takes into account a small part of the entire worth attribution process. What weighs 
heavy now is not the binary itself, but the constitutive role of models. Take the case of 
financial theory. When looking at modern finance, it is true that developments in financial 
theory weighed heavily on financial activity and the financial playing field more 
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generally. But they did so by privileging specific formulas of valuation at the expense of 
the wider social processes, so much so that it became synonymous with the application of 
those formulas upon a variety of targets. In fact, it is only after the start of the second half 
of the 20th century, when mathematised theories of finance permeate financial practice, 
that we see the onset of finance’s expansion: “In the space of 21 years, from 1952 to 1973, 
an entire body of knowledge was created essentially from scratch, with only a few 
scattered roots in the past. Nothing in the history of ideas can compare with this cascade 
of ideas in such a short period of time” (Bernstein, 2005, p. 55). Before this period of 
theoretical effusion, financial activity was mostly dominated by rules of thumb and best 
practice, while financial theory was relegated to describing institutional and legal matters 
pertaining to practice. After Markowitz, an unknown University of Chicago grad student, 
published a paper on what he called ‘a theory of portfolio selection’ (1952), mathematical 
modelling penetrated academic research on finance and gave birth to a host of scholarship 
advancing what would come to be known as modern finance theory (Bernstein, 1998). 
This, in turn, sparked innovation in financial markets. As Robert Merton, Nobel Prize 
laureate in Economics credited with the refinement of the Black-Scholes formula, argued 
four decades later:  
“In summary, in the vast bulk of the past, mathematical models have had a limited 
and ancillary impact on finance practice. But during the last two decades, these 
models have become central to practitioners in financial institutions and markets 
around the world. In the future, mathematical models are likely to have an 
indispensable role in the functioning of the global financial system including 
regulatory and accounting activities.” (1994, p. 460) 
The view that ‘valuation equals model application’ was solidified by sustained 
breakthroughs in academic scholarship which translated into palpable, useable 
instruments in financial markets. For example, before Markowitz’s mean-variance theory 
of portfolio selection, the idea that a group of securities managed in synchronicity can 
yield, over the medium to long term, a higher value than managing a single asset at a time, 
based on the return it provided at that moment in time, was unthinkable (Bernstein, 1998). 
Investment and asset management was crippled by the idea that stocks are essentially bets 
82 
 
that should be cherry-picked but that could not shake off the risks involved; the latter are 
simply ingrained in the nature of stock markets. By using mathematical modelling, which 
was revolutionary enough in the field at the time, Markowitz (1952) proposed the idea of 
a portfolio grounded in a diversified holding of stocks, with total return equivalent to the 
average of the rates of return displayed by each individual stock. By building such a 
portfolio, investors could not only mitigate risk, but actually manage it actively and 
construct bespoke investment profiles predicated on degrees of risk-appetite.  
Markowitz brought complex mathematical calculations to finance, but the real 
breakthrough for the money management industry came with Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965), whose Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) became the foundation for 
quantifying the return that a risky asset should bring in order for it to be included in a 
diversified portfolio. In a nutshell, CAPM states that the expected return of an asset equals 
the risk-free rate of return (for instance, a US Treasury bond yield) plus a risk premium. 
The latter is a function of the expected market rate of return (less the risk-free rate) and 
the volatility of the asset in question, or beta. Beta is the individualised risk that the asset 
brings to the portfolio, and it is gauged not by looking at absolute returns, but at return 
relative to the market. CAPM and its further improvements were employed for measuring 
the risk of a security and investment performance, and show how theoretical innovations 
turned into tools and became industry staples.  
One last example of this process is especially telling, given the impact that it had on 
practice and the speed with which it was adopted from academia directly onto trading 
floors: the Black-Scholes model for options pricing (Black & Scholes, 1973). This fateful 
model would change the face of options trading on the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
within two years of its opening (which coincided with the publication of Black and 
Scholes’s paper) and would lead to a long-time boom in derivatives trading, due to the 
fact that “virtually from the day it was published, this work brought the field to closure 
on the subject” (Merton, 1994, p. 454). Indeed Merton (1994) notes that a bespoke 
calculator utilising the Black-Scholes model was created by Texas Instruments and was 
adopted in options pricing and hedging, and that such a rapid embracing of theory, which 
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would not only overhaul practice, but also usher in a new form of trading, was 
unprecedented.  
Simply put, the Black-Scholes model sought to calculate the price of a stock option by 
replicating, in a dynamic and continuously adjusting manner, a portfolio in the underlying 
stock (Black & Scholes, 1973). If the prices diverge, this creates opportunities for 
arbitrage, therefore the options price has to be constantly equal to the underlying portfolio. 
That said, the value of the underlying stock is assumed to be stochastic, with the stock 
price in time t completely independent of the price in t+1. The price of the derivative – 
for instance, a call option – is then equal to the price of the stock minus the strike price 
(that is, the stock delivery price), both adjusted for spread, interest rate, and volatility. 
This assumption of volatility, though somewhat present – albeit in an implicit way – in 
previous understandings of stock price movements, now has the far-reaching consequence 
of consolidating a new financial object – implied volatility – as a legitimate investible in 
itself that yields higher returns the bigger its value and quasi-independently of the 
underlying assets (Wigan, 2009). This aspect, also known as the ‘random walk’ (Malkiel, 
1973), is far from insignificant. On the contrary, it is one of the most powerful assets of 
the Black-Scholes model and goes a long way in explaining why the model stood the test 
of time in the finance sector and became a staple in derivatives trading. The fact that 
financial derivatives now constitute the bulk of financial transactions worldwide (Hull, 
2014) testifies to the salience of financial theory and its impact on ‘real world’ activity.  
Nowadays, finance professionals use some of these models and representations, albeit in 
tailored and modified versions in order to suit the particular financial operation in which 
they are engaging. In practice, there are a host of other models as well, each with its own 
assumptions regarding the things that count for value and the manner in which the 
counting should be done, while building to a greater or lesser extent on the insights 
provided by the profusion of academic research on finance since the 1950s. But while 
diverse, they do share some common traits and can be grouped together. Financial 
textbooks, for instance, seem to be dominated by three dominant models that are 
employed in the valuation process: absolute value models, relative value models, and 
option pricing models (Hitchner, 2011; F. Milne, 2008; Pilbeam, 2010; Vernimmen, 
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Quiry, Dallocchio, Fur, & Salvi, 2014). It should be noted that these models are not simply 
tools that mirror or re-present the ‘fundamental’ value of specific assets or objects to be 
valued, but they are essentially building blocks through which value is constructed. The 
fact that each one of these rough models yields a different ‘estimation’ of the object’s 
value is telling enough of how models create, not reflect, value.    
Absolute value models are based on the premise that the fundamental value of an asset 
lies in the future cash flows that can be expected through its purchase (Damodaran, 2012). 
In order to estimate this value, the present value of the expected cash flow is calculated 
by discounting back using a rate that accounts for the riskiness of the investment. By using 
the method of discounting cash flows, this model yields the net present value of the 
investment, which can be utilised in assessing its opportunity cost. The rationale for 
relying on a discount rate is that riskier future cash flows should make the net present 
value of assets lower, given that an investor can always choose to place the money in a 
safe security such as a Treasury bond. Despite the significant degree of guesswork 
involved in both the gauging of the future cash flows and in the choice of discount rate, 
absolute value models are one of the most popular models used in financial valuation, 
making some critics go as far as to claim that capitalism itself relies on the logic of 
rendering any possible thing into an investible by discounting to present value (Nitzan & 
Bichler, 2009).  
Relative value models take a more agnostic view of value, construing the asset to be 
valued as an object amongst an ocean of similar and comparable objects, which, given 
they are valued on and by the market, can provide a reference point to extrapolating the 
value of object to be valued. This method relies on construing the market as a site of 
veridiction (Foucault, 2010), a place where price discovery is undertaken in a constant 
and automated manner, by the aggregation of all available information and the balancing 
out of supply and demand dynamics. This, of course, is based on the efficient markets 
hypothesis (EMH), which assumes that the market, operating in a state of liquidity and 
full-information availability, is the best means for the gauging of prices (Read, 2012). In 
contrast to absolute value models, this approach jettisons the idea that there is intrinsic 
value (or that, if there is, it can be grasped), and implies that the value of an asset equals 
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the value of the most similar asset found on the market. Evidently, where singular goods 
are concerned, which lack reference items and indeed a perfectly operating market, 
relative value models do not apply and are replaced by absolute ones.  
Absolute and relative value models have been around for an enduring period, but recently, 
building on the expansion of mathematised finance theory in the decades following 1952, 
financial analysts have increasingly applied models used to value options and other 
derivatives to valuing assets, businesses, and stocks, generally the ones that have option-
like features (Damodaran, 2012). The example of an oil company is rather edifying: the 
investment is composed of the asset itself (the development of the oil mine) and the 
underlying asset (the oil price). If the oil price increases, this provides the investors with 
a call option opportunity. Furthermore, as opposed to the absolute value models, which 
rely on expected cash flows considered statically and singularly, in this case it is presumed 
that the activity of the oil company can be adjusted according to the oil price swings, and 
thus an option premium can be attached to the discounted cash flow. The case of patents 
is similar: neither absolute nor relative value models can estimate their value accordingly 
given their unpredictable development and singularity. A great deal of emphasis is placed 
on contingency and firm ability to dealing with it, which adds another reason to why this 
model is also known as contingent claim valuation.  
All in all, financial valuation is a routine practice occurring in the finance industry; that 
said, temporarily suspending its ordinariness (as it happened on the 9th of August 2007) 
can reveal how it in fact relies on instruments and models that took decades into making, 
and that, by cycling or modifying them to greater or lesser degrees, can display starkly 
different estimations and orders of value. These socio-cognitive but also material 
prostheses weigh heavily on financial activity and serve, among other things, to grasp and 
crystallise value as financial value. But despite all acknowledgement of its tentative, 
spontaneous, or malleable nature, financial valuation is employed with confidence and 
resoluteness. This creates a problem, because, by focusing mostly on iterations of these 
three models, it also leads to an understanding of financialisation as simply a case of the 
application of these pre-existing models upon that non-financial spaces in a linear and 
unidirectional manner, as if the only aspect that matters or that makes the process of 
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financialisation possible is the extrinsic application of, say, discounted cash flow models 
on new sources of capital accumulation, and not also other endogenous processes of 
fashioning that source into a value-producing entity. This view then misses out on wider 
aspects of worth-attribution and ends up with a partial understanding of the more 
pervasive pillars of financialisation.  
Alas, within financial circles, although the explicit goal of financial valuation is to 
‘uncover prices’ and sometimes there is even a discursive equivalence between valuation 
and price, in practice the scope of valuation is a broader one, and much more similar to 
the valuation perspective developed here. Financial valuation considers or accounts for 
the value of something, and it does so in practice, actively and dynamically, by 
constituting value with a view of utilising it for the purpose of business. The language 
finance professionals use in this practice involves describing valuation as more or less 
‘smart’, implying that there is no inherent value before the act of valuation, and that the 
latter is entirely an unique, creative, and pragmatic process, intimately entwined with the 
actors involved, the tools used, and the purpose envisaged (Muniesa, 2011). The value of 
an asset is different before valuation than after it; likewise, different actors with different 
tools or purposes might arrive at different values. In the opening anecdote, the fact that 
the value of the tranches of securities that were valued similarly by credit rating agencies 
both plummeted and diverged shows that it is not accurate to see value as being simply 
‘represented’ or ‘discovered’; rather, in some sense these organisational entities create the 
value itself. Take the following description of the interplay between the process of rating 
and the value of a security:  
“The grade given to a security issued by a company, bank, or country is the 
measure that communicates the risks involved. These ratings might or might not 
deliver accurate predictions but they are the basis by which markets value the debt. 
[…] That the ratings themselves influence the value of the object rated shows how 
judgments do not just measure value but constitute it. Value is a result of 
interpretation and not an objective measure of an inherent quality.” (Beckert & 
Aspers, 2010, p. 22) 
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Value, in this case, is the result of a judgement and of the embedding of that judgement 
into a practical instrument – a rating – that can be utilised by other actors as an objective 
anchor which generates a specific price based on a pre-set algorithm. This works, because 
in a sense this is the socio-financial contract to which all financial actors subscribe, as the 
following description of use of the average valuation formula suggests: 
“A financial analyst is busy crunching data in order to obtain some reliable figures 
about the value of an asset that her employer, a private equity fund, is likely to 
acquire. Some mathematics is involved. The formula indicates the rate the targeted 
company is expected to pay to its creditors or its owners. The formula is a 
convention, and hardly anybody expects it to be absolutely accurate. The analyst 
knows that, but she uses it mainly because everybody else does, and also because 
she needs to use something and the formula is there, available. She also knows, as 
you do, that the data may be flawed, that the company’s value is ultimately 
uncertain and that she is basically tinkering. Yet, the figures are calculated, and a 
financial decision is solidly based on them. On tinkering?” (Muniesa, 2014, p. 1) 
By relying on such socio-institutional supports, particular assets assume specific values 
that would otherwise look different when they are sifted through other supports. That is 
why, specifically in finance circles, valuation is understood to be something that occurs 
in practice, as a performance, and through the addition of various socio-cognitive 
prostheses, much like in spirit of Dewey’s pragmatism (1939) and his call for a flank 
movement in the understanding of valuation.   
That financial models and formulas are performative – in other words, that they are 
performed or acted out, pragmatically – rather than representational is a founding axiom 
of social studies of finance (SSF). Ever since traditional sociology moved from a 
sociology of persons to a sociology of things (Boltanski, Esquerre, & Muniesa, 2015), the 
emphasis has been placed on what these ‘calculative tools’ (Callon, 1998) actually do, not 
what they mirror, reflect, or represent. These calculative tools, sociologists of finance 
point out, can range anywhere from the very abstract and theoretical to the very concrete 
and material. The very title of Donald MacKenzie’s book, An Engine, Not a Camera: How 
88 
 
Financial Models Shape Markets (2008), whose research was the mainspring for the 
explosion of SSF scholarship in the English language speaking community, is indicative 
enough of the premise that financial models, formulas, or theories create or ignite financial 
markets, rather than re-present them (quite literally, present them again in a different 
medium) similar to a photo camera. Examples in this category of calculative tools 
investigated for their performative capacity include the Black-Scholes model of 
derivatives pricing (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003), market indices (Millo, 2007), various 
instruments employed in the service of credit rating agencies (MacKenzie, 2011; Poon, 
2009; Rona-Tas & Hiss, 2010), and the Gaussian copula (MacKenzie & Spears, 2014). It 
can be said then that financial models and formulas, together with financial theory more 
generally, not only capture reality in abstract terms, but actually institute it, creating 
financial markets and practices more broadly: the Black-Scholes model was the 
instrument utilised for the expansion of derivative markets; the FICO score was central in 
the creation and spread of subprime mortgage finance; the Gaussian copula was the 
foundation for pricing various CDOs, thereby creating markets in them. Realities are 
hence brought into being by abstract concepts and tools that simply purport to describe 
and represent.  
At another end lies the issue of materiality and its complementary centrality in the 
constitution of financial markets. The development of information and communication 
technologies had already transformed the face of finance in the second half of the 20th 
century (Neal, 2015; Strange, 1986), but this broad, structural evolution has always been 
underpinned by important leaps at the micro level, in the form of seemingly insignificant, 
but actually essential, material tools. First of all, financial markets, far from embodying 
the ideal of a digitised and interconnected global arena unencumbered by geography or 
matter, are in fact highly concentrated in relatively few ‘global cities’ that harbour the 
technology and computers – hardware and software – that constitute, through the network 
created through their interaction, the plumbing of global finance (Sassen, 2006). Delving 
even deeper, it emerges that desks and their physical orientation and organisation are 
central for the actual creation of opportunities for trading on a trade floor through pattern 
recognition and intelligence distribution (Beunza & Stark, 2006). In fact, something as 
puny and seemingly trivial as a stock ticker might have far-reaching and indeed 
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constitutive implications for financial markets (Preda, 2006). These observations become 
ever more insightful given contemporary developments at the interstices between finance 
and technology, witnessed, for instance, in the rise of automated and high-frequency 
trading (Dragos & Wilkins, 2014). The main implication here is that anthropocentric 
views of agency are insufficient or incorrect in grasping the complexity of agency in 
financial markets, and that the focus should be moved on the assemblage, construction, 
or configuration of human agents, spatial arrangements, social networks, conceptual tools, 
material instruments, financial theories, formal or informal rules of conduct, notice 
boards, etc., which is eloquently captured by the notions of ‘calculative agency’ or 
‘agencements’ (Callon, 1998, 2008). The latter is what really ‘has’ agency or capacity to 
act in the financial realm. Attention to all these socio-technical dimensions, material and 
immaterial, therefore, is paramount to grasping and explaining the mechanisms and 
dynamics of financial agency.  
To conclude, a narrow understanding of financial valuation not only does it capture a very 
limited part of what goes on in the valuation process, but it also has very limited scope 
for being employed as a tool in understanding the process of financialisation. By seeing 
the latter as a case of the application of absolute, relative, or option-pricing models, it 
leads to a self-referential situation in which non-financial spaces would simply be 
distorted and adjusted to the straightjacket of financial valuation narrowly understood. It 
is only by adopting a broader understanding of valuation processes suggested by socio-
economic perspectives on the issue, that we can move to a more profound and 
encompassing grasp of the process of financialisation. This task becomes all the more 
urgent after one looks at the space which financial valuation would come to inhabit: the 
social policy field. The latter, as the next section will show, is already characterised by 
specific inherent dynamics and historical links which are not and arguably cannot be 
integrated in financial forms of valuation.   
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3. Integrating the social  
 
Finance, with its financial forms of valuation, advances in the social policy arena. What 
does it have to contend with here? To begin with, when looking at social impact 
investment, a founding pillar is the meticulous conceptual delineation of the social 
dimension(s) upon which the intervention is undertaken. Whether it is reoffending, 
homelessness, or inclusive growth, impact investment projects generally start with the 
careful demarcation of the target population, the identification of the social risk 
confronting the population, the elaboration of a theory of change or intervention, and the 
specification of potential pathways to better outcomes (Social Finance, 2013). At first 
sight, there is not much novelty in impact investment when compared to traditional ways 
of pursuing social policy; however, what should be noted in the case of impact investment 
is that, at each stage of the engineering of an impact project, there is a strong incentive – 
and indeed an accompanying practice – to combine social theory with ‘hard’ social 
science methods, especially when it comes to the analysis of social dynamics and the 
creation of outcome scenarios. The latter, in particular, rely on the creation of usually 
bespoke metrics for measuring the impact an intervention had on the target population, 
ranging from simple arithmetic measures to more sophisticated experimental methods 
such as randomised controlled trials, long considered the gold standard in medical settings 
and adopted as best practice in social impact investment (Osrin et al., 2009). Outcome 
measurements are not simply guarantees or indicators of the success of a project, but are 
essential indices tied to the financial structure of the investment, with return generally 
predicated on degrees of impact and fluctuating based on the degree achieved.  
What this implies is that financial instruments such as social impact bonds resemble some 
of the financial innovations that took off in the late 20th century, especially derivatives, 
given that what investors buy, at least narrowly seen, is exposure to the performance of 
an asset – the social project funded by the social impact bond – without ownership of that 
underlying asset. One of the perceived consequences of this development is that it 
accelerates the degree of commodification in society by prioritising competitive rates of 
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return and calculative logics in the organisation of social relations (Bryan & Rafferty, 
2014), instead of providing top-down redistributive policies, while embedding markets in 
society and ensuring de-commodification, as per the more conventional understanding of 
the functions of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1989; Polanyi, 1944). According to 
this view, social policy has the function of creating a protective buffer against the 
deleterious social consequences of market vagaries, and the welfare state is viewed as 
being essentially antagonistic to the workings and penalties of the unshackled economy.  
At the same time, impact investment is, in the end, a channel through which social policy 
objectives are pursued. Leaving aside the indirect consequences it might have, at face 
value impact investment seeks to harness the resources of private capital markets and 
direct them to social programmes. Seen from this angle, impact investment can be said to 
transcend the dichotomy laid out by the antagonistic view of the welfare state, and, 
contrary to the narrative of the pernicious effects of laissez-faire capitalism, to cultivate 
the power of unbridled markets for welfare goals.  
While this can be seen, at first gasp, as a novelty pursuant the emergence of practices of 
impact investment, in fact this development falls into line with other interpretations of the 
source and evolution of the welfare state. Some strands of Marxism, for one, have already 
emphasised that, far from consisting into an engine for de-commodification, the safety net 
that the welfare state put into place throughout western societies acted to deepen 
consumerism and commodification (Jessop, 2002; Panitch & Gindin, 2013). By providing 
workers, for instance, with unemployment benefits, this ensures that in case an individual 
becomes jobless, he or she can draw on this purchasing power of last resort to continue 
fulfilling the demand functions that sustain the operations of the economy. In point of 
fact, all benefits accrued by the working classes can be perceived as working to supersede 
the paradox of employers being incentivised to exploit workers as much as possible, 
which is, in the long term, detrimental to capital as a class category (Steinmetz, 1993). 
Accounts of welfare inspired by Marxism thus yield perspectives on social policy that do 
not necessarily include elements of antagonism, but rather complementarity and 
reinforcement.  
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These narratives fit somewhat with the thrust of social investment. Some degree of 
conceptual continuity in the understanding of the means and goals of social policy 
delivery can be identified. For instance, while the determinants and further development 
of the Western welfare state are a matter of unresolved disputes, its first expression as a 
mature institutional feature of Western states is by and large agreed to come, towards the 
end of the 19th century, under the guise of social insurance (see, for instance, Ewald, 1986; 
Steinmetz, 1993; Hennock, 2007; Baldwin, 2008; Fraser, 2009; Castles, Leibfried, Lewis, 
Obinger, & Pierson, 2012). Social insurance crystallised a specific and novel view of ‘the 
social’ as a dynamic reality subject to specific inherent laws that are accessible to 
knowledge and action. The corollary of this finding was that the social was always 
accompanied by a degree of social risk which is insurmountable, but which can be priced 
away as compensation through social insurance. Similarly, financial instruments that fund 
social policy programmes work through the identification of particular social risk and 
their pricing away to private capital market actors. There are definitely some similarities 
and affinities, but more important is the fact that finance, as will be shown below, had to 
grapple with a social space that was not an empty signifier, but a ‘reality’ perceived to 
have inherent traits and dynamics. This created both opportunities and limitations.  
 
1. Policy and political economy 
 
What made ‘the social’ amenable to being integrated in an economic logic is a particular 
interplay between knowledge and power that has characterised the development of the 
modern nation-state. For instance, from the mid-16th century onwards, it is not only the 
case that the medieval and classical antiquity political treatises that took the form of 
princely advice on the “proper conduct, the exercise of power, the means of securing the 
acceptance and respect of his subjects, the love of God and obedience to him, the 
acceptance of divine law to the cities of men, etc.” (Foucault, 1991, p. 87) suddenly 
disappear and give way to something that can be described as ‘the art of government’, but 
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also that the entire issue of ‘government’ explodes in both depth and breadth. From the 
Stoic question of how to govern oneself and the Christian question of how to govern souls, 
to the rise of pedagogy with the issue of governing children and finally the problem of 
governing the state, the concept of ‘government’ emerges as the nodal point tying society 
together under the auspices of a prince that is no longer required to merely obey universal 
and established norms, but to actively manage the subjects of his reign. Most importantly, 
the object of that practice is no longer a territory – or not simply a territory – but a 
population. And the issue of population will turn out to be essential to the development 
of the art of government throughout the next centuries. Crucially, at this point in the 16th 
century, the main predicament that the various political treatises attempt to overcome is 
that of “defining the particular form of governing which can be applied to the state as a 
whole” (Foucault, 1991, p. 91). The recurrent answer that is given is that ‘economy’, 
which is to say the norms governing the perpetuation and augmentation of individuals, 
goods, and wealth within the family, is the best model for governing the population at 
large in a top-bottom model. A good prince therefore is one that behaves towards its 
subjects in a manner similar to that of head of a family looking after his household and 
belongings. 
The dominant issue thus becomes how to introduce ‘economy’ into political management. 
What can be observed in this regard is that as soon as the household economic model 
penetrates political practice, it suffers fundamental modifications, acquires a modern 
meaning, and produces consequences for the exercise of political power: “the word 
‘economy’, which in the 16th century signified a form of government, comes in the 18th 
century to designate a level of reality, a field of intervention” (Foucault, 1991, p. 93). 
Government is no more about overseeing static objects (in the sense of observing whether 
subjects obey the written laws or unwritten customs and norms or not and punishing them 
accordingly if required), it is now about managing dynamic realities: a complex of 
individuals interacting not just with one another, but with the things surrounding them as 
well. The ruling bodies will now have to secure the increase in the nation’s wealth, the 
reproduction of the population, the predictable provision of an uninterrupted flow of the 
means of its subsistence, and so on.  
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What emerges then is the idea of ‘statistics’, or “the science of the state” (Foucault, 1991, 
p. 96). Mercantilism, for instance, as a form of rationalisation of the incipient art of 
government organised around the theme of ‘reason of state’, was based on the idea that 
the global economy is a zero-sum game and that the aim of each state is to ensure that it 
acquires a large slice of the total amount of world monetary reserves (i.e. gold) through 
managed international trade and subsidised domestic production, which would be made 
possible by the development of theories and minute instruments of measurement of trade 
flows and output such as modern accounting and double-entry bookkeeping (Magnusson, 
2015). Statistics were thus interposed as a link between the governing body and the reality 
to be governed. 
Mercantilism became the dominant model for achieving the aims of the monarchical states 
of the 16th-18th centuries. That said, the demographic changes of the late 18th century 
provided the biggest challenge to a political-economic model that was in danger of 
becoming entrenched. One of the main consequences of these changes was a re-emphasis 
on the issue of ‘population’. Until this point, the population issue would emerge time and 
again as a result of some catastrophic event – epidemic, war, famine, etc. – if only, though, 
as its negative, that is, depopulation, and the ensuing question of repopulating barren 
territory (Elden, 2007). ‘Population’, in its new positive sense, is no longer merely the 
aggregation of the totality of individuals inhabiting a particular space; ‘population’ 
becomes a specific dynamic reality: 
“Whereas statistics had previously worked within the administrative frame and 
thus in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, it now gradually reveals that 
population has its own regularities, its own rate of deaths and diseases, its cycles 
of scarcity, etc.; statistics shows also that the domain of population involves a 
range of intrinsic, aggregate effects, phenomena that are irreducible to those of the 
family, such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, ascending spirals of labour 
and wealth; lastly, it shows that, through its shifts, customs, activities, etc., 
population has specific economic effects: statistics, by making it possible to 
quantify these specific phenomena of population, also shows that this specificity 
is irreducible to the dimension of the family.” (Foucault, 1991, p. 99)  
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Population, then, is shown to have specific and observable regularities that are inherent to 
its nature and that will make the object of direct or indirect governmental action (in order 
to, for instance, influence birth rates, the inhabitation of regions, work placements, etc.). 
And the body of knowledge that facilitates the observation and manipulation of these 
parameters is the newly emergent social science called ‘political economy’. The main 
remit and at the same time objective of this discipline is to render intelligible the various 
connections and relationships between population, territory, and wealth, in order to make 
them amenable to political action.  
Thus, the introduction of the model of the economy into the political arena brought with 
it at least a three-fold transformation of political-economic thought and practice. For one, 
government is no longer concerned with merely observing and imposing the law within a 
territory; now, its main objective is to actively intervene in pursuant of various policy 
aims. Second, government has as its main target a population that is not understood simply 
in its negative form, that is, as the absence of depopulation, but as a complex and variable 
reality with particular regularities; at the same time, population is not seen as the 
aggregation of all the individuals inhabiting a particular space, but as a network of 
relationships between individuals and between individuals and things. Third, certain 
institutional and epistemological capacities are developed that allow government to 
intervene upon that dynamic reality – such as political economy; the manner in which it 
intervenes, though, is no longer based on disciplinary methods, but on ‘technologies of 
security’ (Foucault, 2009), which observe regularities, averages, frequencies, etc., and 
from which the empirically normal is derived and set as a benchmark. What is stressed 
here, then, is the importance of observing these statistics for public policy purposes.  
 
2. The social question  
 
Identifying a specific dynamic nature to the reality to be governed and elaborating the 
tools for grasping it statistically created specific opportunities for government. This is 
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connected with a couple of other developments occurring at about the same time and 
having to do with ‘the social question’. For instance, with the rise of Enlightenment and 
the advent of industrialisation at the turn of the 18th century, the legal emancipation of the 
individual and the economic liberation of labour from the shackles of traditional society 
brought into the fore the issue of the organisation of a stable modern society on inherited 
foundations that are unfit for purpose. The main obstacle to this project proved to be the 
fact that the emergence of, effectively, modern liberalism was accompanied by mass 
pauperism, due in part to urbanisation and the withering away of the traditional systems 
of social provision such as family or charity support. In France of the 18th century, this 
issue has come to be known as ‘the social question’ and it essentially referred to the rise 
of mass poverty and the debates about the most appropriate way to overcome this massive 
problem (Procacci, 1993). Leaving the latter aside, one of the unintended consequences 
of approaching this issue was the actual development of social sciences as such and of the 
idea that society cannot be understood as the mere aggregation of the totality of 
individuals, but has to grasped and is to be known as having “autonomous conditions to 
its own development and an autonomous ability to resist changing, both impossible to 
curb by law or through the market” (Procacci, 2015, p. 554). In other words, society is 
characterised by specific and rather impersonal intrinsic qualities, processes, and 
regularities, which can and should be known through objective and actuarial investigation 
– a topic essential to later understandings of the social state.  
These insights proved crucial not only to the reconceptualisation of the relationship 
between governing and the social, but also to the development of tools to influence that 
newly delineated reality. Among them, the new field of ‘sociology’ was particularly 
intriguing, dealing as it was with concepts like ‘solidarity’, ‘social fact’, ‘statistics’, and 
even ‘insurance’ (Donzelot, 1984). In fact, the latter proved very consequential, because 
it constituted the impetus for the subsequent conception and creation of the welfare state 
itself. For instance, one such milestone was represented by an obscure 1898 law insuring 
industrial workers against workplace accidents (Ewald, 1986). The 1898 law as a 
watershed in the establishment and consolidation of the French welfare state around the 
crucial category of ‘risk’. Until the adoption of the law of 9 April 1898, workplace 
accidents were governed by the idea that fault and, consequently, responsibility lied with 
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an implicated person – either the employee or the employer. In order for the employee to 
request compensation for the injury, they would have to sue the company in order to 
recover damages, if fault could be proven (Cannarsa, 2002). Given that this process was 
prohibitively onerous for the average industrial worker, the code regulating it proved 
woefully inadequate in addressing the issue of workplace accidents in the rapidly 
industrialising France of the late 19th century.  
The 1898 law completely changed the rules of the game. Rather than viewing the need for 
compensation rooted in the employer’s personal responsibility and the burden of proving 
that responsibility lying with the employee, the law stipulated that there is such a thing as 
‘workplace risk’ that is independent of any human agency and that is inherent to the 
workplace itself. This was based precisely on the astounding regularity and predictability 
encountered in the historical succession of industrial injuries, which could have only 
meant that whenever anyone engages in any workplace task, one takes upon oneself a 
specific degree of natural ‘professional risk’. The moral category of responsibility was 
thus unsurprisingly ill-suited to manage the issue and was rendered therefore obsolete. 
Compensation was now construed as a necessary cost to any industrial enterprise, which 
would thus have to be paid automatically in case an injury occurred, irrespective of the 
burden of proof. And that cost was immediately externalised to insurance companies, 
where the turnover of injury insurance ballooned sevenfold from 1895 to 1913 (Ruffat, 
1998).  
The welfare state, then, had at its origin the obscure 1898 law and at its centre a philosophy 
of objectification and monetisation of risk. By aggregating individuals and analysing past 
regularities of the group, future probable distributions of risk can be inferred. This risk 
can then be valued by weighing costs and benefits and discounted from a dedicated 
insurance fund. The story of the advent of the welfare state could very well be connected 
to the story of the emergence of the notion of risk, specifically social risk. This new 
category came thus to replace the old conception of personal and moral responsibility that 
still informed Marxist views of the workplace as a site of class struggle between workers 
and employers. Modern politics, in sum, had at its core the governmental technology of 
social risk and the odyssey of its optimal allocation. Looking at the welfare state through 
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the conceptual lens of social risk as well as through the historical practice of social 
insurance can shed light on the origins and development of social policy in the Western 
world. As such, the traditional narrative of class antagonism can be de-emphasised and 
replaced by the stress on the importance of the notion of social risk and the practice of 
pricing it away through the means of social insurance. The advent of social insurance was 
therefore a harbinger of a fundamental change in the nature of the social contract, which 
developed gradually and is still present in the contemporary design of social policy. And 
as discussed, this created opportunities for governing, while at the same time 
acknowledging the limitation that social risk cannot be completely eliminated, though it 
can be priced away. This was a crucial factor because it effectively endowed the space of 
the social with particular inherent traits and dynamics that could not be simply brushed 
aside, but had to be reckoned with one way or another. 
For the least, German and English experiences seem to vindicate this position. Before the 
French accidents law, the newly-founded German Empire found itself leading the way 
towards welfare by signing into law the Imperial Decree of 1881, which introduced 
national compulsory social insurance for sickness, accidents, old age, and invalidity 
(Kuhnle & Sander, 2012). In current settings, accident insurance is by and large one of 
the least important aspects of social insurance, but at the end of the 19th century it proved 
to be one of the most controversial and momentous policies adopted by Western states. 
Its contentious nature explains, among other things, also why it was firstly introduced in 
the context of the ‘enlightened despotism’ of Imperial Germany, and not in the liberal 
environment of the more industrialised and democratic England (Hennock, 2007). The 
fact that, at the time, the German Empire displayed higher relative – though not absolute 
– rates of industrialisation than England, coupled with the similarly significant aspect that 
it was undergoing a process of nation-building, Germany indeed spearheaded the 
introduction and consolidation of a compulsory, nation-wide system of social insurance, 
which was to be accessed not as a matter of merit, but as a matter of social right.  
Before the introduction of social insurance, both England and what was then Prussia had 
a system in place for the relief of poverty and sickness, but it was delegated mostly to 
local authorities, especially parishes, given that poverty alleviation was seen as a Christian 
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duty. With the consolidation of nation-states, a form of national legislation was 
introduced, but it still delegated the administration of poverty and sickness relief to local 
authorities. The Elizabethan Act for the Relief of the Poor (1601), for instance, put into 
place a national system of support for the unemployed, work-shy, destitute children, the 
disabled, and the infirm (Kuhnle & Sander, 2012). However, instead of creating a national 
authority to oversee the delivery of this primitive form of social policy, the system was to 
be administered by local parishes. Moreover, a clear distinction between the ‘deserving’ 
and ‘undeserving’ individual was to be upheld at all times, dismissing the idea of universal 
‘social right’.  
The sea of change that was to occur during the 19th century in Prussia is also captured by 
linguistic innovations in the German language, particularly the importation of neologisms 
denoting processes taking place between the level of the state and of the civil society qua 
aggregation of individuals. The introduction of the word sozial (social) pointed to a 
dimension of collective existence that transcended the interests of atomistic individuals 
but was also different from that of political existence (Steinmetz, 1993). The social, in 
this understanding, was a phenomenon in itself, with specific traits and dynamics, 
independent of the will of individuals or the grasp of the state. A pejorative term, it was 
soon equated with another neologism, Pauperismus, borrowed from the English, and 
denoting a sort of mass poverty that was independent of the simple sum of the individual 
poor, thus unable to be pin-pointed to individual responsibility, but perceived more and 
more to be an expression of structural forces. The advance of industrialisation and 
urbanisation also coincided with the introduction of the term Proletariat, which shifted 
the emphasis from the poor as a consequence of the natural order of things to the 
‘precarious’ as a consequence of socio-economic change. Associated with industrial 
workers, the proletariat further deepened the negative associations of this space between 
civil society and the state, adding a dimension of fear legitimised by comparison with the 
events of the French revolution. The issue of social dynamics increasingly teased out a 
distinction between ‘reform’ and ‘revolution’, with the German Empire striving to placate 
the fear of revolution and apply a specifically social type of reform. This dimension of 
collective existence, thus, was construed as being amenable not only to knowing, but also, 
more importantly, to action.  
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Social insurance, therefore, was not really meant to completely restructure socio-
economic relations, but nor was it meant to preserve the status-quo. What it strove to 
achieve was to build, top-down, a universal and overarching system on the patchy and 
relatively unorganised foundation populated by private actors (parishes and philanthropic 
organisations), in the spirit of reform and improvement. The two pillars of social insurance 
were prevention and compensation. At first, companies subject to work-related risks set 
up their own subsidiaries dedicated to insurance, and thus had a financial incentive to 
minimise the costs incurred by these subsidiaries. However, it soon proved to be the case 
that prevention was in fact itself costly, and the threat of bankruptcy in case of a major 
industrial accident would strip the workers of the possibility to acquire compensation. 
That is why companies increasingly started to appeal to third parties in the commercial 
insurance industry, which happily gobbled up this emergent and law-induced business 
(Ruffat, 1998). That said, in Imperial Germany in particular, top-down regulation forced 
each trade to establish state-sanctioned mutual associations with compulsory membership, 
which would garner financial contribution from members in order to provide 
compensation on request. The advantage that these mutual associations had in Germany 
over commercial insurance companies was that they were funded as a pay-as-you-go 
system, which implied that they were not required to establish capital buffers, and were 
thus able to provide reduced costs for trade members. In England, by contrast, mutual 
indemnity associations, albeit widespread and preferred, only covered extremely heavy 
incidents and not run of the mill work accidents that plagued specific industries on a day 
to day basis (Steinmetz, 1993). In these circumstances, commercial insurance companies 
played a more important role, benefitting also from the liberal financial environment 
characterised by lack of regulation and indeed oversight. The commercial industry could 
thus expand and play a much larger role in the delivery of social policy objectives in 
England than in Imperial Germany. 
Regardless of the origin of the actors that played a part in social insurance at the dawn of 
the welfare state, the thing to note is that this policy was similar throughout Western 
Europe and it expressed the same conceptual innovations and socio-economic concerns. 
The social – a space between the centralising power of the state and the diffusing character 
of the sum of atomised individuals – was a dimension of collective existence that had its 
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own nature and dynamics. Mostly associated with social risks, it posed deep questions 
both for the individual but especially for the state, given that an unimpeded expansion 
could bring about existential challenges for the ruling elites and the organisation of state-
individual relations. So instead of resorting to repression, which could backfire, Western 
polities decreed that a system of pricing away social risks through insurance and 
compensation could alleviate the ills accompanying increasing rates of industrialisation 
throughout the region and keep the societal order in place. The contemporary practice of 
social impact investment, while different in many respects, shares fundamentally the same 
conception when looking at the social arena as a space infused with pockets of social risk, 
which can be alleviated through pricing away, but cannot be essentially eradicated. 
Homelessness, unemployment, recidivism, illiteracy, poverty, etc. are all structural forces 
part and parcel of modern existence; the role of social policy, then and now, is to 
understand the dynamics affecting social ills and engage with third-party actors who 
would bear the financial costs of protecting against these social risks. That said, 
paradoxically, the first has to do with the preliminary steps towards constructing the 
welfare state, while the latter can and has been construed as having to do with the 
dismantling and privatisation of the same welfare state.  
 
3. The politics of numbers 
 
Establishing a link between political objectives and social realities led to a number of 
noteworthy developments that have shaped modern social policy. One is the role of 
‘expertise’ and experts. Expertise comes to shape and normalise political subjects in such 
a way that their capacity for self-regulation becomes a crucial resource, and it allows for 
a form of governing ‘at a distance’ that becomes essential in modern liberal democracies 
(Latour, 1988). This is no matter of little importance, because the technical representations 
that expertise produces is of greater consequence that a mere arcane and isolated 
endeavour: 
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“Knowing an object in such a way that it can be governed is more than a purely 
speculative activity: it requires the invention of procedures of notation, ways of 
collecting and presenting statistics, the transportation of these to centres where 
calculations and judgements can be made and so forth. It is through such 
procedures of inscription that the diverse domains of ‘governmentality’ are made 
up, that ‘objects’ such as the economy, the enterprise, the social field and the 
family are rendered in a particular conceptual form and made amenable to 
intervention and regulation.” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 5) 
A specialised language, knowledge, or science is required in order for a specific slice of 
‘reality’ to become governable. The emphasis on language implies that it is not only the 
case that a particular object has to be measured first, in order that it can be governed 
second, but also that it has to be rendered intelligible, thinkable, prior to be subjected to 
any form of action. This, again, can be done, in principle, through an unlimited array of 
conceptual instruments such as calculations, surveys, reports, white papers, and so forth.  
The inscription techniques that follow the representation of a specific object are followed 
in their turn by the endeavour of operationalising political programmes based on them. 
The interesting argument here is that far from this being an issue of unaccountable and 
isolated technocracy (Fischer, 1990), it is really an instance of a specific socially 
permeating relationship that expertise yields. And that is because of the nature and 
dimensions of the expertise compound – “that complex amalgam of professionals, truth 
claims and technical procedures” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 8) – that creates the conditions 
for regulation and intervention. Technical expertise thus allows professionals to ‘govern 
at a distance’ also through the establishment of a “loose assemblage of agents and 
agencies into a functioning network” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 10). What binds together 
this network of experts and expertise and what confers it power and applicability is not 
necessarily a specific legal, institutional, or financial connection, but rather allied and 
shared interests, as well as, and even more importantly, a particular language or jargon. 
This alignment of goals and concerns is thus made possible by the development of 
common interpretations and vocabularies, which can, eventually, bind agents that are not 
bound to a specific physical space, but are spread across different localities and strata of 
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society. This then allows them to think problems, pose questions, draw conclusions, and 
apply solutions from the same linguistic repertoire and with the same mind frame. 
Government departments, lobbyists, academia, businesses, workers, parents, etc. can thus 
retain their autonomy and separation, while participating in society within the confines of 
the same governmental programme. This is, thus, another iteration of the idea of 
‘governing at a distance’.  
A second development is concerned with the issue of risk. Risk had already emerged as 
not inherently real, but as a particular probabilistic technique employed in understanding 
and approaching problems as well as building programmatic responses to perceived future 
risk (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). In fact, liberal politics characterising modern 
industrial societies can be construed as having evolved around and being predicated on 
the notion of risk, producing an epochal rupture with pre-modern forms of social 
organisation. Risk is also connected with unprecedented technological and scientific 
change, and can be seen in fact more as an ideology rather than a concept employed to 
create solutions for mitigating the consequences of unmatched social and material 
transformations, while actually being utilised for masking the fact that these 
transformations are actually indomitable (Beck, 1992). Risk can also be conceptualised 
as being linked with an epistemological change in which “society is increasingly 
preoccupied with the future” (Giddens, 1999, p. 3). Society is thus no longer dominated 
by customary and predictable ways of being in the world, but by the preoccupation with 
unknown turns of events – or ‘manufactured risks’ – brought about by the shifting 
dynamics of industrial modernity. This, in turn, provides an impetus for societies to be 
constructed around the identification, measurement, and management of risk (Ekberg, 
2007). Liberalism, in other words, has been characterised equally by calculable risk based 
on forecasting and probabilistic science, as by incalculable uncertainty epitomised by the 
ethic of hero-entrepreneurs who plunge into an unknown future that cannot be deduced 
through statistical methods based on past patterns.  
Statistics and numbers have thus exerted a great deal of fascination within political circles, 
not least because of the capacity for accountability. Indeed, in the 19th century, suddenly, 
an avalanche of numbers can be observed throughout Europe issued by institutions such 
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as the National Debt Office of the UK, the French Ministry of Justice, and the Prussian 
Statistical Bureau (Hacking, 1990). This practice mushroomed, as will be shown below, 
with the governance revolution of the late 1980s in the UK, which ushered in the new 
approach of New Public Management (NPM) techniques and the increasing reliance on 
Value for Money (VfM) studies and programmes (Power, 1999). Auditing has been 
especially powerful as a practice, and it has operated to “penetrate deep into the core of 
organisational operations, not just in terms of requiring energy and resources to conform 
to new reporting demands but in the creation over time of new mentalities, new incentives 
and perceptions of significance” (Power, 1999, p. 7). In short, even based on incipient 
science, the technologies of standards, benchmarks, and audits have proved crucial in 
moulding organisational structures and practices, and have contributed to advancing 
programmes of governing at a distance.  
The dawn of the Western welfare state coincides, then, to a large degree, with the 
consolidation of statistical sciences as legitimate fields of inquiry. As it will be shown 
below, the reliance on quantitative evidential data is similarly important for the social 
investment market. And the legitimacy of this new form of knowledge can even be 
considered to be derivative of the emerging administrative apparatus at the centre of the 
state. Indeed, as mentioned above, ‘statistics’ itself denoted a ‘science of the state’, having 
as its core purpose the counting and classification of subjects. Of course, under one form 
or another, enumeration has been a constant feature of political communities throughout 
the world, at least for the purpose of military recruitment and, at times, taxation. But what 
was generally considered to be a matter of state secrecy, being kept away for the public 
eye, gradually started to be unveiled during the 19th century, while acquiring a new 
meaning and bearing on the administration of state power. Dominated in the 17th and 18th 
centuries by the philosophical question of human nature, as debated by the likes of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, the question of the individual pointed, at the advent of the 
19th century and in the eye of state bureaucracy, to ‘normal people’ as signifier of the 
subject of political exercise (Hacking, 1990). The notion of ‘normalcy’ was a crucial one. 
On the one hand, it implied that what was commonly referred to as universal laws of 
nature, in particular human nature, needed not apply any more. There were individuals 
that conformed to the norm, and there were individuals that deviated from the said norm. 
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On the other hand, the jettisoning of the notion of universality did not mean that a descend 
into chaos and indeterminacy was inevitable. For the concept of ‘normalcy’ brought with 
it its own sense of regularity: a ‘normal individual’ was identifiable and statistically 
significant. The law of averages came to replace strict causal connections that were the 
epistemological bases for approaching social realities. Now, large populations revealed 
law-like statistical regularities.  
The first enumerations and classifications done for the purpose of government were 
precisely the ones that sanctioned deviancy: madness, disease, prostitution, pauperism, 
births, baptisms, deaths, etc. (Foucault, 1988, 1990, 1995). These statistics circumscribed, 
negatively, the boundaries of what came to be described as normal. By extrapolation, the 
data collected from industrial accidents came to be viewed in the same light, and a politics 
of large numbers appeared, which associated, as described above, the practice of insurance 
with intervention on statistically-backed social risk events. This politics of large numbers, 
moreover, was buttressed on new institutional forms that sought to address social risks by 
combining statistics with legislation. In Britain, for instance, ever since the beginning of 
the 19th century, there existed a close association between statistical knowledge and public 
administration. Even though the latter was mostly undertaken, before the first nation-wide 
legislation that signalled the advent of national welfare, at a local level, the fact that 
Britain had a strong public sphere composed of scientists, intellectuals, and university 
professors oriented towards practical knowledge meant that the production and diffusion 
of statistical knowledge – especially regarding poverty, public health, and unemployment 
– could take place unimpeded and could inform administrative decisions throughout the 
state (Desrosières, 2010).  
Two branches constituted the foundation of public statistics in 19th century Britain: the 
Board of Trade (as part of the Ministry of Commerce), and the General Register Office 
(GRO). The former dealt with collecting economic data (trade statistics, imports, exports, 
etc.), while the latter dealt with social statistics, and was central to the administration of 
the Poor Laws (Szreter, 1991). The GRO came to replace the scattered system of civil 
registration in England and Wales, which relied on parishes recording births, marriages, 
and deaths, which became increasingly more inadequate due to rising non-conformism 
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and tolerance of non-Anglican denominations. But the GRO was crucial in two aspects: 
first, it recorded more detailed statistics, such as percentages of deaths related to particular 
causes, and it did so attaching additional geographical data so as to locate areas of social 
risk; second, it compiled national averages, which became norms, and it calculated 
municipal deviations from those norms (Higgs, 2004). These two aspects combined had 
the consequence of transforming statistical data into indicators of municipal public policy, 
with localities that were straying too much from averages being forced to address the 
underlying issues giving rise to such negative results. For instance, a public health law 
from 1848 stipulated that municipalities that were surpassing the national average of 23 
deaths per 1000 people had to set up health tables and undertake sanitary reforms 
(Desrosières, 2010). By tinkering with the statistics, these standards could be pushed even 
higher: say, by establishing the average death rate from the healthiest ten percent of 
municipalities as the ideal. The dialogue between scholars of statistics and public 
institutions in Britain thus transformed statistics into a science of the state and not merely 
an intellectual endeavour for its own sake. Through this avalanche of numbers, ‘the social’ 
thus became not only known, but also amenable to intervention in an informed and 
scientifically backed manner. 
All in all, as this section shows, finance, in its trotting advance in the field of social policy, 
encountered a complex space characterised by an age-old struggle to perfect mechanisms 
for the quantitative grasp of social dynamics and risk, and utilise these tools and associated 
forms of knowledge in a logic of governing, according to specific policy goals and 
political ideologies. Of course, through various funding mechanisms and inevitably as the 
role of finance in society expanded throughout the years, finance and social policy have 
always been tied in one way or another. But social investment, through its stated aim of 
fashioning social programmes into opportunities for capital accumulation, including via 
the creation of financial assets in their own right, represents a higher order development. 
Regardless of that, the financialisation of this field could not be rendered successful 
through the mere application of financial forms of valuation, as these were not sufficiently 
malleable or indeed even applicable to the social policy arena. The social had its own 
dynamics and regularities, as evidenced by a century of attempts at its statistical 
apprehension, and the only kind of financial value that could be created here was the one 
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occurring in the process of compensation or, in other words, in the pricing away of social 
risk through insurance. Financial forms of valuation had no bearing upon the social itself 
and upon the process of value creation within the social space. The latter was still the 
remit of state, and finance was on the sideline. Things are not the same when it comes to 
social impact investment. In order to understand what actually occurred as social 
investment emerged, the need to move on from assuming that financialisation equals the 
embrace of financial valuation is imperative.   
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4. A flank movement: Valuation as framework 
 
In order to understand the underlying value infrastructure created as finance marches on 
in the social policy sector, a framework for analysis is required: in this case, the focus is 
on the valuation framework. During the past decade, the issue of valuation emerged anew 
as a topical subject-matter central to the understanding of the construction and functioning 
of markets of all sorts. Instead of representing simple economic facts, markets and money 
have been shown to mobilise a complex social structure that goes beyond the isolated 
spaces of the production site or the individual consumer, and this process involves, 
crucially, various systems of worth, evaluation, ranking, rating, etc. that constitute the 
plumbing of markets and are part and parcel of its dynamics (Kockelman, 2006; Maurer, 
2006; Muniesa, 2007; Ortiz, 2005; Stark, 2011; Vatin, 2009). In 2011, calls have been 
issued for a renewed ‘flank movement’ in the study of valuation (Muniesa, 2011).  
The intention was to build on the pragmatist theory of John Dewey (1913, 1918, 1939), 
whose original call for a ‘flank movement’ was issued almost a century before, as a better 
way to achieve a more refined understanding of the creation or construction of value, 
rather than to rely on the old subjective-objective binary or to accord too much primacy 
to one particular dimension of the valuation process, like models in the case of financial 
valuation. Dewey, alongside Charles Sanders Pierce and William James, is considered to 
be one of the founding fathers of pragmatism, a philosophical current that underlines that 
the intellect’s main function is not to represent or describe reality, but to envisage and 
construct avenues for problem-solving through practical action (Biesta & Burbules, 
2003). From a pragmatist perspective, most human dimensions, ranging from knowledge 
and science to language and ideology, are construed as instruments and prostheses devised 
with the purpose of ordering reality and rendering it navigable. The same is the case with 
value, where, instead of assuming that it is either something an object has or something 
that is bequeathed upon the object by the impression of some external actor, the study of 
value would benefit from an approach that looks at its construction-in-action. Indeed, 
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when it comes to the subjective-objective understandings of value, Dewey’s sentence is 
unambiguous:  
“The conclusion is not that value is subjective, but that it is practical. The situation 
in which judgement of value is required is not mental, much less fanciful. It is 
existential, but it exists as something whose good or value resides (first) in 
something to be attained in action and (secondly) whose value both as an idea and 
as existence depends upon judgement on what to do. Value is ‘objective,’ but it is 
such in an active or practical situation, not apart from it. To deny the possibility 
of such a view, is to reduce the objectivity of every tool and machine to the 
physical ingredients that compose it, and to treat a distinctive ‘plow’ character as 
merely subjective.” (Dewey, 1915, p. 516) 
Value as either subjective or objective is an empty category for analysis. Instead, it should 
be replaced with the notion of valuation, which emphasises the practicality of the notion 
of value, as something that is considered, conceived, and constructed in practice or in 
action. Looking at value(s) from this perspective has the advantage of providing a more 
encompassing grasp of their coming into being: “to say of something that it is ‘done’ 
subjectively or objectively is less mutually exclusive than to say that it ‘is’ subjective or 
objective” (Muniesa, 2011, p. 25). In other words, there is scope for the notion of 
‘subjectivity’, but only in so far as it is understood as the action of an individual in the 
valuation process; similarly, there is scope for the notion of ‘objectivity’, but only in so 
far as it is understood as the result of a valuation process. With this caveat in mind, in the 
end the subjective-objective binary is irrelevant. What matters is the action or 
performance of valuation: how an entity is given or attains a certain type of value (Lamont, 
2012). This does not (only) happen in the mind of an individual, nor is it (simply) 
inscribed in the commodity; it is done by practice and through experience, through 
dialogue and negotiation, consensus and contention about systems of reference, the 
establishment of legitimate judges, the inter-relational comparison between entities, etc.  
The field of social impact investment is particularly amenable to constituting a case 
through which to respond to Dewey’s call for a flank movement. Resting as it does on the 
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notion of ‘blended value’, the market for social investment has had to go through a lengthy 
valuation process in order to fashion and delineate a new value form in the guise of 
blended value, and the manner in which this has been undertaken can be appropriately 
illuminated through the application of said valuation perspective. But so far, there have 
not been any attempts at providing a guiding map for investigating valuation processes. 
That said, the existing literature analysing processes of worth-attribution provides some 
hints at what the specific stages of the process of worth attribution could be. This thesis 
will attempt to tease out an original framework out of those scattered insights, and apply 
it on the case of the financialisation of the social policy field.  
The framework could be summarised as such: the coming into being of a new value form 
seems to track a process of negotiation, selection, ordering, abstraction, standardisation, 
and institutionalisation. At the end of the tunnel is a new form of value that becomes 
amenable to be utilised in various other social processes as a legitimate and operational 
integrative factor. Dividing the valuation process thusly reveals both the stages which led 
to its creation and its constitutive components. The next part will attempt to discuss these 
stages based on the insights from which they were drawn.  
Negotiation is a preliminary process that has to do with the very first deliberations 
regarding the new value form that is considered for conception. As such, it is a highly 
interactive process occurring among a number of parties and is characterised by 
discussion, contestation, feedback, and potentially contention and struggle. Take the 
transactional relations established as a result of the contact between people from the 
Pacific coast and Europeans: instead of conforming to Mauss’s idea of ‘the gift’ as a 
general heuristic tool that would be applicable to and would elucidate non-European 
forms of exchange, the records of the Europeans’ interactions with islanders point to the 
highly experimental nature of exchange on both sides (Thomas, 1991). The objects in 
which they traded – food, tools, weapons, artefacts – presented no self-emergent form of 
value for each side, and when specific values did crystallise, they proved to be short-lived, 
variable, and changing. Furthermore, upon the establishment of transactional relations, no 
one-way imposition of, for instance, European modes of valuation upon non-European 
ones occurred. Rather, what succeeded was re-contextualisation based on negotiation of 
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various subjective rationalities. In establishing the value of things, especially when it 
comes to alien or novel objects, local practices and inter-subjective interactions at the 
level of the singular event were preliminary.  
In another instance, the transactional relations established in Atlantic Africa at the end of 
the 20th century reveal the primacy of negotiation processes (Guyer, 2004). In this case, 
the emphasis is not only on individual and context-specific processes of valuation, but 
also on the personalities of the people involved in these acts of negotiation. Thus, the 
diversity of items that have functioned as currencies, registers, and scales are explained 
by the creativity and interaction of individuals involved in the quest for making ‘marginal 
gains’. Monetary multiplicities functioned at the same time, with overlapping forms of 
currency ebbing and flowing as successful personalities engaged in practices to ensure 
margins. The ingeniousness and thrust of these individuals was manifested in the 
asymmetrical exchange they attempted to produce by employing different scales of value 
and equivalence for the same types of goods, as opposed to the universal scales of classical 
and neoclassical economics – labour or demand and supply. As soon as one individual’s 
marginal gain successfully re-negotiated the contextuality a specific commodity, this 
would tip the exchange in favour of his scale and processes of inflationary pressure would 
soon follow, allowing for other competitive scales to emerge and challenge the dominance 
of the former. Thus the idea of a market economy buttressed on a uniform currency that 
generates equivalence between all goods could not be found in Atlantic Africa. Instead, 
various overlapping logics of negotiation and de-contextualisation together with re-
contextualisation, driven by creative individuals endowed with interests and intelligence, 
emerged constantly to challenge entrenched practices and were effaced as soon as other, 
more potent agreements, appeared. Negotiation, in this case, was diverse and dynamic, 
and driven by specific actors with specific missions and intentions.  
These examples illustrate how negotiation is constitutive of value. At the same time, it is 
only one first step in the construction and entrenchment of new value forms. The second 
step is selection. Selection is important because it ensues negotiation as the target where 
the new meaning negotiated will be applied. It draws particular boundaries as to where 
the new value form negotiated can or should be found or applied. As such, it relies on 
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clarification, engagement, and commitment. Take the concept of ‘earmarking’ (Zelizer, 
1997), which has been utilised to described how attributes became attached to specific 
objects without being part of their physicality, but remaining in place independent of the 
human actor that engaged with that particular object. ‘Earmarking’ is meant to capture the 
fact that objects are not uniform, as they may embody different types of values inscribed 
in their materiality, depending on the selection to which they were subjected. Money is a 
good example, because it is often perceived to be mostly homogeneous in its appearance 
and in its function as either means of exchange, unit of account, or store of value (Dodd, 
1995; Ingham, 2004). But this ignores the more immediate social contexts in which money 
circulates and which bestow upon it diverse forms of significance that become inscribed 
in its materiality as part of a selection process. For instance, money in specific contexts 
can be ‘earmarked’ as either gift, charity, bribe, alimony, blackmail, or simply as a tip. In 
this case, the material inscription comes as an articulation of the transmitter’s significance 
on the medium, depending on the target context which was selected. Money in circulation, 
then, already reflects in different contexts the conducts and intentions of the human agents 
that were behind its handling and are now at arm’s length distance from it. This way, 
money assumes a specific selected value and becomes re-classified or re-qualified to 
function in particular social contexts, independent of human actors.  
The creation of a particular form of value necessitates also a specific ordering of the 
actors’ interaction involved in the process, which needs to be roughly replicated in all 
circumstances in which the same form of value is summoned in order for it to follow the 
particular behaviour ascribed in the actors’ intention. This insight stems from some of the 
ethnographic observations of economic anthropology and is sometimes equated with the 
notion of ‘regimes of value’ (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009). The latter concept came to 
prominence with Marcel Mauss’s reflections on alternative modes of commodity 
exchange in selected ‘archaic societies’ (1954). Drawing on various ethnographic studies, 
Mauss observed that in some isolated societies from the Pacific Northwest, Polynesia, and 
Melanesia the exchange of goods happens not through commodification or monetary 
intermediation, but through a particular practice of reciprocal exchange, especially mutual 
gift-giving. Potlatch was a case in point. What was so consequential about this fact was 
that it did not happen at an individual level, but at the level of the group, and the gift-
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giving form was not simply confined to the exchange of goods, but it pervaded other 
aspects of social life as well, providing the foundation for morality, politics, religion, and 
law. This observation led Mauss to conclude that at different points in history there were 
radically different social orderings existing in separate geographies, which determined the 
manner in which the worth of goods was assessed and the way in which they circulated 
in society. This idea was grounded in early to mid-20th century French structuralism (Lévi-
Strauss, 1949; Saussure, 1916) and in what has later been coined as ‘embeddedness’ 
(Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 1944), and it implied that a good receives its value based on 
the ordering of actors in which it is integrated and where it circulates; as soon as the good 
is extracted from that particular ordering and is integrated into an alternative regime, it 
receives a different order of value immanent to the alternative regime where the good 
subsequently circulates.  
To some extent, the importance of the ordering process has also been confirmed by the 
acceptance of the variability and relativism of value while ‘dis-embedding’ the notion of 
commodity from a culturally specific regime of value and placing it into the limelight as 
a ‘thing’ that has a career (Appadurai, 1986). By the very fact that things are in a process 
of circulation, they can suffer changes in their status. Within the same system, a thing can 
move from being construed as a commodity to being construed as a gift relative to the 
manner in which it is subjected to a particular ordering. What matters is not the 
overarching regime of value, but the immediate circumstances in which things move. This 
implies that structuralist arguments about grand systems of exchange are not necessary 
for grasping the evolving nature of the value of objects; what counts is the minute 
processes and immediate networks through which things circulate and are delivered from 
one place to another, acquiring specific meanings as they go along. 
At the same time, while ordering plays a great role in structuring the parameters that give 
birth to a specific form of value, this process is not sufficient: 
“Even if our own approach to things is conditioned necessarily by the view that 
things have no meanings apart from those that human transactions, attributions, 
and motivations endow them with, the anthropological problem is that this formal 
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truth does not illuminate the concrete, historical circulation of things. For that we 
have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their 
forms, their uses, their trajectories. It is only through the analysis of these 
trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions and calculations that 
enliven things. Thus, even though from a theoretical point of view human actors 
encode things with significance, from a methodological point of view it is the 
things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social context.” (Appadurai, 
1986, p. 5)  
In other words, occurring in parallel is a process of abstraction that helps crystallise 
particular types of attributes to the new form of value. In a way, these ethnographic studies 
share with the subjective theory of value the premise that to some extent it is people that 
endow things with specific meanings and value – albeit diverse, shifting, and overlapping. 
There are valuation processes at the level of the producer, the intermediary, and the 
consumer, and the distinct fashion in which each category or each individual in each 
category engages with the good may change that process. That said, the idea that things 
have ‘careers’ (Appadurai, 1986) is meant to also go beyond that point. Human agency, 
reason, and creativity are crucial to understanding the determinants and intentions behind 
the pragmatics of valuation; but an analysis focused too much on the intention or outcome 
of the exchange skews it towards immateriality and throws the ‘thing’ itself into the 
background. Instead, valuation perspectives insist that things are not only endowed with 
value from human agents, but they also have specific materialities as a result of this 
process of abstraction that intervene with or contribute to the valuation processes (Myers, 
2001). If more emphasis is put on circulation than exchange, then the material dimension 
of goods surfaces more eloquently. The latter does not determine valuation fully, but it 
does raise various limits and creates tendencies. Abstraction essentially aims to stamp the 
particular object or process with a particular value seal that should become independent 
of the agents producing the endowment and should became an integral dimension that 
moves alongside and as part of the objet or process.  
Closely related to the process of abstraction is standardisation, the further stage in the 
valuation process that seeks to produce a systematisation of the various abstraction 
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processes that might occur independently of one another and might create tensions and 
contradictions. Standardisation, together with the last stage of the worth-attribution 
process, institutionalisation, are, crucially, public acts that aim to make value transparent 
and accessible in order to dispel any obscurity and confusion that might arise in the 
previous processes and render the new value form valid and operational. This feature of 
the valuation process has been persuasively captured by the economics of conventions, 
which puts the issue of classification at the fore of the analysis, and looks at how 
‘conventions’ regarding various aspects of goods function as third-party or externalised 
(public) signs that classify, hierarchise, or qualify things in order to ‘objectify’ value and 
imprint it on the objects for smoothing their circulation and exchange (Orléan, 1994). As 
mentioned above, it is quite similar to the abstraction process.  
That said, what sets it apart is the imperative of publicity and accessibility so that any 
entity contesting the value could simply place it against the standards or conventions to 
judge whether or not it conforms. Furthermore, the economics of conventions points out 
that this is not just a process that occurs sporadically or in isolated events, but is indeed 
perceived to be foundational to any mercantile act. In this view, before any good can be 
exchanged in the market, a specific agreement or understanding must be struck that allows 
for the good to be assessed or qualified (Vatin, 2009). The good must be contextualised 
into a particular class, and the means or measures for independently assessing whether 
that good fits in into that particular goods must be readily available. The Walrasian model 
(Walras, 1874) misses precisely the fact that before the mechanics of supply and demand 
can be put into operation to determine the price of a good, a host of dimensions of that 
good must be established, qualified, valorised, and then inscribed onto it. In a sense, 
standards and standardisation can be construed as an overarching framework 
characterising the regulation and organisation of social life in modernity (Timmermans & 
Epstein, 2010). In the mercantile realm, this translates to various forms of, for instance, 
food standards, labour standards, safety standards, or standardised contracts. Standardised 
credit scores (Poon, 2009) and standardised assets (Carruthers & Stinchcombe, 1999), for 
instance, have been shown to be crucial in the provision of liquidity and the construction 
of markets in mortgages in the US.  
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These processes of standardisation have occurred through multiple channels, at different 
rates, and to various extents: in the company-scarce electrical industry it happened 
succinctly; the diverse chemical industry depended on corporate consolidation for 
standardisation to be pushed in; top-down processes of standardisation for materials, 
machinery, and parts were endemic around WWI; increasingly present international non-
governmental organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
OECD, and OPEC, as well as international trade agreements such as EEA, ASEAN, and 
NAFTA (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). The latter organisations are important to 
mention because they play a particularly strategic role in the entrenchment of particular 
values. For instance, the regulation that ensued the financial crises of the 1990s was based 
on standards of ‘best practice’ that were presented as international, but they in fact 
encapsulated values that were distinguishably related to the Anglo-American model of 
capitalism (Vestergaard, 2008). Furthermore, this is important for the last stage in the 
valuation process, namely institutionalisation. Institutionalisation, in this form, is not 
inherently necessary for the creation and spread of particular values, but one way or 
another it does occur, albeit at different levels of formality. Regardless, institutionalisation 
is essentially a political act of baptism that sanctions and legitimates the new value form. 
And when it happens via formal institutions and receives political support from governing 
parties or institutions held in high esteem, it is all the more potent.  
By developing qualifications, classifications, metrics, and entrenching them into 
institutions, the interpersonal trust of primitive exchange is displaced by impersonal 
exchange via standardisation. As such, contra neoclassical views, things display 
themselves in the mercantile space not as ‘naked’, but as bearing the stamp of one or 
another certificate in their materiality, which attests to a specific measurable and already 
measured value, available for the scrutinising gaze of the end-user. Organic or fair-trade 
labels, Michelin restaurant guides, user-generated ratings, packaging and content 
information, etc. are just some examples of moral, aesthetic, or physical indications of 
value. Market price, in other words, does not emerge spontaneously and independently by 
the simple and straight-forward interaction between supply and demand, but is deeply tied 
to the vast metrological cosmos mobilised to ‘put’ things in their lawful place. Only 
afterwards, and constricted by these former parameters, do the forces of supply and 
117 
 
demand stir the price into one way or another. The price is the ultimate indicator of 
economic value, but the mercantile universe cannot be reduced to its immediate 
‘discovery’; rather, it has to be placed within the complex socio-technological 
environment that characterises the valuation processes at play prior to exchange.  
Dewey’s flank movement thus points to valuation as a multifaceted operation that occurs 
as a dynamic process, in constant action and potential change, at various levels, including 
that of the originator, the exchange, the good itself, and the end-user. In other words, 
“value is then seen as the outcome of a process of social work and the result of a wide 
range of activities (from production and combination to circulation and assessment) that 
aim at making things valuable” (Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013, p. 6). Value is not, as the 
traditional subjective-objective binary framed it, intrinsic to the object or bestowed upon 
it by the rational and utility-maximising individual; nor does it simply get acquired due to 
a structural regime of value. It is rather, as economic anthropology and economic 
sociology show, the open-ended result of a process that involves a sequence of 
negotiation, selection, ordering, abstraction, standardisation, and institutionalisation (see 
Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. The valuation process 
Bringing a new value form to life is thus a relatively labour-intensive project occurring in 
time and at various levels, involving different actors potentially coming from conflicting 
backgrounds, and, not least, making use of various material and cognitive tools in 
facilitating its aims. The interplay between these processes can shed light on grander 
processes that might be implicated in instances of conflict of values and might illuminate 
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whether or not some are becoming dominant at the expense of others, or if instances of 
value plurality emerge or subside. By looking at, as mentioned previously, financialisation 
as a process in which financialised forms of valuation expand and engulf other, non-
financial forms of valuation, one can assess whether or not particular dimensions of social 
life previously shielded from the operations of ‘high finance’ might show evidence of 
financialisation, might remain isolated, or might develop hybrid forms of valuation.   
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5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter looked at the issue of worth attribution and the relevance of a shift to the 
valuation perspective with an eye to elucidate more clearly the relationship between 
financialisation and non-financial spaces. By leaving behind the entrenched dichotomy 
that viewed value as either intrinsic and absolute (classical political economy) or extrinsic 
and relative (neoclassical or Marginalist economics), as well as by jettisoning the one-
sided view of financial theory, the perspective opened by Dewey’s pragmatism allows for 
a reconceptualisation of value as the result of a complex act of worth attribution and re-
attribution. This means that it is less relevant whether value is something that an object 
has, something that a person bequeaths upon it, or something that is simply ‘discovered’ 
through a model, rather it is more important to look at the actions through which value is 
constructed or experienced. In a sense, both financial valuation, narrowly understood, and 
valuation as presented here are pathways to price discovery. But the first assumes that the 
entity subjected to the valuation process is an inert object and there is no outside 
environment that might influence this process or that might be itself affected by it, whilst 
the latter is a more encompassing view that sees price as a result of a wider social process 
of worth attribution. This process is complex, time consuming, and labour intensive, but 
it has been surmised here that it generally follows a sequence of negotiation, selection, 
ordering, abstraction, standardisation, and institutionalisation. These elements should be 
seen as stages in the valuation process, and while they can overlap, they generally develop 
in a succession, with negotiation being the most preliminary and experimental step and 
institutionalisation the most entrenching and unequivocal one.  
The move away from a static view of value also emphasises the importance of inputs not 
just from diverse actors, but also from non-human sources. Social studies of finance and 
economic sociology, for instance, have revealed how so-called socio-cognitive but also 
material prostheses are employed not only as adjuvants but as foundational elements in 
the estimation of value. From gadgets to theoretical models, these prostheses constitute 
entryways to the issue of the creation and consolidation of value, and to some extent they 
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are more edifying in answering the value question that looking simply at the end-result. 
Furthermore, the stress on standards and institutions cannot be overstated, as these factors 
contribute overwhelmingly in fostering accessibility, transparency, publicity, and 
legitimation. A valuation perspective thus stresses how an intricate interplay of human 
agency, material instruments, and public formalisation contribute to fashion new value 
forms that can be integrated and utilised in societal processes. 
This applies especially in the case of financialisation and social investment. In a narrow 
understanding, the simple observation that the field of social policy – traditionally the 
remit of a state’s welfare policy – has been permeated by financial activity and has 
contributed to an increase in overall financial activity is not sufficient proof that we are 
dealing with a case of the financialisation of social policy. Rather, in order to assess that 
hypothesis, we must attend to the kind of valuation processes that are at work in and are 
brought about by the intercourse of finance and social policy. If we construe 
financialisation as the expansion of instruments, representations, and models belonging 
to the explicit knowledge of finance professionals – as financial valuation, narrowly 
understood, was described above – then we would expect the instruments, representations, 
and models at work in the field of social investment to be similarly imbued with the 
elements governing financial valuation. Employing the strategy outlined above and 
looking at the sequence of valuation processes occurring in the field of social investment 
and assessing if they are indeed dominated by such elements is what really explains 
whether financialisation was the engine behind the rise of social investment or whether 
we are really dealing with a process of a different and perhaps more complex nature.  
At the same time, the other aspect that this chapter has emphasised is the taken-for-granted 
complexity of the social policy field stemming from its historical development. Instead of 
construing ‘the social’ as a worthy slice of reality in itself, with particular regularities and 
dynamics, the financialisation literature more often than not assumed that financial forms 
of valuation are adequate and thus simply apply upon this space in order to extract 
financial value. In fact, financialisation has embraced an intricate field that was already 
characterised, among others, by the creation of a particular linkage between political 
economy and ‘the social’. In a sense, financialisation comes to inhabit a place opened up 
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ever since the first bricks were laid in order to outline a solid social policy towards the 
end of the 19th century. This would not have been possible if not for, among other things, 
the interconnectedness between calculative tools, organisational networks, and ‘trickle 
down’ mechanisms, which were part and parcel of the liberal ethos of ‘governing at a 
distance’. Similarly, putting these policies in place relied on the delineation and 
specification of a place called ‘the social’, which was, up until then, outside the boundaries 
of Western thought. But the way the social came to be construed was such that it was not 
simply a static object, it was rather a dynamic reality with specific regularities, norms, as 
well as variances and deviations. It is this feature that rendered it graspable through 
statistical means, and amenable to intervention and change. And the opportunities created 
by the concomitant delineation of a social space and the construction of tools and metrics 
for its apprehension extended beyond the conception and delivery of social policy. The 
latter allowed ‘the social’ to be integrated into a governing logic, but the links thus created 
also allowed for other actors to jump on the bandwagon. Financial actors are a case in 
point. Even though, for varying reasons, it took a considerable amount of time for them 
to advance in this field, they eventually did, and this created new opportunities for capital 
accumulation, especially crucial in an age of austerity, stagnation, and rock-bottom 
interest rates. But the manner in which financialisation occurs, and particularly in this 
field, is still a matter of contention. For the least, the worth attribution process, which 
reveals a great deal about the value dimensions that are at play and about the 
transformations that financialisation has wrought upon this field, has been ignored.  The 
subsequent unpacking of the case of SIBs and of the valuation processes underpinning the 
rise of social investment, might just provide an answer to how financialisation advances 
in non-financial spaces.  
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Negotiation and selection: Social investment as source of social value creation 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter starts off the investigation of the valuation processes at play by looking at 
the first steps made in the process of finance’s advance in the social policy delivery field. 
The advent of social impact investment is not a necessity of history, but nor is it an 
outcome of complete contingency. Rather, impact investment, as a particular arrangement 
of social policy delivery, follows closely transformations occurring in the infrastructure 
of the public policy domain. As will be discussed below, these changes created 
opportunities for new practices and processes to emerge. Particularly, the lengthy, patchy, 
but gradual and seemingly implacable opening up of social policy design and delivery 
allowed the creation of new forms of interaction based on network-like features, which, 
in turn, contributed to new valuation processes predicated on negotiation and selection 
rather than administration or competition. These proved to be consequential for providing 
the groundwork for the construction of innovative financial instruments such as social 
impact bonds, especially, but not only, through endowing new actors with the power to 
have a say in matters of social value creation.    
Social impact investment programmes are thus both a consequence and a symptom of 
changes that have happened in the realm of public administration, given that they dispose 
of a structure of policy design and delivery that is rather uncommon by the standards of a 
long-term perspective. This chapter then argues that, in order to understand the 
financialisation of social policy delivery, one should, as a first step, look at the 
infrastructure undergirding and guiding the interaction between the various actors present 
in this domain and the new prerogatives with which they were bestowed, especially, in 
this case, the capacity for the negotiation of the meaning of social value creation and the 
capacity for the selection of the targets where this new manner of ‘doing social policy’ 
will be applied. The literature on public administration (Hood, 1991; Flynn, 2001; 
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Hughes, 2003; S. Osborne, 2006, 2010) has long pointed out that there has been a 
discontinuity in the practice of administering public policy and that several succeeding 
frameworks can be identified: around the 1970s, the old hierarchical model was replaced 
by the new public management (NPM) model, which has increasingly been destabilised 
around the beginning of the new millennium, leading to the emergence of what some call 
the new public governance (NPG) model (S. Osborne, 2010). NPG relies on network-like 
mechanisms of structuring, with multiple inter-dependent actors collaborating within the 
delivery of public services, and multiple and heterogeneous processes informing the 
system of policy making. It is these mechanisms that are responsible for opening up the 
possibility for new valuation processes to occur and to set the basis for a new market in 
impact investments. 
In light of this, this chapter will look at how these new valuation processes appeared in 
the field of social policy. It will do this by tracing the reforms undertaken upon the 
functioning of public administration and their outcomes, both generally and with a 
specific focus on the UK case, in order to highlight the opportunities created for various 
actors to participate in the design and delivery of policy programmes. Thus, first it looks 
at the wider context of public policy reforms since the late 1970s. Endemic economic 
turmoil and the increasing appeal of the ethos of the private sector produced, at that point 
in time, a break with the traditional understanding of the scope and means of public policy, 
which proved consequential for the manner in which governments pursued their policy 
objectives. Successive layers of reforms transformed, though they did not completely 
replace, the realm of policy design and delivery. Second, it shifts to the UK, one of the 
first countries to adopt far-reaching reforms, where the various governments that came to 
power, though driven by conflicting agendas, overhauled the system in the same direction 
of gradually opening up the public policy realm to more and more actors from the private 
and third sectors. The result – a network-like policy infrastructure – created opportunities 
for new valuation processes replacing the old ethos of the NPM model. Third, it looks 
into more detail at how these events translated into the first deliberations and initiatives 
for setting up a market in social investment, by looking at the task forces set up to foster 
its creation. Indeed, the groundwork for fostering the development of a social impact 
investment market in the UK was laid out by New Labour, as will be shown below, ever 
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since the early 2000s. This was done against the backdrop of NPG reforms and by utilising 
the opportunities created by these innovations in the infrastructure governing the pursuit 
of social policy objectives. Specifically, this chapter will look at two trans-societal 
networks of actors, the Social Investment Task Force (SITF) and the Council on Social 
Action (CoSA), which were created with the aim of providing that broad-based platform 
of trans-sectorial collaboration nurtured by the NPG model.  
The chapter finds that, through their work on envisaging a new approach to social value 
creation, these task forces engaged in a valuation process of negotiation and selection 
which proved consequential for the promotion of the impact investment market and for 
the creation of the world’s first social impact bond. Even though they differed in their 
particular remits (and sometimes in their methods), SITF and CoSA overlapped and 
concurred both in the manner in which they negotiated the approach to this new form of 
value at the core of social impact investment – blended value – and in selecting the 
potential target for applying the novel approach in order to begin the process of 
delineating the field of impact investing – ex-offender rehabilitation.  
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2. Shunning administration at the turn of the millennium  
 
Understanding the valuation infrastructure and the novelty present in the structure of the 
delivery of social or public services, of which social impact bonds constitute, arguably, a 
milestone innovation, warrants a historical contextualisation of public administration and 
its evolution over the past decades. While debates about the nature, limits, and most 
effective methods of delivering sound social policy are now part and parcel of the public 
and political spheres (white papers, brochures, and public consultations are only some 
examples of the ‘publicity’ surrounding public services), this was not necessarily the case 
in the past. As late as the 1950s, debates about public administration and reform in the 
field were confined to the realms of technicality and legality, without seeping out into the 
mass media or into the discussions pertaining to the higher echelons of political parties 
(Pollitt, 2011). This also implied that there was limited international circulation and 
penetration of ideas regarding effective public administration, with countries relying on 
their own indigenous bureaucrats in the quest of reforming the public sector. The 
valuation processes underpinning these practices thus remained opaque and dominated by 
hierarchical and particular state formations and agencies. That being said, behind the 
potential multitude of variations, it was possible to identify some convergence in the 
manner in which the public sector was organised and functioned across borders.  
 
The centralised administration of social value  
 
The social security practices that started appearing at the close of the 19th century and 
which consolidated in the first half of the 20th were accompanied by the putting into place 
of a vast administrative apparatus that would provide the infrastructure for efficiently 
delivering said practices. As the state began displacing voluntary and community 
provision of essential services, a vast bureaucracy for handling the newly-developed 
branch of government was fashioned. Differences across countries notwithstanding, this 
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system achieved its apex around mid-century, when a highly centralised and hierarchical 
system was in charge of administering public services (S. Osborne, 2010). This phase, 
known as the ‘classical’ period in public administration (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013), 
was characterised by the domination of the principles of legality (‘rule of law’), 
impartiality, objectivity, and the authority of public service professionals in the delivery 
of social services. This bureaucratic system, eloquently described, avant la lettre, by Max 
Weber (1968), centralised the power of both designing public policy and delivering it into 
the hands of the public administration, which carried out decisions made by representative 
and democratically elected governments. Many dimensions of social existence came 
under the purview, regulation, and intervention of the centralised public administration, 
which ensured equality and impersonality in treatment.  
The ethos of this system was epitomised by the post-WWII Beveridgean welfare state, 
which sought to provide a minimum degree of social standards across the board – ‘from 
cradle to grave’ – and which was to deliver and augment social value top-down and by a 
closely-knit structure of planners motivated solely by the urgency of public service and 
by the demands of public duty. These planners were themselves subordinated to the 
democratically elected rulers of the country and were following their general indications, 
although a strict dichotomy between politics and administration was observed in order to 
safeguard equality and objectivity (Pollitt, 2011). The separation from the turbulences of 
political mechanisms was complemented by the separation from the private sector, whose 
own dynamics could have constituted a trigger for social intervention, instead of a safety 
net. Funding this system was to be done through universal and individual contributions, 
to be drawn upon in each particular case of social turmoil. Were contributions not large 
enough to cover particular needs at particular times, the state would step in and top it up 
through its own mechanisms for funding. These, in a nutshell, were the traits towards 
which many Western countries were converging around the middle of the 20th century: 
hierarchy, rationality, objectivity, centralisation, equality, universality, and rule of law.  
The massive bill that this system incurred for the state was but one reason for it being 
supplanted by other forms of public administration (S. Osborne, 2006). That said, there 
was no demise per se, with classical variants of public administration lingering on and 
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even thriving in particular layers of public management, while, of course, in different 
countries change occurred to various extents and in various forms. That said, a proclivity 
for change and a new discourse on public administration was noticeable from the late 
1970s onwards. The hitherto accepted practice of isolation of centralised administration 
from the private sphere no longer held sway in public debates. The centralised system of 
bureaucratic rule was thought to be at the same time too onerous and costly to be effective, 
and too insensitive and unable to envelop all the sprawling needs of an increasing 
population with a longer life expectancy (Considine, 2001). Overreaching and becoming 
overwhelmed, the classical form of public administration was perceived to be in dire need 
of fundamental reform in order to face the challenges posed by the environment of the 
1980s, which included the consequences of the two oil shocks, the advent of monetarism, 
and neo-liberal ideas more generally.  
 
The value added of competition 
 
One of the preferred avenues for achieving this was to make government more efficient, 
not by optimising its operations and preserving its basic mechanisms, but by revamping 
it more profoundly and making it work more like business and more ‘through’ business. 
This new approach was captured in the transition from classical public ‘administration’ 
to new public ‘management’ (NPM) and in the move to an entrepreneurial government 
that was observable at the international level as both converging and inevitable (D. 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). While elements from the classical form of public 
administration still persisted in different corners of social policy delivery in various 
countries, a move towards an ethos informed by the private sector was observable, being 
stimulated also by the increasing public attention that NPM was receiving in academia 
but also in international organisations such as the OECD.  
NPM mainly relied on three interconnected principles: disaggregation (the splitting up of 
centralised and hierarchical structures into semi-autonomous and horizontal entities), 
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incentivisation (tying financial rewards with specific performance targets), and – the main 
force, after all, of liberalism – competition (the introduction of the distinction between 
purchaser and provider, in order to allow choice and competition in the provision of 
services, together with further competition for the allocation of resources, instead of 
simple centralised decision-making processes) (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 
2006). These three principles were thought to be quintessential to the efficiency witnessed 
in the private sector, and their application to matters of public policy was believed to bring 
about comparable levels of success in the pursuit of policy objectives. Introducing market-
type mechanisms into the heart of public administration would benefit, it was thought, the 
three pillars of public policy: the administrators, by leaning out and optimising the 
organisation, whilst focusing on performance and the measurement of outputs; the service 
itself, by privatising the hitherto impersonal and clunky offices in charge of delivery, 
relying on contractual relationships with private entities competing with each other in 
providing the most efficient services instead of hierarchical internal relations; and the 
target population, which would now benefit from quality control and service 
improvements as a customer or a client, instead of the traditional beneficiary of classical 
public administration.  
Through practices such as privatisation and contracting out, NPM changed the 
relationship between the public and the private sectors (Klijn, 2012). Instead of command 
and control, guidance and horizontality (via competition) became the norm. Paraphrasing 
two American authors who wrote a bestseller on public management reform that propelled 
them to the advisory office of the vice-president of the US, the new predicament is as 
follows: instead of ‘rowing’ (setting out to achieve the goals themselves), governments 
should be in charge of ‘steering’ (only setting the goals) (D. Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). 
The idea of becoming more business-like as well as the practice of relying more on 
business rendered the central administration more concerned with the nitty-gritty of 
specifying and outlining goals, as well as monitoring and surveilling the tendered service 
delivery. Having the ability to assess the performance of the contractor in accordance with 
goals is crucial to making sure that policy standards are observed and achieved. 
Furthermore, focusing on cost management throughout the entire process ensures that 
outputs are maximised at all times and specific output-quality standards are respected. 
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Thus, the imperative of efficiency that was at the core of NPM was to be achieved 
essentially by the mechanism of accountability to market forces, which bring about choice 
and competition for the satisfaction of customers’ needs. Social value creation was best 
serviced, as any microeconomic primer might predict, by the invisible hand of markets. 
The valuation processes here, thus, were not dominated by centralised administration as 
in the previous model, but neither were they available or accessible to any concerned 
stakeholder; they were rather characterised by antagonism and competition as the source 
of value creation.  
This model reached its apex in the 1990s, when its perceived international reach resulted 
in the establishment of the Public Management Committee and Secretariat within the 
OECD. That said, the reputation it accumulated at an international level brought along a 
significant degree of controversy and criticism, not least on grounds of cultural specificity 
and unfitness. Indeed, it was believed that NPM could never truly work in countries like 
France, Germany, and the southern Mediterranean states, while in the European 
Commission it was not uncommon to overhear notions pertaining to NPM being referred 
to as ‘Anglo-Saxon ideas’ (Pollitt, 2011). But even in the countries where it originated 
and where it developed more solid and pervasive roots (the US, the UK, Australia, New 
Zealand, etc.), it came under increasing fire from critics who argued that it had not 
delivered on its promises or even that the extent of its efficiency or, for that matter, 
application was grossly exaggerated (Barraket, Keast, & Furneaux, 2015). These 
criticisms added up to paint a more complex picture of the reform of public administration, 
with elements from the older organisational structure and the newer one coexisting and 
being applied to several degrees in different countries. NPM thus did not (completely) 
replace classical public administration, as it, in its turn, was not completely replaced by 
the reforms occurring at the end of the millennium.  
Indeed, albeit gradual and sectorially limited, the reforms that came under the umbrella 
programme of NPM slowly revealed the limitations that were inherent to an antagonistic 
understanding of public policy delivery. By making a distinction between purchaser and 
provider and by introducing fragmentation at the core of public administration and 
competition on the delivery side, NPM proponents destabilised and excluded the potential 
133 
 
collaborative nature of the processes undertaken in the sector (Milward & Provan, 2003). 
This was inevitably noticed by reform-minded individuals in the 1990s, when a rich 
scholarship surrounding the idea of a ‘network society’ made headway in the public 
sphere and provided the inspiration for overcoming the shortcomings of NPM (Castells, 
2009). The network as a framework was particularly appealing for solving the problem of 
essential antagonism, given, among other things, the emphasis on trans-sectoral 
cooperation that was implicated in the notion. Networks as governance models were said 
to have the property of bridging the fragmentation and separation ushered in by NPM, as 
well as allowing for more profound and fruitful inter-personal relations rather than 
contractual or, as in the case of Weberian models, hierarchical and objective interactions. 
While NPM and the marketisation implied by the idea of the entrepreneurial government 
unshackled public policy from the clutches of the state and opened it up to the private 
sector and its inherent dynamics, what ensued from adopting the insights brought about 
by the idea of the network society was the extension beyond the public-private dichotomy 
and the incorporation of actors from the third sector, as quintessential parts of the 
valuation process undergirding social value creation (Barraket et al., 2015). In fact, the 
observations crystallised in the idea of the network society seemed already to be 
confirmed by transformations in the realm of public policy delivery.  
 
The move to networks and inclusiveness   
 
As in the case with previous public sector shake-ups, the move to New Public Governance 
(NPG) was by no means absolute and existing patterns lingered on to some extent: there 
was no clear-cut, linear progression from classical public administration to NPM to NPG. 
Previous models intermeshed with newer iterations, and no one single model can do 
justice to the contemporary diversity of avenues for experimentation in the pursuit of 
public policy objectives (Pollitt, 2011). But while narratives of dominance and 
inevitability are unwarranted, NPG can be witnessed, in the present, in various sectors of 
social policy, including the field of social impact investment, as will be explained below. 
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An analysis of these implications is thus warranted, given that it constitutes the 
contemporary backbone of the functioning of social investment as well as the beacon 
guiding actor interaction in the field.  
One of the shortcomings of previous frameworks of public administration was that they 
considered the target population of public policy as a passive and inert recipient. Granted, 
within NPM there was a move towards construing the beneficiary of policy as a customer 
and not a simple receiver. But the stress in this case was more on competitive tendering, 
thus providing a more efficient and diverse supply of programmes for social value 
creation, without really implicating the recipients into the process and being somewhat 
independent from their particular circumstances (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013). While it 
drew on neoclassical economics, NPM policies, paradoxically, did not take seriously 
enough Hayek’s views on the privileged epistemological position of individuals in matters 
that are of their concern (Hayek, 1945). Proponents of NPG, on the other hand, sought not 
only to provide choice in public policy delivery, but also a voice therein for stakeholders. 
By adding the third sector, or indeed any stakeholder that might be implicated in a 
particular process, this new model brought about a flurry of new inputs in public policy 
delivery. Active participation of concerned parties, as well as interaction and cooperation 
between all the entities involved, constitute the essential vectors of this new framework. 
Policy design and delivery were thought to have the potential of being greatly improved 
by the inputs provided by stakeholders, who are believed to be in the best position to opine 
upon their needs and their thoughts regarding the best ways of fulfilling those needs, and 
are indeed expected to chime in with ideas and any other relevant resources (Torfing & 
Triantafillou, 2013). The augmentation of social value, in this case, is best brought about 
by a valuation process resting on a quasi-democratic form of negotiation between 
implicated parties on the meaning of social value in its particular context, together with 
the resolution of that negotiation through the selection of targets and channels for bringing 
that about. Policy issues, thus, are now approached within wide and horizontal networks 
of actors, and not through hierarchical control centres or separate silos working in 
competition.   
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There are two main implications in the transition towards networked governance: one 
concerns the policy process itself and is most eloquently captured by the idea of co-
production, the other one concerns the issue of policy objectives and the role of public 
administration, and this is what has been described as meta-governance. These two 
implications parallel the distinction that Osborne (2010) made between the pluralist and 
the plural natures of the state as construed by the proponents of NPG: a pluralist state is 
one where multiple interdependent actors are implicated in policy delivery, while a plural 
state is one where multiple policymaking processes are present along the political-
administrative spectrum. This double pluralism has been observed and evidenced 
throughout most OECD countries, with policymaking being increasingly informed by the 
trans-sectorial and expanded arena of public, private, and tertiary actors (OECD, 2011).  
The notion of co-production has been receiving a lot of traction of late, being increasingly 
seen as the cornerstone or the gold standard of contemporary public policy reform (S. 
Osborne, Radnor, & Strokosch, 2016). While a univocal definition of co-production is 
still lacking, the common denominator seems to be the involvement of the public service 
user in any or all stages of design, delivery, or evaluation of public services. This 
involvement has two main purposes: on the one hand, it is meant to empower users and 
to elevate them from passive bearers of legal rights to active and equal collaborators in 
the production and pursuit of public policy objectives. In theory, empowering users has 
the benefits of enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the co-produced policies, of 
increasing the accountability and transparency of public service, and of fostering a sense 
of participation in citizenship. The latter involves the addition of and stress on the idea of 
obligation that comes, alongside the idea of rights, part and parcel with the notion of active 
citizenship3. On the other hand, user involvement has the purpose of increasing the 
efficiency and scope of policy by utilising stakeholder knowledge, ideas, and resources. 
NPG retains from the individualism of neoclassical economics the idea that the individual 
is the ultimate bearer of the knowledge of what works best in his or her case, and the 
                                                 
3 Ultimately, as described above, co-production is also part of the governmental agenda of what Foucault 
(1991) called ‘self-government’: an art of governing that regulates the conduct of conduct; that is, it operates 
by requiring and motivating individuals to exercise the individual freedom guaranteed by liberalism in such 
a way that they align it with political objectives, without losing the sense of autonomous volition. 
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network created by the aggregation and interaction of all this dispersed information is the 
best structure on which to build efficient public policy. Indeed, in the end, the main 
implication of co-production as one of the pillars of NPG is the pursuit of creating supply 
networks that increase the success rate of public policy administration by bundling up and 
bringing together all the potential resources of stakeholders at the disposal of public 
policy, who negotiate and select matters and targets of social value creation (Pestoff, 
2012). Thus, a host of actors, coupled with their multifaceted inputs, combine, in a 
horizontal manner, to create supply chains for the production of a more bespoke and 
optimised policy.  
The second implication brought about by the emergence, alongside older forms of public 
policy design and delivery, of NPG is the move away from older forms of governing – 
whether command and control or simply contractual and directional – to meta-
governance. Meta-governance implies that the role of elected politicians, which hitherto 
was either deep and all-pervasive, as in the case of the classical form of public 
administration, or concerned only with design and goal specification, as in NPM, is now 
limited to providing the infrastructure or platform where interaction – in this case, 
negotiation and selection – would take place and setting up very basic and minimal 
constraints and rules for the grander scheme of policymaking (Klijn, 2012). Besides this, 
meta-governors have to open up, to a great extent, their authority and share it with all the 
actors who pool their resources together in the decision-making process. Through meta-
governance, NPG facilitates coordination and collaborations, fosters interactive decision-
making, and supports more complex and multidimensional policymaking. In this, it relies 
on a host of new technologies for enhancing conflict mediation and problem-solving 
capacities. For instance, NPG is characterised by an immanent dynamic given by a host 
of feedback mechanisms that it puts into place and that mitigate the valuation processes 
occurring here, among which recurrent negotiation and re-evaluation are the most easily 
noticeable. The assumption in this case is that stakeholders are in the best position to 
assess their needs and wants, but that this knowledge itself is bounded and is in fact a 
form of ‘working knowledge’. In other words, it relies a great deal on guesswork and 
reassessment, which means that should circumstances change, knowledge changes too, 
requiring signalling and re-purposing of policy on the go. This pragmatism is thus crucial 
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to the hybrid nature of NPG as negotiated enterprise. While still controversial (Pollitt, 
2011), NPG does crystallise a set of novel principles of public administration which 
constitute, as it will be argued below, the groundwork for the rise of social impact 
investment.  
Classical public administration, NPM, and NPG constitute, therefore, ideal-types that do 
not necessarily exclude each other in practice. Though they are based on different 
understandings of the role of the public, private, and third sectors as well as on different 
institutional arrangements, in the present they co-exist and it would constitute a distorted 
image to focus merely on one as exhaustively descriptive of the public policy context in 
a particular country in the contemporary world. However, NPG brought many innovations 
to the design and delivery of social policy, not least by opening up the black box of 
government to other actors and valuation processes in society at large. Particularly, there 
was a noticeable move in the stress on the dominating valuation process from the initial 
hierarchical and centralised administration of public policy in its classical form, to the 
competition and antagonism occurring horizontally between service deliverers introduced 
with the NPM reforms, to, finally, the networked, open, and collaborative forms of 
interaction characterising NPG. This constituted not so much an institutional straitjacket, 
but it did command that same power by representing the state-of-the-art vision of public 
policy delivery and the gold standard of its implementation. The next section fleshes out 
these implications by focusing more closely on the UK case.   
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3. Embracing networks in the UK  
 
Whether public policy reform in the UK followed global trends or whether it was the 
reverse, one thing is beyond doubt: the transformations described in the above section 
coincide to a great degree with the historical unfolding of the public policy domain in the 
UK. Thus, in broad lines, UK public sector reform can be seen as trailing the following 
stages: a pre-1979 classical period of bureaucratic, hierarchical, centralised public 
administration operating on a mostly command and control basis; the coming to power of 
the Conservative Thatcherite government in 1979, which heralded the abandonment of 
the embedded liberalism of the Keynesian era together with its macro-economic policies 
of stabilisation and of safety net provision, and which saw the advent of NPM policies of 
marketisation alongside the maintenance of some classical forms of public provision of 
social services but also the dismantling and privatisations of others;  the transition to the 
Labour government in 1997, which, albeit more receptive to the idea of a vigorous public 
sector, mostly maintained the NPM reforms initiated by the previous government and 
even intensified some aspects of it, but which also saw the addition of a ‘modernisation’ 
programme which aimed to introduce dimensions of networked governance, that is, NPG 
reforms, including, as will be argued below, social investment and social impact bonds; 
finally, the coming to power of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010, 
which deepened the NPG agenda amidst the announcement of the inception of an age of 
austerity in public finances (Castles et al., 2012). 
The UK thus epitomises, if not takes lead in, the gradual appearance and introduction of 
public sector reforms together with new social valuation processes, of which the social 
impact bond launched at Peterborough in 2010 was both long in the coming and truly 
innovative. That social impact bonds, together with social impact investment more 
generally, started making headway at the time that NPG reforms were launched 
throughout the world should not come as a surprise. As it will be argued later on, the 
social value that SIBs aim to create requires the sort of horizontal, networked, and trans-
sectorial arrangements that NPG reforms made conceivable and practicable.  
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Conservatives bring competition 
 
The first set of major reforms that the UK saw in the way in which its public 
administration operated were those introduced in the 1980s. The 1979 election brought to 
power a Conservative government with an agenda to stop rampant inflation and thwart 
the rising power of trade unions in the country. In pursuing its vision of repairing and 
growing the ailing UK economy, the Conservatives envisaged a decreased and revamped 
role for the state in society, one in which government would operate more like business. 
That said, the eventual adoption of NPM reforms at the core of government does not mean 
to say that the Conservatives had a managerialist ambition from the very outset. It was 
their insistence on the supremacy of the private sector, together with the confidence 
ensuing from the two election successes of 1983 and 1987, that emboldened them to 
increasingly venture into more experimental policies on the functioning of the central 
state. With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that these policies of introducing market-
like mechanisms into state functions rested on four pillars: maintenance, modernisation, 
marketisation, and minimisation (Martin, 2010).  
The first pillar refers to the maintenance of controls on public spending and the reduction 
of the proportion of public spending relative to GDP. This generally took the form of the 
reduction in civil service numbers and the decrease in grants to local councils, but also in 
measures to increase the turnover of policies at the governmental level. This was related 
to modernisation (the second pillar), namely, the attempt to render decision-making more 
similar to the corporate world. For this, a twin system of reporting and surveillance was 
put into place: first, managers were introduced at more and more levels in the 
administration, and were required to set explicit performance targets and report their 
success therein; second, institutions dedicated to auditing were established, like the 
Financial Management Initiative (1982), the Audit Commission (1982), and the National 
Audit Office (1983). Performance indicators began sprouting at all levels of the public 
service.  
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The last two pillars were the most radical. On the one hand, marketisation sought to 
introduce competition in the provision of public services, by adopting the principle of the 
purchaser – provider division in, for instance, health care, community, and education. This 
required, for instance, local councils to compete with the private sector for contracts, by 
submitting a lower bid and generating a specific level of return on capital. On the other 
hand, minimisation saw the ‘return’ of specific public services to the private sector, mostly 
through large-scale privatisations and the transferral of public servants to private 
enterprises: for instance, the privatisation of British Telecom (1984), British Gas (1986), 
British Airports Authority (1987), and other national giants led to the ‘privatisation’ of 
800,000 public sector employees (Pollitt, 2011). All in all, the result of the 18 years of 
Conservative rule resulted in the adopting of some typically NPM measures, mostly by 
the handing over of swathes of the public sector to the private one, or of making the 
remaining administration follow more closely the laws of business, which would become 
the main source of adding social value in society.  
 
New Labour adds networks  
 
Installed in 1997, the New Labour government of Tony Blair ushered in a new era of 
networked governance, by adopting many of the aspects of NPG described above. Of 
course, some of the NPM reforms introduced by the outgoing Conservative cabinet 
remained in place, others – especially those pertaining to the field of performance 
reporting and surveillance – were intensified, while others still were rolled back: for 
example, controls on public spending at the local level (Laffin, 2016). But what New 
Labour brought was a fundamental reconceptualisation of inter-societal relations: instead 
of aiming to essentially transform the public sector into a private actor for the public good, 
as the Conservatives did, New Labour sought to foster the force of the private sector itself 
and employ it for the public good through cooperation with the public sector and 
horizontal partnerships. Their vision of the most efficient socio-economic organisation 
for the UK at the end of the millennium – the third way – had a direct impact on their 
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understanding of the role of public services and the partnership between public and private 
(Giddens 1998).  
Thus, in between the release of the White Paper on Modernising Government (PM and 
Cabinet Office, 1999) and the coming to power of the coalition government in 2010, New 
Labour put great emphasis on fostering partnerships on a horizontal-networked basis 
between local councils, central government, and the private sector. This required the 
introduction of a degree of decentralisation, concomitant with the joining-up of dispersed 
silos into long-term partnerships. Local councils, in New Labour’s view, became key to 
the delivery of public services. In contrast to the Conservatives, New Labour did not seek 
to limit the function of local government to that of outsource and surveillance of 
performance. But nor did it seek to simply expand, unreformed, the emasculated powers 
that it possessed. The government envisioned a completely revamped role for councils, 
one in which it was not necessarily their function to provide local services, but to oversee 
and coordinate delivery across public, private, and third sectors, and essentially act as 
mediators between negotiating cross-sectoral partners. As the prime minister argued: “it 
is in partnership with others – public agencies, private companies, community groups, and 
voluntary organisations – that local government’s future lies” (Blair, 1998).  
Local councils would provide the impetus, leadership, and infrastructure for entering into 
deep and comprehensive relationship with cross-societal actors. Thus, institutional 
novelties, built on network-like structures, were set into place: the ‘Local Strategic 
Partnerships’, for instance, were created as platform for meetings of public, private, third 
sector, and community representatives to formulate long-term (five to ten years) plans 
called ‘Sustainable Community Strategies’ (Martin, 2010). These Partnerships were truly 
innovative, requiring hitherto disparate and antagonistic entities to coordinate and 
cooperate on matters of interest set by common initiative. But the networked community 
partnership model spanned other parts of the public sector as well. Indeed, as it will be 
argued below, SIBs constitute an offspring of the establishment of this form of NPG 
reforms, which contribute to the creation of the novel valuation framework on which 
blended value is predicated.  
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The Coalition embraces NPG  
 
Lastly, the 2010-2015 coalition government, whose ideological underpinnings will form 
the topic of discussion later on, came to government with an agenda of anti-statism, 
decentralisation, and the ‘return’ of initiative and power to local communities and 
individuals. This was to be achieved through fostering the ‘Big Society’, a sort of a trans-
societal community of atomised individuals, local communities, private businesses, non-
governmental organisations, or indeed any non-state stakeholder, as opposed to a 
perceived overbearing, inefficient, and impersonal ‘Big Government’. Though explicit 
talk of Big Society gradually faded away, the ideological undercurrents held up, 
particularly in the nurturing of institutional foundations designed for NPG-type reforms. 
That said, the self-proclaimed break with the previous Labour agenda was less radical that 
announced, with many of the novelties introduced in the operations of the public 
administration by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government actually taking to 
fruition initiatives put into place beforehand by the previous cabinet. The fostering of a 
social impact investment market, together with the launch of the first social impact bond, 
are precisely such examples.  
The succession of reforms wrought on the public sector in the UK by the governments 
that came to power after the break of the late 70s brought about a transformation in the 
traditional manner in which public policy was pursued in the country and a move towards 
a novel type of governance structure opening up possibilities for new valuation processes. 
But the chain of reforms did not completely overhaul the operation of government. 
Instead, they restructured some parts of it or added new layers that would be expanded or 
re-organised by the government that inherited the cabinet.  
That said, one of the most consequential and durable renovations was the re-calibration 
of the relationship between the public, private, and third sectors. While this did not 
completely change the customary function of service delivery, and some forms of 
command and control administration together with NPM policies held up, it did produce 
a watershed transformation in the ideational as well as material infrastructure that guided 
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and organised the approach to social issues. By opening up the design and delivery of 
public policy to as many stakeholders as possible, by bringing the former closer to the 
target population and the community to which they belong, by relying on horizontal-
networked decision-making, dynamic reporting, and constant feedback – essentially, a 
reiterating process of negotiation and selection – NPG reforms allowed public policy to 
yield innovative avenues for pursuing societal objectives and creating social value, impact 
investment programmes being a case in point.    
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4. New Labour, new networks 
 
The establishment of the first Social Impact Bond (SIB) at Peterborough Prison in 2010 
was made possible by the involvement of a myriad of actors and institutions, that 
essentially engaged in a process of negotiation of the meaning of social value creation and 
selection of the target of application, over a longer-term process than is usually 
acknowledged, with their coming together in a contractual relationship that was described 
as ‘complex’ at the very least (MoJ, 2011). Even though the effective launch of the first 
SIB occurred after the coming into power of the coalition government in May 2010, talks 
about creating new means for funding social policy objectives go back at least a decade. 
One of the reasons why the new government did not jettison the project altogether, as will 
be seen below, was because it seamlessly suited the ideological tenets of The Big Society 
agenda.  
The Big Society agenda is indeed crucial for understanding the institutional and 
ideological grounding for SIBs as well as what explains their popularity, but the break 
with the traditional manner in which the public sector operates was less radical than it 
might have appeared. Because the history of this aspect was to some extent neglected, a 
great deal of the academic scholarship writing on SIBs denounced them as opportunistic 
transformations of the public sector under the pretext of living in an age of restrictive 
austerity (Cameron’s ‘Age of Austerity’ being the most blatant example), or symptoms of 
the transmogrification of capitalism itself and the implacable consolidation of neoliberal 
interests (see, for instance, Joy & Shields, 2013; McHugh et al., 2013; Dowling & Harvie, 
2014). However, that perspective fails to notice at least two aspects: first, that talks about 
alternative finance for social projects in the UK and novel valuation processes 
accompanying them have a longer history, and second, that not all countries that adopted 
SIBs enthusiastically did so under the pretext of living in an ineluctable age of austerity: 
Australia, for instance, did not experience the same economic turmoil during the crisis 
and subsequent structural deficit as did the US or the UK, but it has launched SIBs even 
before the first performance report came out in 2014 (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). In 
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other words, SIBs were indeed an innovative financial instrument, but what was not novel 
in this whole equation was the valuation infrastructure governing a particular corner of 
social policy delivery in the UK (and indeed elsewhere), which had already set the scene 
for the particular manner in which actors interact in their pursuit of policy objectives – 
the only thing missing were the actors themselves who were supposed to populate said 
infrastructure and engage in the processes specific to the new valuation infrastructure.  
In that regard, there are two distinct platforms that were set up with the explicit intent of 
fostering a social investment market (that ultimately led to the launch of the Peterborough 
Prison Social Impact Bond), which required the envisaging of a new value form that 
would cater to this field appropriately. Both of them were created by the then Labour 
governments in power. The first one, established under Prime Minister Tony Blair, was 
The Social Investment Task Force, with a lifespan of 10 years, from 2000 until right 
before the general election of 2010. The second one, created in late 2007 under the 
auspices of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, had a two-year mandate and was called The 
Council on Social Action. Both of them played a crucial role in the creation of a forum of 
discussion, networking, and, not least, development of the institutional and legal structure 
necessary for the founding of a social investment market in the UK, and that subsequently 
provided the model for the adoption of SIBs around the world. Bringing together senior 
policymakers and actors from both the philanthropic and business sectors at the request 
of the ruling party proved to be a powerful impetus for achieving social policy goals with 
material and institutional consequences that are essential to the understanding of the 
advance of finance in the field of social policy delivery. 
 
1. The Social Investment Task Force negotiates 
 
The Social Investment Task Force (SITF) was announced by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in February 2000, and had the following remit:  
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“To set out how entrepreneurial practices can be applied to obtain higher social 
and financial returns from social investment, to harness new talents and skills to 
address economic regeneration and to unleash new sources of private and 
institutional investment. In addition, the Task Force should explore innovative 
roles that the voluntary sector, businesses and Government could play as partners 
in this area.” (SITF, 2000)  
While the SITF did acknowledge later on that Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) 
funds had emerged at the time the first report came out in 2000 (SITF, 2010), its mission 
was in many ways quite innovative. As opposed to SRI, which operates mainly by 
utilising negative screening in order to eschew investment in harmful sectors (for instance, 
tobacco, weapons, or fossil fuel production) and encouraging shareholder activism to 
prevent unethical behaviour by companies, the SITF’s mandate involved developing 
avenues of blending financial with social returns in such a manner that it not only avoids 
investment in pernicious sectors but it specifically funds projects which have a social 
return or impact as the primary and active goal of the projects. In other words, SITF had 
to negotiate a new value form – blended value – that would form the foundation for the 
legitimisation and promotion of social investment. The main avenue for achieving this, 
SITF stressed, was by finding ways to integrate actors from the third sector, business, and 
the government, and motivate them to work alongside each other in collaborative projects, 
much like the NPG reforms stipulated. Figure 4 provides a snapshot of the results of this 
initiative.  
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Figure 4. Actors in SITF 
The SITF had its Secretariat provided by the UK Investment Forum (a SRI platform 
founded in 1991, now called The UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association) 
and worked in collaboration with the New Economics Foundation (a UK think-tank which 
started off in 1986 as the permanent secretariat for TOES – ‘The Other Economic 
Summit’, a counter-summit to the annual G7 Summit, organised by new economists, 
environmentalists and development campaigners – but which has since developed into 
one of the largest UK think-tanks), and the Development Trusts Association (an 
association of development trusts – organisations which are local-community based, 
owned and led, and engage in environmental, social, and economic development). The 
inputs that would go into the negotiation regarding blended value were therefore coming 
from a multifarious value background, including from heterodox views. 
Ronald Cohen was appointed chair of the SITF. Founder of Apax Partners, one of 
Britain’s first venture capital firms and one of the most successful globally, Cohen would 
become a social investment veteran, chairing most of the crucial institutions that were 
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established with the intent of fostering a social investment market in the UK (the 
Commission on Unclaimed Assets, Social Finance, Big Society Capital etc.). He also 
would found Bridges Ventures in 2002, a mission-driven investor with over £500 million 
in portfolio across three types of funds: sustainable growth funds (a type of SRI funds), 
property funds (investing in properties in regeneration areas and those showing 
environmental leadership), and social sector funds (providing finance and support to 
charities and social enterprises), as well as, in 2003, the not-for-profit Portland Trust, a 
so-called ‘action-tank’, whose mission is to promote peace between Israel and Palestine 
through economic development .  
The other initial members included David Carrington (a former director at the Baring 
Foundation and at various housing associations, as well as a former chair at the Charities 
Aid Foundation Grants Council and a member of the executive committee of the 
Association of Charitable Foundations, and who would become, an experienced 
Independent Consultant on the charities sector), Ian Hargreaves (a journalist and media 
academic formerly at the New Statesman, Financial Times, and News and Current Affairs 
at the BBC, as well as a Director of Cardiff University Centre for Journalism Studies), 
Philip Hulme (founder of business dealing with banking software and e-commerce, as 
well as founder of the Hadley Trust, a grant making charity), Geraldine Peacock (a former 
chair of the Charities Commission and trustee of the National Council of Voluntary 
Organisations), Joan Shapiro (a former executive vice president of the South Shore Bank 
in Chicago, a pioneer in the creation of the concept of community economic development 
through banking), and Tom Singh (founder of New Look, one of the UK’s largest 
women’s fashion retailers). In time, other appointments were made, notably Ben 
Kernighan (deputy chief executive at the National Council for Voluntary Organisations), 
Ed Mayo (secretary general of Co-operatives UK), David Orr (Chief Executive of the 
National Housing Federation), and Danny Truell (Chief Investment Officer of the 
Wellcome Trust).  
Consistent with the mission assigned by the Labour government – that of creating cross-
sector collaborative partnerships with the purpose of blending social and financial returns, 
especially in the most disadvantaged sectors of society – the SITF was composed therefore 
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of a motley but experienced group of third sector practitioners, philanthropists, and 
business people, which produced innovative recommendations and set paths to new ways 
of providing community development finance. Even though the Task Force was rather 
dominated by the charity/voluntary sector, it was diverse enough to contain members 
representative of the various sectors of society whose visions regarding the notion and 
means of creating social value diverged and needed to be subjected to a process of 
reconciliation. The negotiated nature of the meaning of social value is visible first of all 
in this latter process, which aimed to arrive at a common value denominator that would 
act as a foundation for building the social investment market.  
The SITF published an initial list of recommendations six months after its establishment, 
two more reports on the progress of the implementation of those recommendations (one 
in 2003 and one in 2005), and a final report reflecting on its achievements, shortcomings, 
and final recommendations – these documents provide valuable information regarding the 
process of the establishment and promotion of a social investment market in the UK, as 
well as the vision regarding the scope and meaning of such a market. In their last report, 
the SITF finds that the recommendations were implemented to a great degree, that “the 
way ahead is clear” (SITF, 2010, p. 2), and that “the social investment market looks set 
for exciting growth over the next decade, and the SITF believes that social investment 
will, in time, become an established asset class. It is important that it does.” (SITF, 2010, 
p. 9). The confident tone of the positive self-evaluation warrants an analysis of these 
recommendations in order to gauge the depth and breadth of the particular legal and 
institutional measures implemented, as well as the actors’ aims and achievements realised 
as a consequence. 
The four reports that the SITF publish reveal how, as a first step in construing ways for 
bringing about the social and financial returns as per the Task Force’s remit, the actors 
involved had to negotiate the meaning and scope of social investment and the sought-after 
values underlying it, before proceeding to select the area in which the latter would be best 
applied and illustrated. Within the reports there is a visible tendency, at first, to identify 
local community development as the site where social value can be created most 
efficiently. Later on, as will be discussed, the stress moves from local initiative to a vision 
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of co-production between the latter and national agencies together with global investors. 
Thus, the first five recommendations produced by the SITF within the first half a year 
since its establishment in 2000 were directed specifically towards the improvement of 
local community development finance, as a source of social value creation. The last three 
recommendations with which the SITF completed its mandate in 2010 move beyond 
localism and suggest policies targeted at creating rather larger-scale social investment and 
social stock exchange hubs. Indeed, besides analysing the work of the SITF, the report 
also provides an overview of the development of the social investment market in the UK 
over the first decade of the third millennium. The first report, nonetheless, focuses more 
strictly on ‘under-invested’ communities, though by the very nature of attempting to 
connect community development with global investors it eventually had to move beyond 
stern localism.  
The recommendations were as follows (SITF, 2000, 2010): 
1. First, the adoption of a community investment tax credit, to provide incentives for 
finance to flow to communities via Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs). This resulted in the introduction of the Community 
Investment Tax Relief (CITR), which provides 5% tax offset each year over a five-
year period to investors providing finance to CDFIs, which then direct the funds 
to enterprises and community projects. CITR had unlocked £58 million by March 
2009.  
2. Second, the creation of community development venture funds (CDVFs), through 
the government matching the funds that venture capital, private entrepreneurs, 
banks, or institutional investors provide. This resulted in the creation of the first 
community development venture fund, Bridges Ventures (founded by the 
aforementioned Ronald Cohen, chair of the SITF), through the governmental 
provision of £20 million of matching investment, half in the form of a loan at 
Treasury Bills rates and half as an investment in the fund. The other £20 million 
were raised from venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, banks, and local authority 
pension funds. As mentioned above, Bridges Ventures built on the success of its 
first experience and founded the three funds that it today operates. Besides Bridges 
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Ventures, the government provided funding for other community development 
venture funds such as the Advantage Growth Fund, WHEB Ventures, and others.  
3. Third, disclosure of individual bank lending activities in under-invested 
communities. Due to the scarcity of information in this regard, a need for 
disclosure emerged in order to observe the lending practices of individual banks 
in communities and evaluate practices in a time of perceived branch closures and 
lack of regional finance. This had limited results, given that in the original 
recommendation disclosure was required on a voluntary basis. While this has led 
to an improvement, the practice is not systematically widespread, and is trailing 
behind the US, which, through the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, has 
required reports on branch lending in order to assess whether the banks are 
meeting the credit needs of local communities that might be affected by financial 
exclusion.  
4. Fourth, greater latitude and encouragement for charitable trusts and foundations 
to invest in community development initiatives. This was required due to the fact 
that trusts and foundations were confused as to the restrictions imposed by the 
Charity Commission when it comes to community development finance, which 
led to under-investment by such institutions in community projects. This initiative 
resulted in the Charity Commission publishing new guidance immediately after 
the first SITF report and effectively allowing trusts and foundations to fund social 
investment as long as it advances the charity’s objectives.  
5. Lastly, support for community development financial institutions (CDFIs). The 
proposal argued for supporting the efforts of CDFIs through new mechanisms of 
attracting finance at the wholesale level to be channelled to CDFIs, together with 
a trade association representing the needs and interests of CDFIs and operating as 
a forum for data provision and organisation. This resulted in the creation in 2002 
of the Community Development Finance Association (CDFA), which 
accumulated, by 2009, an overall loan book of £400 million and collected £500 
million of private investment for businesses and households overlooked by 
mainstream financial institutions. The CDFA also developed a code of practice 
and an outlet for gathering performance data to foster confidence in the sector. 
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To anticipate, in some respects the reports of the SITF are surprisingly similar in tone and 
recommendations with the then incoming Big Society agenda. The same language of re-
empowering local communities, for instance, is apparent in both. That said, the main 
difference is to be found in the role that the state is perceived to play in the revival, as 
sources of social value creation, of the weakened communities, fraught with poverty and 
inequality: in the case of The Big Society, as will be described below, the state is the cause 
of the latter predicament, through crowding out and fostering apathy and irresponsibility, 
thus an economic and a moral problem as well; in the case of the SITF, the state is the 
solution to an issue of under-investment. Indeed, under Labour and the SITF, the 
government had the role of providing incentives (CITR for instance) or matching funding 
(for CDVFs) in order to nurture social investment, or of supporting and promoting 
associations of community development financial institutions which would act as the 
representing body of intermediaries between local communities and national investors, 
much as in the spirit of the initial mission of the US government sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs). To quote a culinary interpretation of the difference between the two governments:  
“For New Labour, citizen participation was the yeast in the dough: a way of getting 
more out of public services by transforming the bare ingredients and the way they 
interacted. For the Coalition, The Big Society promises a cake alongside the dry 
bread of residual public services – for those who can afford to bake it, that is.” 
(Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012)  
That said, the difference between discourse and practice in the case of the Coalition 
Government agenda is not to be overlooked: for instance, most of the institutions set up 
under the auspices of the SITF were not abolished – some of them were revamped, other 
merely renamed (for instance, Big Society Capital was created on the backbone of the 
Labour-proposed Social Investment Wholesale Bank).  
All in all, the SITF was relatively successful in rapidly implementing its proposals for 
improving under-invested areas’ access to development finance, as well as in conceiving 
ways in which to blend financial return with social impact, and connect local needs to 
national and international finance. For instance, in its final report (SITF, 2010), the SITF 
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also goes a long way in discussing the emergence of a social investment market in the UK 
and listing the social investment organisations that appeared on this scene since 2000: 
organisations offering grants to charities and social entrepreneurs (UnLtd, Impetus, 
Private Equity Foundation, Breakthrough), patient capital (CAF Venturesome), loans 
(Futurebuilders, Communitybuilders, Social Enterprise Investment Fund – all government 
funded, and Charity Bank – private), investment advice and intermediaries (Investing for 
Good, Social Finance), hubs for sector (ClearlySo), risk capital (Bridges Social 
Entrepreneurs Fund, Big Issue Invest, Triodos Social Enterprise Fund), and venture 
capital (WHEB Ventures, Bridges Ventures). It is unclear whether the SITF played an 
active role in creating all or some of these entities, but, given that (at least some of) the 
people who chair or are members of the executive committees in these companies (all 
created after the SITF came into being) were members of the SITF, it is safe to assume 
the SITF played a crucial role in providing the impetus, networks, and perhaps expertise 
for creating these social investment organisations. As it claims itself: “over the last 10 
years, the SITF has succeeded in fostering the creation of a UK social investment market. 
There is now an opportunity to develop a robust and sustainable market and to turn ‘social 
investment’ into a mainstream asset class” (SITF, 2010, p. 16).  
The last report draws to a close by providing three final recommendations which signal 
the negotiation tilting in the direction of a more co-productive understanding of social 
value creation by implicating non-local entities as well: establishing a properly capitalised 
Social Investment Bank; developing SIBs; and adopting a UK Community Reinvestment 
Act. These were perceived as the next necessary steps in order to consolidate a social 
investment market that was emerging but was still in its infancy.  
The first recommendation suggested the creation of a Social Investment Bank, using the 
proceeds from the Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Act of 2008 as the initial 
capitalisation. The latter authorised the use of assets from deposit accounts that have been 
inactive for 15 years, totalling an estimated £500 million in 2014. Out of this, the report 
acknowledged that the proposed £75 million to be devoted to the Social Investment Bank 
was an appropriate initial stage. The mission of the Social Investment Bank would be to 
create the market infrastructure for social investment to become a well-structured, 
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transparent, and predictable asset class with a clear track record and a solid network of 
intermediaries as well as reliable data. As mentioned above, the blueprint for the Social 
Investment Bank has been appropriated by the coalition government and has given birth 
to Big Society Capital, a Big Society social investment institution that plays a crucial role 
in the development and funding of SIBs and has a promised working capital of £400 
million from the dormant accounts and an additional £200 million from four UK high 
street banks: Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group and RBS (BSC, 2013). 
The second recommendation involved the widespread use of Social Impact Bonds. By the 
time the report came out in April 2010, the first SIB at Peterborough Prison was already 
announced, though not launched yet. This was met with considerable enthusiasm by the 
report, emphasising its advantages – a focus on funding preventative work, fostering 
multi-level innovation, enabling locally-tailored solution – and expressing the long-term 
vision for these instruments:  
“Investment fund managers believe there would be considerable consumer interest 
in investing in SIBs once a track record has been established. Ultimately, SIBs 
could become a new social asset class in their own right, comparable to 
microfinance, enabling a flow of investment from the capital markets to resolve 
social issues around the world.” (SITF, 2010, p. 19)  
The perspective of developing SIBs together with a market for them, as well as that of 
attracting finance from capital markets was not simply Labour’s desideratum, picked up 
later on by and made central to the Conservative Party’s campaign. It was, in fact, the 
predictable next stage of an initiative that Labour oversaw through the creation of the 
SITF in 2000 and its offspring, Social Finance, in 2007 (two entities whose chair was the 
same individual, Ronald Cohen), as well of the Council on Social Action, a platform for 
discussing social action founded also in 2007 and the subject of the next section. All of 
these organisations came to play a central role in the selection process which resulted in 
the Peterborough Prison being the target of the first SIB, and were appropriated and placed 
into the limelight as Big Society projects.  
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The last recommendation involved the creation of a UK Community Reinvestment Act, 
explicitly modelled after the US 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), and building 
on the initial third recommendation of more disclosure by community bank branches. The 
US CRA, the report suggested, provides an exemplary framework for making local 
financial institutions responsible for addressing financial prejudice and exclusion. The 
lessons from that example were threefold: compulsory, not voluntary disclosure for 
braches, in order to identify under-investment and exclusion; social fairness, in order to 
prevent instances of abusive behaviour such as unregulated sub-prime lending; and 
partnership between government, financial institutions, and communities. Nothing came 
out of this proposal, though it has managed to attract attention and approval from think 
tanks such as ResPublica (2014). 
The SITF, therefore, plays a crucial role in the genealogy of the first SIB, and of the 
creation of a social investment market in the UK more generally. The innovative mission 
of moving away from responsible investment, which focuses specifically on negative 
screening (and more on which later), to social investment, which seeks to blend financial 
return with social impact in an active fashion, was the perhaps insufficiently 
acknowledged remit but also merit of this government sponsored platform. The SITF, in 
its decade-long existence, also oversaw the emergence of a social investment market in 
the UK through the promotion and provision of social investment talent and expertise, as 
well as the fostering of a number of companies working in the social investment sector. 
Its work, ranging from providing a discussion platform to delivering legislation or 
creating, directly and indirectly, social investment institutions and organisations, proved 
to be, in the end, of decisive importance to the creation of a market in social impact 
investment. And at the centre of this achievement lied precisely the cross-sectoral 
blending of actors into a cohesive and determined whole, who benefited from new 
valuation processes in which networked negotiation and selection played a crucial role in 
bringing about the first SIB and in fostering the social investment market in the UK. The 
most important feat of its existence, though, was the negotiation of the meaning and scope 
of social value, which provided the groundwork and impetus for the legitimation and 
promotion of the entire field of social impact investment. And while this negotiation 
seemed to point to local community development as the source of social value creation 
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initially, it subsequently broadened its scope to include other state agencies and private 
actors in an understanding that social value is created as a result of a process of 
collaboration and co-production. In order to flesh out this consensus, a selection of an area 
of social risk was required, which was undertaken by the other Task Force.   
 
6. The Council on Social Action selects  
 
The second platform that was thus of seminal importance to the creation of SIBs was the 
Council on Social Action (CoSA), an organisation set up by Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown in 2007, and with a pre-defined lifespan of two years. CoSA was co-chaired by 
the Prime Minister and had 15 members, supported by a small team working mainly part-
time. The members were, similarly to the SITF, a mixed cohort – “innovators from every 
sector” (CoSA, 2009, p. iv) – that included people from charities, foundations, trusts, but 
also private businesses and consultancies. The meetings (two hours long, every six weeks) 
were also attended by ministers, senior civil servants, and advisors. CoSA produced ten 
reports throughout the two years of activity, outlining its initial goals and the subsequent 
progress in achieving them. Below is a stylised snapshot of the main actors brought 
together by this platform (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Actors in CoSA 
The initial remit of the CoSA was to find a way to  
“generate ideas and initiatives through which government and other key 
stakeholders can catalyse, develop and celebrate social action. We consider ‘social 
action’ to include the wide range of ways in which individuals, communities, 
organisations and businesses can seek through their choices, actions and 
commitments to address the social issues they care about”. (CoSA, 2008, p. iii) 
Similar to SITF, CoSA benefitted from the changing landscape of public policy design 
and delivery and engaged in a process of negotiation and selection, but this time the 
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negotiation was to be undertaken in order to clarify how social value can be generated via 
an elusive something called ‘social action’. CoSA identified this project with that of 
developing ‘the good society’ through the help of ‘willing citizens’. As opposed to the 
incoming Big Society, the good society was construed as a potential realisation of 
qualities inherent in a normal society characterised by the presence of both positive and 
negative elements, but whose actualisation would only be possible with the cooperation 
of or through the state. Once achieved, ‘the good society’ will be composed of only 
‘willing citizens’, that is, individuals with an acute sense of social responsibility and moral 
duty. The manifesto of the CoSA, laid out in the first paper published, outlined the values 
espoused that were to be promoted through the efforts of the platform (the ubiquity of 
grassroots empowerment, equality, inter-connectedness, and optimism), together with the 
imperatives of cooperation at all levels and guidance by ‘those who have the least’. 
Interestingly enough, the average ‘willing citizens’ that populate this quasi-utopian 
society were to have as their model, the report goes on to say, personalities such as Sylvia 
Pankhurst (a prominent Suffragette, but also an adherent to council communism and an 
anti-war militant), and Václav Havel (the celebrated Czech anti-totalitarian dissident and 
former president of Czech Republic). All in all, it was believed that individual agency and 
volition, together with the enabling embrace of state institutions, would contribute to 
turning the vision of ‘the good society’ into a palpable reality.  
Most of the work that the CoSA accomplished ranged in the field of policy-making, from 
light-touch or heavy consultancy to actual policy development and delivery. The first step 
in CoSA’s approach was to put in motion a series of initiatives through which more 
intimate and un-mediated relationships could be built on all levels of society. It thus 
produced 44 recommendations about how volunteerism projects could be improved or 
stimulated to grow, but also about how the government could adopt a ‘humanisation’ 
principle by improving the quality of it called ‘one-to-one relationships’. The 
developments that ensued comprised 
“the specific inclusion of one-to-one in government procurement requirements, 
the change in the policy making processes which now require officials to consider 
the role of one-to-one in every new policy and the review of workforce training 
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strategies to include mentoring as one of the ‘common core’ of skills that all those 
working with children and young people are expected to demonstrate”. (CoSA, 
2009, p. 16) 
As part of this increase in the scale, quality, and prominence of the so-called ‘one-to-one’ 
formula, CoSA advised and worked with the Department for Children, Schools, and 
Families (DCSF), TimeBank, The Mentoring and Befriending Foundation (MBF), Do-It, 
Heart of the City, Business in the Community, and other institutions or organisations on 
creating mentoring opportunities, national standards, or volunteering incentives, as well 
as developed policy for the DCSF so that from that time onwards officials would be 
required to consider how new policy provides opportunities for one-to-one relationship-
building. On the same lines, it also advised the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) on ways to 
integrate and strengthen one-to-one relationships between legal advice workers and their 
clients, which eventually materialised in the requirement that the MoJ service delivery 
contracts include peer-to-peer dimensions in service delivery.  
At the same time, CoSA reflected upon new mechanisms to connect, collaborate, and 
commit to social action, in the context of the need to cope with recession. Thence, it 
established a fellowship (The Sinnott Fellowship) to support outward-facing staff in 
schools and eight awards for the use of new technologies that would stimulate social 
action (The Catalyst Awards). It also established and led a handful of events with the same 
function, among them Chain Reaction (which was attended 1,000 people from 17 
countries) and The Big Lunch (which provided the means and support for two million 
people to sit down and lunch with their neighbours).   
Overall, CoSA reckoned, not unlike SITF, that its actions were followed by ‘solid, 
important achievements’, and that officials acknowledged the influence that they had on  
“[…] thinking in government departments on the value of this approach 
[community development approach to social change, a.n.] and on how practically 
to shape policy and processes for policy-making in the future so as to give greater 
prominence to this way of working.” (CoSA, 2009, p. 6)  
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Nevertheless, beyond these institutional transformations and social initiatives, CoSA 
acknowledged that this purportedly simple but all-pervasive change in the delivery of 
welfare services required as well an innovative model of funding that would reflect the 
‘one-to-one’ principle. So after the negotiation regarding the meaning and purpose for 
social action, it moved on to selecting innovative funding models as the channel for 
bringing the latter about. In order to develop one such model of funding, David Robinson, 
co-chair of the CoSA, build on the expertise he acquired at Community Links. Community 
Links, a ‘legendary charity’ (Guardian, 2011), was established by Robinson and Kevin 
Jenkins (another third sector ‘institution’, active across the board, and an elected 
councillor for the London Borough of Newham for 28 years), in East London in 1977, 
with the explicit mission of regenerating deprived neighbourhoods and engaging with the 
youth. While Community Links has, throughout the years, or rather decades, achieved 
almost unanimously celebrated success, one of the recurrent issues that was not 
sufficiently addressed, Robinson reckoned, was funding long-term outcomes, rather than 
year-by-year projects.  
This was particularly a problem in the challenging area of youth (re)offending. Before the 
first SIB was launched to address this issue, it was estimated that, in the UK, out of 40,200 
adults that served short-term sentences (less than one year), 73% went on to re-offend 
within two years of release (with 92% of them under the age of 21) (CoSA 2009). This 
added a significant amount of taxpayer’s money to the already whopping yearly cost of 
£213 million for the entire cohort. The typical governmental approach, it was assumed, 
was to disregard long-term developments (concretely, in this case, to discount the issue 
of reintegrating in the community that would have probably precluded re-offending), and 
focus on crisis interventions, thus dealing with the consequences rather than the causes. 
Charities such as Community Links stepped in to address the problem of re-integration, 
but due to limited funding and the similar nature of year-by-year financing, the success of 
the operations was restricted. 
At CoSA’s first meeting, board members David Robinson and Peter Wheeler, in line with 
the prime minister’s request of construing alternative funding mechanisms, shared their 
vision of combining long-term and large-scale funding with preventative projects that 
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would, over time, save money for the government and the taxpayer. They mentioned that 
the International Financial Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) Bond could serve as a useful 
model for developing a new financial instrument that would satisfy these requirements 
and help overcome the issues in the conventional governmental approach centred on crisis 
interventions. The social impact bond developed from these early (2007) initial 
discussions as the result of the selection process undertaken by CoSA.  
In the following months, CoSA proved to be a fertile ground for assembling experts and 
practitioners from the business and the third sectors in order to tease out a potential 
structure for an innovative financial instrument. Thus, Robinson and Wheeler approached 
Social Finance (the NGO that sprang from the Social Investment Task Force and that had 
Ronal Cohen, the head of the latter, as its chair, and that was, finally, tasked with the 
acceleration of the creation of a social investment market in the UK), and asked them to 
develop a manner in which preventative projects with measurable outcomes could be 
funded from savings in acute services spending. Through Shankari Chandran, another 
member of the CoSA board, Robinson and Wheeler introduced Allen & Overy, an 
international law firm, to Social Finance, who provided the latter with pro bono legal 
support for the contractual details of the SIB. Also through CoSA, Social Finance 
connected with Edmond Curtir, a derivatives lawyer who wrote the first draft term sheet 
for the Peterborough SIB, and with Chris Egerton-Warburton, an investment banker 
known for structuring a ‘vaccine bond’, and who played an essential role in developing 
the accounting aspects of the instrument. At the same time, the Young Foundation, an 
organisation working on social innovation and whose then-CEO was CoSA member 
Geoff Mulgan, provided the research on outcome-based commissioning, and, in 2008, 
published a short paper in which it introduced the term “Social Impact Bond”  (Young 
Foundation, 2008). 
Building on the concerns voiced by Robinson and Wheeler regarding youth re-offending, 
Social Finance partnered with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and HM Treasury to build an 
SIB pilot in criminal justice. This was further encouraged by the Justice Committee of the 
UK Parliament who published a report called Cutting Crime: the Case for Justice 
Reinvestment (Justice Committee, 2010), in which the development of SIBs was 
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explicitly recommended, as well as by the White Paper published by the Labour 
Government called Putting the Frontline First: Smarter Government (HM Government, 
2009), which declared that the Labour government would pioneer SIBs as a way of 
funding. Finally, in March 2010, the contracts were signed and the MoJ announced that 
the launch of the world’s first SIB would begin that summer at Peterborough Prison (MoJ, 
2011). The Brownite Council on Social Action thus successfully provided the impetus 
and groundwork – not to mention the network of rightly-placed people – necessary for the 
elaboration and development of an innovative financial instrument to fund welfare 
services.  
Of course, in the interstices of those two moments in time, the Labour government lost 
the office and gave way to a Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition Government. The 
Conservatives jumped on the bandwagon of the emerging UK social investment market, 
promoted a social investment bank (later renamed Big Society Capital) as the pillar 
vehicle of investment in innovative financial products that blend social with financial 
return, and pledged £5 million of funding to Social Finance together with other funding 
for the outcome payments of the Peterborough Pilot SIB through the Big Lottery Fund 
(Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). All elements were thus set in play for SIBs to become the 
cornerstone and, ultimately, the perhaps only inheritance of The Big Society ideology. At 
the same time, at the Peterborough Prison, the first SIB-based project was about to 
commence in September 2010. CoSA itself, like the SITF, would go down in history as 
the representatives of the NPG ethos of trans-sectoral interaction, collaboration, and 
compromise that was crucial to the advance of finance into the field of social policy 
delivery. And so, while both SITF and CoSA engaged in a process of negotiation that 
emphasised either co-production or the one-to-one principle (which essentially 
overlapped to a great degree), it was the latter that was more consequential, given that it 
was explicitly tied to an innovative funding model that would reflect it, and this led to a 
selection process that led to youth reoffending being the social risk that most reflected 
this new understanding of social value creation.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the first steps made in the process of finance’s advance in the 
field of social policy design and delivery. Social impact investment is shown to follow 
closely the transformations occurring in the infrastructure of the public policy domain, 
given that these open up possibilities for new valuation processes to emerge. Among them, 
new forms of interaction based on network-like features are especially salient, and the 
manner in which they evolved allowed new entities to engage in new valuation processes 
predicated on negotiation and selection rather than administration or competition. These 
proved to have far-reaching consequence, at least in so far as the social policy field is 
concerned. Indeed, they proved nothing short of foundational for the social investment 
market and for the construction of innovative financial instruments such as social impact 
bonds. 
In particular, what has been shown in this chapter is that the new valuation processes were 
brought about by the move from classical public administration to NPM to NPG. This 
was not a wholesale move, but rather an increasing tendency to construct public policies 
based on NPG features, particularly its penchant for network-like arrangements of cross-
sectorial inter-dependent actors collaborating and utilising multiple and heterogeneous 
processes which inform the policy-making activity. This translated, in the UK, into the 
New Labour governments of 2000-2010 setting up two Task Forces endowed with the 
remit of fostering a social impact investment market in the UK. These two Task Forces, 
SITF and CoSA, were both a product and a symptom of the changes occurring in the 
public policy field, and they thus benefitted from the new opportunities emerging from 
the opening up of the latter. Rather than a centralised bureaucracy administering policy 
or tendering it to competitive and antagonistic private entities, the state oversaw the 
creation of these Task Forces and charged them with the power of re-envisaging social 
policy delivery through the creation of a social investment market.  
SITF and CoSA were essentially different, not least in the fact that the first was set up in 
2000 and had a lifespan of 10 years, whereas the latter was set up in 2007 with a two-year 
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long term. An even more significant difference was constituted by their particular remits 
– the first was supposed to construe ways of nurturing trans-societal collaboration (of 
which it was itself an example, as was CoSA) as a fundamental premise of the social 
investment field, whereas the second was tasked with catalysing social action. 
Nonetheless, they both overlapped in the very process of approaching value in the field – 
they first engaged in a practice of negotiation, and then in an exercise of selection based 
on the resolution of the former. SITF dithered more that CoSA, and while it first 
considered that social value creation would best be serviced by local community 
development, it then acknowledged that co-production with the aid of national agencies 
and global investors is better suited for the task at hand. CoSA, on the other hand, 
negotiated the meaning and purpose of social action and came to the conclusion that the 
so-called one-to-one formula is appropriate to generate the maximum amount of social 
action, but that it falls short of its potential if it is not followed and supported by an 
innovative funding arrangement. The latter turned out to be precisely the social impact 
bond, modelled as it was, at the outset, on the IFFIm bond.  
SITF and CoSA also overlapped – or rather concurred – in their selection process, as they 
both saw youth reoffending as a target with potential not only for improvement, but also 
for acting as an example of how this new policy arrangement might work and thus getting 
the ball rolling in the quest for establishing a social investment track record. These Task 
Forces, through the organisations they created (among them, Social Finance and the 
Social Investment Bank), partnered up with HM Treasury and the Ministry of Justice, and 
proceeded to design and launch the world’s first SIB at Peterborough in 2010. The arduous 
road for initiating a social investment market was thus 10 years in the making, and it 
would not have been possible without these broad-based platforms of trans-sectorial 
collaboration nurtured by the NPG model. Through their work on envisaging a new 
approach to social value creation, these Task Forces engaged in a valuation process of 
negotiation and selection which proved consequential for the promotion of the impact 
investment market and for the creation of the world’s first SIB.   
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Ordering and abstraction: Gauging social value 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The first steps in finance’s advance in the field of social policy design and delivery were 
undertaken via an exercise in negotiation of the meaning and scope of social value 
creation, followed by a process of selection of the target where this new meaning would 
be applied. By 2010, when the Task Forces ended their activity, a social investment 
market was already in the works, with Community Development Funds and Social 
Enterprises already engaging in the creation of social value according to the new 
principles and avenues set up and promoted by the said Task Forces (HM Government, 
2011). But these programmes were very local and rather subdued – they were not 
transformative enough to shake up public policy as such. This is where SIBs came in, and 
specifically the first of its kind, the Peterborough Prison SIB, which was the selection 
target of the same government-sponsored Task Forces.  
Thus the valuation process behind finance’s advance entered a new stage, now 
characterised by the need for ordering the particular actors involved in a potential SIB 
arrangement and their interaction, as well as abstracting the quantity of impact created, in 
order to link it to financial return and create what the social investment literature calls 
‘blended value’ (Emerson, 2003) – the foundational value form, as mentioned above, of 
impact investment. Consequently, this chapter will analyse the next steps undertaken in 
the creation and expansion of this field, first by providing an account of the particular and 
stylised ordering of actors and their interaction in a SIB, and then by looking at how the 
social outcome of the actors’ actions was to be abstracted through metrics and 
methodologies for calculating impact, as a foundational feature not just of SIBs, but of 
any social investment project.  
Being a product primarily of the work of the Task Forces, the actor-interaction 
arrangement in an SIB is an heir to the NPG reforms. As such, it is predictably complex, 
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not least due to the network-like features that NPG bestowed upon it. Among the latter, 
horizontality, collaboration, and continuous feedback loops are probably the most salient 
ones. Behind these labels lies the ideal of equal partnerships between trans-societal actors 
in the social policy act and a democratic sense of the inherent worth of all the inputs 
coming from stakeholders. That said, while on paper equality is the name of the game, 
there is no lack of criticism emphasising the hidden limitations and potential power 
imbalances displayed within the structure of SIBs. Despite the latter, SIBs still epitomise 
a novel arrangement of social policy design and implementation, which relies on 
multipolar inputs and networked feedback mechanisms. 
Of course, these would be if not meaningless, then at least unaccountable, were it not for 
the ‘technical’ side of social value creation, which includes instruments, models, and 
methodologies utilised in the practice of measuring social outcome creation. This practice 
of abstraction is what gives social investment its tangibility. The actors present on the 
social investment arena, interacting according to the explicit or implicit principles of NPG 
reforms, rely thus on particular tools to grasp and gauge value in the field. Indeed, at the 
very core of impact investing lie ‘metrics’ – indicators of impact performance that render 
a social intervention commensurable, reportable, and comparable. Metrics encapsulate 
and account for social value creation. It is metrics, in the end, that afford the still inchoate 
sector of impact investment to crystallise and slowly develop contours as a legitimate and 
accessible practice, because they allow cross-sectorial and large-scale data – as will be 
argued in the next chapter – to be standardised, easily retrieved and processed, and thus 
allowing for investment decisions to be taken in conditions of ‘perfect’ knowledge. This 
way, financial return can be tied to impact achieved.  
But metrics, as this section will show, are also fraught with a specific degree of uncertainty 
and contingency. Their sheer number and the process through which they are chosen, 
together with the continuous appearance of new metrics tied to the specificity of particular 
interventions, means that at this point the process of assessing impact is an open-ended 
one that lacks the sort of relative clarity that traditional mainstream financial valuations 
contain. Nonetheless, metrics are the sine qua non of the financialisation of social policy 
delivery. But contrary to the conventional financialisation narrative, metrics are not 
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simply picked from the financial repertoire or replicated in an identical manner; a whole 
cornucopia of metrics and measures are being created endogenously – on the ground and 
on the go – in order to support the functioning of social impact programmes. They are 
created as finance advances in the field of social investment, but are not the same as the 
tools of conventional financial valuation. It will be shown that they constitute hybrid 
spaces of abstraction, which represent, crystallise, and indeed preserve different types of 
values than the ones contained in financial forms of valuation. Social Return on 
Investment (SROI), emerging as one of the most popular calculative framework, is given 
pride of place and is unpacked in some detail.  
Ultimately, what this chapter finds is that, in the quest for the entrenchment of blended 
value, the actors involved engaged in processes systematisation, particularly ordering and 
abstraction. The first became necessary in order to forestall social investment programmes 
from becoming decisional free-for-alls and to make sure that inputs regarding social value 
creation were collected in an orderly manner. SIB projects were particularly amenable to 
such perils due to the fact that they included a great number of stakeholders from across 
the social sector board. Despite some inevitable power imbalances that this chapter will 
note, the ordering process was designed in such a manner to prevent such infelicities from 
occurring. Similarly, without the second factor – abstraction – social value creation would 
have been if not meaningless, then at least unaccountable. Once abstraction was 
undertaken, conceptual delineation of the field become possible, together with the 
subsequent conceptual clarification as well as quantification of social impact creation 
through the creation of metrics and frameworks for gauging social value creation. In the 
end, these median stages in the valuation process that characterises finance’s advance in 
the social policy field played a crucial part in rendering value creation a palpable and 
workable pillar of social impact investment.   
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2. Order in the SIB court 
 
Being contemporaneous with and indeed a part of NPG reforms, SIBs epitomise the drive 
for network-like arrangements that encourage horizontality and collaboration in the 
development and unfolding of a particular social programme. This is so not least because 
of the meaning of social value creation negotiated at the outset of envisaging SIBs, which 
was deemed a result of co-production and one-to-one principles. But this ideal would 
simply transmogrify into a decisional free-for-all, were it not for a process of ordering of 
actors and interactions that is part and parcel of the new valuation infrastructure that SIBs 
possess. The definitions of an SIB that were circulated illustrate the tendency towards this 
ambiguity, though the structure itself, as will be shown, is quite clear-cut.  
Various interpretations of what SIBs are were provided, each emphasising a particular 
dimension of the instrument. For instance, Social Finance UK, the institution that 
launched the first SIB and coined the term, defined SIBs as: “a new contracting and 
financing mechanisms … [that] seeks to drive significant non-government investment into 
addressing the causes of deep-rooted social problems with returns generated from a 
proportion of the related reduction in spending on acute services” (Social Finance, 2009, 
p. 2). The Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund, a fund set up by the Big Lottery Fund 
to finance and support the development of SIBs, defined them as: “a type of Payment by 
Results (PbR) contract, where the finance needed to make the contract work is provided 
by social investors rather than by service providers” (TBLF, 2014, p. 1). The Young 
Foundation, which was heavily involved in the initial talks about developing an alternative 
method of financing social issues projects in the earliest years of the creation of SIBs, 
defined them as: “funding mechanisms which invest in social outcomes” (Young 
Foundation, 2011). Similarly, scholars differed in their understanding of SIBs, some 
defining them as “a financial product used to encourage private, philanthropic, and/or 
private investors to provide upfront capital to support project-oriented service delivery by 
public, private, or non-profit actors, or a combination of these actors” (Joy & Shields, 
2013, p. 40), others as instruments that “permit the government to pay providers of 
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outsourced public services in relation to the achievement of measured outcomes, thus 
transferring the financial risk to the provider” (McHugh et al., 2013, p. 248), and others 
still as aiming “to improve a social outcome through the collaboration of government, 
service providers and external investors” (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015, p. 338).  
These definitions put the stress on different actors and different aspects of the programme 
delivery, but this does not imply that there was no consensus on what an SIB is or does, 
but rather that it could be looked at from various angles, depending on which aspect of its 
novelty is of particular relevance to a specific individual, institution, or context. And that 
is because to the extent that a well-rounded definition of SIBs was possible, it would have 
had to be easy enough to capture its essential purpose (financing social policy), and 
complex enough to emphasise its novelty (financialising social policy delivery). In other 
words, it would have had to capture the fact that while at face value SIBs are about social 
services provision (such as offender rehabilitation, public safety, rough sleeping, 
homelessness, healthcare, employment, child welfare, etc.) in a context of tight budgets 
and public sector reform, and about financing those services, the manner in which that 
financing is being done is novel: it involves a network of new actors, an innovative 
method of gathering funding from capital markets and other investors, a shifting of risk 
from public to private actors, and a sophisticated manner of quantifying social value 
added, discussed below. The novelty of financialisation is easily graspable in the fact that 
social policy delivery becomes a financial asset class meant to connect investors looking 
for return with particular financialised social policy deliverables – the SIBs themselves – 
that pay a pre-established, if varying, return, calculated on the basis of social outcome and 
risk measurements. Not unlike the New Deal policy-makers of the 1930s, who noticed 
that credit dried out in the economy as a result of the Great Depression and that there was 
great scope for government intervention to connect capital pools with consumer debt 
(Hyman, 2012), so the engineers of SIBs saw great scope for opening up the financing 
and provision of social policy deliverables to capital markets and other hitherto ignored 
stakeholders.  
As a result of the deliberations presented in the previous chapter, particularly the 
negotiation and selection processes undertaken by the institutions that provided the 
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groundwork for the social investment market in the UK, SIBs were construed by the same 
Young Foundation to involve a myriad of actors, which could generally be divided into 
four categories subject to a particular ordering process as a condition for creating the 
particular type of social value sought after (see Figure 6 below): 
1. Commissioners – these can be local or national governments or foundations that 
commit to transfer funds only if the SIB-financed deliverable improves social 
outcomes for service users, thus shifting the financial risk linked to the success of 
the deliverable to investors.  
2. Investors – these can be conventional charitable trusts and foundations, or retail, 
social, commercial, and institutional investors, high net worth individuals, etc. that 
are incentivised by the mix of social and financial returns on investment; given 
that investors receive a variable rate of return depending on the degree of 
improvement in social outcomes, their financial interest becomes thus aligned 
with the social outcome interest.  
3. Service Providers – these can be social enterprises, charities, other civil society 
organisations, or a combination of these that are sub-contracted by a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (also called Delivery Agency) created solely with the purpose of 
playing an enabling role in the legal, financial, and operational structure of the 
SIB. Through the SPV, the service providers are contracted, funded, managed, and 
monitored. Some service providers, particularly small NGOs, lack working capital 
to undertake various projects and are thus generally excluded from participation, 
so that the upfront capital provided by investors through the SPV overcomes this 
issue. Service providers are encouraged to collaborate between themselves and 
with the communities in which the service is undertaken and innovate with the 
aim of maximising social output. The contract with service providers is generally 
longer than the usual hierarchical social services provision, which implies greater 
funding stability and employability, as well as more capacity for adaptive learning 
and dynamism.   
4. Service Users – these are the target population who benefit from a more flexible 
social service given that the stress is on outcome (success metric) and not on inputs 
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(for instance, number of hours of interaction with the target population) or outputs 
(number of people benefitting from the project.  
 
Figure 6. Generic Structure of SIB. Adapted from Young Foundation (2011) 
Social value is thus created by the coming together of all the actors described above. But 
the way this occurs is not through a mere jump-along, but rather through a valuation 
process of ordering of actors and of actors’ interests. Because of the fundamentally 
collaborative nature of the delivery of social services through such a programme, SIBs 
were perceived to work most efficiently precisely when there is a misalignment of 
incentives that prevents the development, funding, and delivery of preventative services 
that might reduce costs in the long run and achieve results more successfully through the 
system as a whole (Young Foundation, 2011). In other words, because resources are 
usually scarce for preventative, early interventions, and costs are usually high(er) for crisis 
interventions (Social Finance, 2009), SIBs provided an opportunity for aligning 
government policy objectives with non-government investor interests and social service 
providers around a particular social goal. This way, instead of deploying public services 
for overcoming a concretised social crisis, the state could harbour non-state actors to 
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intervene and address as yet non-actualised social risk. Social risk could thus be packaged 
into a financial instrument and potentially traded on capital markets. 
Besides aligning interest, the ordering process was also salient in that it enabled 
stakeholders to overcome structural obstacles in the implementation of social projects, 
which would not have been possible if attempting to undertake these projects individually 
(Bridges Ventures, 2014). All in all, commissioners stood to win by bringing external 
investment and potential savings to current budgets (while being weary of managing to 
build the economic case for the SIB and agreeing to contracts that suit all parties 
involved); investors achieved a social return in tandem with the sought financial return 
(while fretting the fact that specialist knowledge is required in managing and measuring 
progress, and the fact that policy changes might affect outcome measurements); and 
service providers could take advantage of the imperative of social measures to provide 
empirical evidence of their impact, while smaller service provides gain access to PbR 
contracts (while heeding the fact that involvement requires adaptive skills and more 
flexibility than conventional projects) (TBLF, 2014). The ensuing and complex 
partnership itself, it was thus argued, could have positive consequences for the actors 
involved, and not least in the development of transferable skills and knowledge.  
Of course, despite the aforementioned horizontality and collaborative nature of SIBs, this 
did not preclude actors from having a different weight in the process of social outcome 
delivery, which meant that the ordering process had a degree of flexibility, depending on 
which of the actors involved played a ‘more’ primary role. The source of finance could 
determine the weight of the actors and there could be, for instance, philanthropic SIBs (in 
which funds are raised from philanthropic sources, which allow for more innovation, 
experimentation, and, implicitly, risk, but also provides more leeway to philanthropists to 
engage directly in financing outcomes, rather than indirectly through the funding of, for 
instance, charities); public sector SIBs (in which a local authority borrows, for instance, 
by issuing municipal bonds, and funds an SIB with the intent of receiving funds from the 
central government in the future in case social outcomes are achieved); or commercial 
SIBs (in which funding comes purely from banks, institutional investors, etc., and 
methods of risk assessment are  sufficiently sophisticated for these private companies to 
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find them reliable investment sources). The method of delivery could also vary, in that 
the organisation designing the intervention could use existing resources to undertake the 
process and receive future payment from the government (streamlined delivery structure); 
the delivery agency could assume a leading role and undertake the project itself (lead 
delivery agency structure); or a special purpose vehicle could be set up that would act as 
an enabler and a mediator between sub-contracted delivery organisations, funders and 
payers, effectively managing the collaborative structure of the SIB and monitoring its 
performance (SPV delivery structure) (Young Foundation, 2011). So, whereas the SIB 
models and delivery structures mentioned above were in fact ideal-types, in reality the 
most frequent types of SIBs and delivery structures are hybrid ones, in which the sources 
of finance are manifold and the weight of the actors involved is unique and dynamic, 
albeit within a very small margin.  
On the other hand, this process of ordering also had the potential for creating negative 
externalities, a fact that was less acknowledged by the main institutions promoting SIBs. 
For instance, there did not seem to be much evidence of any reduction in the extent of 
bureaucratic volume and public sector costs (Joy & Shields, 2013). A complete reliance 
on SIBs required, at least temporarily, significant fixed costs through investment in 
developing new skills for bureaucrats for adopting an almost paradigm-shifting mode of 
delivering social services, as well as in laying off any human resources made superfluous 
by such a wholesale shift, due to potential costly and protracted legal battles. Of course, 
the very definition of fixed costs implied that these will be written off as time went by, 
which was deemed a real possibility in the case of SIBs. That said, Treasuries also 
complained that SIBs were an unjustifiably complicated and costly means of financing 
more efficient social programmes (Young Foundation, 2011). This was due to the fact 
that governments generally benefitted from a lower cost of borrowing capital, which 
translated into the situation that the returns that investors were due if the programmes 
were successful, and that are tantamount to the interest that the government must thus pay 
to investors, were higher than the price incurred for government borrowing. In other 
words, from a cost of capital point of view, SIBs might not have legitimised the 
abandonment of direct governmental financing of social programmes. Even the argument 
that the necessity of shunning direct governmental financing was imperative because of 
174 
 
the structural inability of governments to tackle social issues in a preventative manner was 
reconsidered in light of growing concerns that there was no empirical evidence for this 
line of reasoning and that this argument is in fact built on ideological grounds (Loxley, 
2013).  
In other words, while this ordering process succeeded in realigning incentives and 
streamlining development and delivery, it also had the potential for creating important 
spill-overs which need to be addressed, and the complexity of SIB contracts does not 
make this task any easier, at least as yet, when the market is only in its infancy4. 
Regardless, the social policy goals that particular governments set for themselves would 
imply a contract that would be agreeable to the multitude of parties involved in the SIB, 
especially in regard to the metrics that are employed and need to be established in order 
to suit all actors: they need to provide an acceptable risk-return profile for investors, to 
yield measurable outcomes for service providers, and, most importantly, achieve policy 
goals for governments (TBLF, 2014). This complexity can be further deepened when one 
takes into consideration that SIBs span across three different fields of activity, the public, 
the private, and the social, each with its own set of (potentially conflicting) values, skills, 
and expectations. That said, complexity in this sense could simply be a case of a more 
                                                 
4 Indeed, one of the issues here is precisely the timidity of investors facing a novel and untested asset. The 
fact that SIBs do not yet have a proven track record means that governments will bear the additional burden 
of making the economic case for developing and investing in SIBs, while potentially making significant 
concessions to early bird investors in the form of guarantees, low outcome requirements, or high returns. It 
is conceivable, on the other hand, that once a handful of SIBs are completed and a positive track record is 
built, the costs incurred by the public sector will diminish considerably. That said, there is also a suspicion 
that if, in the time between the establishment of the contract and the commencement of the delivery, the 
investor faces financial difficulties and is unable to honour his or her financial commitments, the 
government will have no choice but to step in and bear the risk (Hanlon, 2011), defeating thus one of the 
essential objectives of SIBs – shifting the risk from the public to the private sector. In fact, The Economist 
magazine likens SIBs with the infamous financial innovations that were so central to the financial crisis of 
2008: “The social impact bond is based on the concept of risk transfer, in this case from the government to 
financial investors who will get paid only if the scheme is successful. Risk transfer is also one of the big 
ideas behind securitisation, the bundling of the cash flows from mortgages and other types of debt on 
lenders' books into a single security that can be sold to capital-markets investors. The credit-default swap is 
an even simpler risk-transfer instrument: you pay someone else an insurance premium to take on the risk 
that a borrower will default” (Economist, 2012). In other words, cost and risk considerations will probably 
be top of the list in governments’ evaluating of the usefulness and urgency of adopting SIBs as a model of 
delivery of social policy objectives. 
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thorough and sophisticated version of implementing public policy, rather than a 
burdensome iteration of it. 
Putting complexity aside, there was still a real possibility that this ordering process that 
plays such a salient role in social value creation was fraught with potential predicaments 
coming from invisible imbalances of power. Service providers and the third sector were 
of particular concern. While the network-like structure of the SIB could in theory provide 
an opportunity for small service providers which lack vast amounts of working capital (or 
indeed were bound by law to cap the cash reserves that they could carry from one fiscal 
year to another) to participate in large-scale projects, in practice there were suspicions 
regarding this ‘overly optimistic’ scenario. Indeed, it was perceived that the competitive 
environment in which bidding was being done meant that small third sector organisations 
were at a disadvantage compared to their larger rivals, given that the latter had more 
immediate access to capital and resources in order to make a good case for bidding, not 
to mention the fact that capital limitations implied less ability to hire financial and legal 
expertise in order to inform themselves regarding risk and contract implications (Joy & 
Shields, 2013). In fact, there were worries that the shift to SIBs could simply consolidate 
the emerging private sector oligopoly in public services delivery, in which massive 
multinational firms (Atos, A4E, Serco, etc.) with projects in various public service 
markets and which often were too big or complex to fail, were forcing out smaller charities 
or social enterprises that might have been logistically able to deliver the same services in 
a more successful manner (Social Enterprise UK, 2012). Lastly, the cost of training staff 
to develop new skills would similarly bear most on smaller providers. There was a strong 
case to be made regarding the hidden power imbalances at play in SIB arrangements.  
And that was not all. An even more scathing accusation was the fact that the ordering 
process contained within it the seed of generating a value misplacement or a ‘mission 
drift’ (McHugh et al., 2013), in which perverse incentives determined service providers 
to eschew topical but highly difficult-to-approach social issues in favour of more plain, 
easily quantifiable initiatives, in order to more easily develop or comply with the terms of 
the contract. This could have had the effect of ignoring the most hapless and threatened 
segments of society in favour of more easily measurable issues, and thus satisfying the 
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outcome benchmarks at lower costs and with higher efficiency. The quantification of 
social outcomes in order to determine the risk and create a risk-return profile for investors 
could have the further unintended consequence that the profit motive would extend to 
traditional philanthropic agents that would usually provide funding in a grant or donation 
form rather than seek a specific monetary return in exchange, and thus that some 
organisations that operated on the basis of such funding were being left out.  
Despite these accusations, SIBs were still understood as a novel arrangement for social 
policy delivery, which drew inputs from actors from across the social spectrum – 
government, business, finance, philanthropy, third sector, civil society, grassroots – and 
organised them in a nexus of networked-horizontality, interaction, and collaboration in 
the pursuit and alignment of their goals. This nexus was a result of an ordering process 
which, though malleable to some extent and subject to potential negative externalities, 
was part and parcel of the NPG reforms and contributed to a wider and novel valuation 
process that in the end gave birth to an innovative and more participatory channel for 
designing and delivering social policy objectives – social investment. Ordering was so 
crucial because it was understood that only a specific pattern of interaction could 
overcome some of the limitations of NPG reforms – namely, the potential for a free-for-
all ingrained in the construction of the programmes – and produce the kind of alignment 
of incentives and inputs that was necessary for the creation of social value according to 
the new principles outlined by the Task Forces in charge of fostering the social investment 
market.   
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5. Impact metrology  
 
Once the interaction patterns which should characterise SIB projects were conceived via 
the generative force of the ordering process, what was left on the table was the issue of 
accounting for the action of the involved parties’ concerted efforts. What was perceived 
as necessary in this regard was the construction of a mechanism for, on the one hand, 
understanding and delineating the impact sought through the programme and, on the other 
hand, grasping it and expressing it in a quantitative manner. In other words, impact 
creation was subjected to abstraction, as a further step in the novel valuation process 
characterising finance’s advance in the field of social policy. And this process of 
abstraction unfolded in a two-level manner – first, a conceptual demarcation of the very 
field of impact investment from the sister field of socially responsible investment, and 
then a conceptual clarification of the notion of ‘impact’ itself, together with the 
elaboration of a plan for gauging the newly-delineated notion of impact. As a 
consequence, this section will tackle these two aspects of the abstraction process, and it 
will further provide a more in-depth discussion of Social Return on Investment, which is 
one of the most popular metric frameworks used in practice.  
 
1. Demarcating impact investment  
 
For impact investment to become a legitimate investment paradigm resting on the notion 
of blending value, a degree of interpretational labour was required to differentiate it from 
the closely-related and often confused-with practice of socially responsible investment. 
What was it, indeed, that was sought by creating an SIB, as opposed to SRI or 
conventional investing? The answer was the elusive ‘impact’. But impact investment is, 
as expected, a rather recent practice. A 2012 survey of major investors in the market found 
that a fifth of investors had already engaged in one form or another with impact investing 
before 1995 (Saltuk, Bouri, Mudaliar, & Pease, 2013). That said, the results were not 
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conclusive: one of the main issues was that what exactly ‘impact’ was meant to capture 
was rather unclear, and it lent the notion of impact investment some degree of confusion, 
especially for the actors involved in setting up the world’s first SIB. For instance, impact 
investment was placed on the same plane with similar concepts such as socially 
responsible investment (SRI), ethical banking, corporate social responsibility, or even 
Islamic finance.  
Take SRI: loosely conceived, SRI can be traced back to religious debates taking place 
several hundred years ago concerning the reconciliation of ethical imperatives with 
investment practices. This was reflected, for example, in the issue of whether or not the 
practice of asking for interest on a loan is legitimate and virtuous, and whether or not it 
should therefore be permitted (Domini, 2000). Religious organisations were thus the 
mainspring of responsible investment, as they perceived investment to be a practice that 
was far from morally neutral, and that it implied values and ethical decisions along the 
way. From the Quakers’ opposition to investment in the slave trade in the 18th century, to 
the establishment of the Pioneer Fund in the US in 1928 that became the first mutual fund 
that explicitly circumvented ‘unethical investments’, and the creation of the Ethical 
Investment Research Service in 1983, the notion of responsible investment gradually 
overcame its initial religious undercurrents, developed into a confrontational but secular 
practice during the 1970s and 1980s (driven by the protest movements against the 
Vietnam War and the South African apartheid), and finally consolidated itself as a 
legitimate and professional practice after the 1990s (Louche, Arenas, & Cranenburgh, 
2012). In 2014, the value of responsible investment assets under management (AUM) 
reached $6.57 trillion in the US (18% of total US AUM), and €7 trillion in Europe (a 
staggering 41% of total European AUM) (Eurosif, 2014; US SIF, 2014). The ascending 
trend did make responsible investment a candidate for becoming a veritable mainstream 
investment strategy.  
And at the end of the day, SRI and social impact investment did have some shared 
characteristics: they had, for instance, the imperative of being mission-driven as a 
common denominator. Both sought to foster economic, social, and/or environmental 
value by explicitly divesting from or avoiding investment into pernicious and morally 
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contentious sectors, and actively focusing on or encouraging areas or businesses that bring 
about added economic, social, and/or environmental value. It was not only impact 
investment that sought to “create positive impact beyond financial return”, as some of its 
campaigners understood and promoted it (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud, Saltuk, Bugg-
levine, & Brandenburg, 2010, p. 5). All forms of responsible investment, by utilising 
negative screening, essentially promoted some sort of value, be it at the very least 
economic, in the guise of employment, or moral, through stigmatisation and avoidance. 
And some of the advocates of impact investment claimed, rather confusingly, that “all 
organisations, for-profit and non-profit alike, create value that consists of economic, 
social, and environmental components. All investors, whether market rate, charitable, or 
some mix of the two, generated all three forms of value” (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011, 
p. 9). In fact, this insight had already been produced in a sense around the turn of the 19th 
century when Henry Sidgwick and Arthur Pigou started reflecting upon the issue of 
‘externalities’ – the positive or negative spill-overs that economic exchanges might 
exhibit (Medema, 2007). A positive externality, therefore, can be conceived as a net 
positive spill-over effect for society at large resulting from an economic act, thus a form 
of investment with impact.  
Of course, externality was an epiphenomenon, an unintended by-product that escaped the 
initial design of the economic exchange, therefore not on par with responsible investment, 
which implied an overt intention to produce a specific effect, negative screening included. 
Leaving aside the notoriously difficult task of defining ‘intention’, responsible investment 
was still a form of profit-making activity – one, though, that was beholden to specific 
ethical standards and benchmarks that governed the investment process. This meant that 
investors acquired, held, or discarded shares of companies on the basis of their track 
record in corporate social responsibility (Louche & Lydenberg, 2011). However, what 
really set impact investment apart from responsible investment – and this was one of the 
places of demarcation – was that while the latter did possess some tools for measuring 
these standards, especially when it came to the economic, social, and environmental 
effects of real estate projects, these were secondary and remained underdeveloped. 
Furthermore, responsible investment predominantly remained the mainstay of 
institutional investors (sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, mutual funds, exchange 
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traded funds, etc.), partly also as a strategy for portfolio diversification and for taking 
advantage of under-priced assets outside the so-called ‘sin stocks’ (alcohol, tobacco, 
weapons, gambling, etc.) (Reeder & Colantonio, 2013). This entrenchment was also 
reflected in the coverage of socially responsible investment in the media and in academic 
journals: while initially the discussions were concerned with ethics, altruism, moral 
values, and the mission of going beyond financial aspects, the more recent coverage 
overwhelmingly moved towards the question of financial performance and the evidence 
that it is not all that different from common stocks after all (Capelle-Blancard & Monjon, 
2012). Responsible investment, therefore, shared with impact investment the common 
goal of problematising investment practice as an ethical matter, but it did so in a passive 
fashion and mostly without quantifying the resultant impact. 
Impact investment, in order to differentiate itself from practices such as SRI, had therefore 
to undergo a valuation process of abstraction, in which the clear definition of social value 
creation would become a top priority and a cornerstone of the entire field. Thus, it was 
decided that it would have to actively engage with two aspects: the social dimension of 
investment, and the elaboration of appropriate tools or metrics for measuring the impact 
on that social dimension. It therefore stressed non-financial returns not only as a filter 
through which illegitimate, noxious investments can be sifted out, but also as an 
investment rationale and essential factor through which financial return is calculated. 
Non-financial returns, as an investment mission, had generally been the lifeblood of 
philanthropy, but with the advent of the notion of ‘blended value’ at the beginning of the 
past decade, they transcended their segregated condition only to gradually become 
integrated in the investment mainstream.  
Indeed, by introducing the notion of ‘blended value’, social investment could delineate a 
new site of value creation, which would end up mixing different activities and approaches, 
and thus become an autonomous field in itself. Impact investment could actually be 
conceived as a “significant revolution [that] appears to be underway on the frontiers of 
philanthropy” (Salamon, 2014, p. 2), and very much visible in the profusion of new actors 
which were interested in outcome and not output, and which put to use various new tools 
to harbour private capital markets in order to achieve leverage and supersede the issue of 
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scarcity of retained funds. The distinction from traditional philanthropy was important, 
given that it provided an avenue for thinking through the value added of linking social 
impact with financial return, which provided opportunities not only for accountability, but 
also, through the increasing involvement of private sector financial actors, for leverage 
(see Table 1). The social value that was created as a result of social investment 
programmes was therefore different from the value that was brought about by traditional 
philanthropy, because, unlike the latter, it could be injected both with innovative 
entrepreneurship and with a virtually unlimited amount of wherewithal from profit-
minded and capital-endowed financial actors.  
 
Table 1. Old v new philanthropy. Source: Salomon (2014) 
The idea that synergies were taking place at the borders of philanthropy was indeed 
attested earlier by the nouveaux riches of Silicon Valley, who, during the 1990s in 
California, borrowed from their expertise in funding successful start-ups with venture 
capital and lent it to found and fund philanthropic activities – thus the emergence of 
‘venture philanthropy’ (Abélès, 2002). That said, this could not be untangled from another 
development that was rising to prominence around the same time, namely the advent of 
‘social entrepreneurship’ and ‘social innovation’ (Leadbeater, 1997; Nicholls & Murdock, 
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2012). The latter concepts were closely connected through the idea that activities that 
strive to bring about social change were grossly inefficient and stood to learn a few things 
from the gradual but constant improvements that entrepreneurship had benefitted from 
during the past decades. Successful entrepreneurs, driven by the imperative of efficiency 
quantified in monetary returns, could make for useful models in the field of social 
intervention. This new practical ethos combining social impact with business efficiency 
materialised, for instance, in the founding of Ashoka, an NGO dedicated to finding and 
fostering social entrepreneurs, in 1980 by legendary Bill Drayton, or in the establishment 
of the Social Enterprise Initiative at the Harvard Business School in 1993. Thus, the 
blending and hybridisation of the fields of philanthropy and business in the social field 
gradually gathered momentum and contributed to the crystallisation of a field that was 
distinct from the likes of SRI. Social entrepreneurship or innovation was quintessential to 
the demarcation of the field of impact investment from similar fields.  
Furthermore, whereas social intervention stemming from traditional philanthropy relied 
on the limited availability of grants and gifts bestowed by individuals, charitable 
foundations, or corporate philanthropic programmes, the new iteration of philanthropy, 
which thus hybridised traditional investment techniques and entities with traditional 
philanthropy, afforded to move beyond these entrenched habits and put to work a host of 
new instruments such as securitisation, equity-type investments, credit enhancements, 
crowd sourcing, or social impact bonds, while it mobilised, at the same time, a plethora 
of new institutions such as capital aggregators, secondary markets, social stock 
exchanges, venture philanthropy organisations, online portals, conversion foundations, or 
funding collaboratives. By combining tools and actors from across the investment 
spectrum, ‘new philanthropy’ strove to achieve something that was of paramount 
importance to the whole new business of impact investment, namely, leverage (Salamon, 
2014). These emerging financial instruments allowed organisations engaging in social 
programmes to tap into the vast pools of global capital markets and magnify their limited 
resources (traditionally, operating income) by leveraging from institutions such as 
pension funds, mutual funds, investment banks, insurance companies, or from the savings 
of high net worth individuals.  
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The fact that leverage was such a crucial factor that made impact investment not only 
possible but also potentially successful was also due to another essential development that 
was part and parcel of the abstraction process: the shift from a focus on output to focus 
on outcome. While output sought to quantify, for instance, the services or products offered 
as part of a programme with less stress on impact and more on delivery, a focus on 
outcome looked at the implications of the programme, the transformative results – 
benefits, changes, welfare etc. – it managed to achieve or not. That said, a focus on 
outcome was not powerful only because of the shift in perspective, but also because it is 
accompanied by tools that render it measurable: metrics. And that is the final piece of the 
abstraction puzzle. Because metrics allow data regarding social value creation to be 
collected, examined, reported, and integrated within the calculation of the financial flows 
that result of social investment programme. Metrics, in other words, allow potential 
impact to be integrated within the valuation process, a novel practice that alters 
conventional methods of worth-attribution or pricing. Social entrepreneurship or 
innovation, leverage, outcome-focus, and metrics are all part and parcel, and indeed 
essentially intertwined aspects, of the abstraction process that was thus undertaken in 
order to legitimise the social investment market as a legitimate and entrenched practice.  
 
2. Impact and metric extraction  
 
The specification of a field dealing with ‘impact investment’, as opposed to SRI or 
classical philanthropy, was therefore a required technical exercise in the abstraction of a 
framework for approaching value creation and a steppingstone in the creation of a market 
in associated financial instruments. However, initially, impact investment was not a self-
explanatory investment class (such as government bonds or corporate assets) for financial 
actors to simply come in and buy into. It was unclear, as described above, what the notion 
of ‘impact’ even referred to. The first obstacle that thus needed to be tackled after the 
market for impact investment was demarcated from other types of investment and in order 
for it to surpass its pre-paradigmatic state (Nicholls, 2010) was the creation of the 
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foundational consensus regarding the meaning of ‘impact’ and ways of extracting impact 
data (metrics) from social investment programmes.  
Within the sister practice of responsible investment, as argued above, the social dimension 
of impact was considerably underdeveloped, and the notion of utilising metrics to measure 
impact was, with some exceptions, virtually absent (Fiestas, Sullivan, & Crossley, 2010). 
Even within microfinance, a practice that also strove to foster capital market funding for 
social or developmental programmes, the social dimension had generally been 
underspecified (Fenton, 2010; on poverty see Fiestas et al., 2010). It was noted, for 
instance, that “in fact of all the metrics listed on mixmarket.org — the main resource for 
MFI data — none directly, if at all, indicate social performance or attempt to measure 
impacts on poverty” (Fenton, 2010). When the Social Performance Task Force – a non-
profit founded in 2005 to “develop and promote standards and good practices for social 
performance management” (SPTF, 2016) – partnered with the Microfinance Information 
Exchange (MIX) in 2011 and developed 11 indicators by which to evaluate the social 
performance of microfinance institutions, they did not really measure anything, but only, 
as their name suggests, indicated whether or not specific aspects of a social programme 
fulfilled the established standards for being categorised as a ‘social impact programme’ 
(target population, development objectives, training in social performance management, 
products offered, consumer protection principles, accounting for poverty, etc.)  (MIX, 
2016).   
But the notion of ‘impact’ as used in impact investment went beyond this and was coeval 
with the practice of assessing or measuring said impact. At the same time, it was laden 
with a certain degree of conceptual ambiguity. The many institutions, businesses, NGOs, 
platforms, working groups, etc. that utilised and promoted the notion of impact investment 
(e.g. The Global Impact Investment Network, The European Venture Philanthropy 
Association, The International Association for Impact Assessment, JPMorgan) did not 
necessarily employ a common or strict understanding of what it was exactly that impact 
entailed, but this attested less to the vagueness of the concept and more to the flexibility 
and adaptability of the notion to various uses. There were, at early stages, some attempts 
at defining impact by looking the kinds of concrete outcomes that may form part of 
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successful interventions, and construing them as ‘changes’ to one or more of the 
following:  
1. People’s way of life – that is, how they live, work, play, and interact with one 
another on a day-to-day basis. 
2. Their culture – that is, their shared beliefs, customs, values, and language or 
dialect. 
3. Their community – its cohesion, stability, character, services, and facilities. 
4. Their political systems – the extent to which people are able to participate in 
decisions that affect their lives, the level of democratisation that is taking place, 
and the resources provided for this purpose. 
5. Their environment – the quality of the air and water people use; the availability 
and quality of the food they eat; the level of hazard or risk, dust, and noise they 
are exposed to; the adequacy of sanitation, their physical safety, and their access 
to and control over resources. 
6. Their health and wellbeing – health is a state of complete physical, mental, social, 
and spiritual wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. 
7. Their personal and property rights – particularly whether people are economically 
affected, or experience personal disadvantage which may include a violation of 
their civil liberties. 
8. Their fears and aspirations – their perceptions about their safety, their fears about 
the future of their community, and their aspirations for their future and the future 
of their children. (Vanclay, 2003, p. 8) 
Even as late as 2009, close to the launching date of the first SIB, The International 
Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), one of the most prominent non-profits 
developing standards and principles for impact assessment, defined impact, simply but 
rather ambiguously, as “the difference between what would happen with the action and 
what would happen without it”, and the procedure of assessing impact as “the process of 
identifying the future consequences of a current or proposed action” (IAIA, 2009). Hence 
even right before the Peterborough SIB, the result of the process of abstraction was a 
working definition of ‘impact’, which, rather than constituting a shortcoming, provided it 
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with sufficient conceptual flexibility in order to be employed in social investment 
programmes with success and efficiency.  
It was later, in 2012-2013, that ‘impact’ received – after learning, retrospectively, about 
the manner in which it was utilised – a more rounded and clear-cut definition. And here 
NESTA, a charity dedicated to increasing the capacity for innovation in the UK, came in 
to play a major role in the qualification of the notion in a more analytical vein, by making 
the following distinctions between output, outcome, impact, and impact risk: 
1. An ‘output’ is a measurable unit of a product or a defined episode of service 
delivery directly produced by an investee’s activities. 
2. An ‘outcome’ is an observable, and measurable, change for an individual or 
organisation.  
3. ‘Impact’ is the effect on outcomes attributable to the output, which may be positive 
or negative, and will be identified through high-quality evaluation. 
4. ‘Impact Risk’ is a concept developed to give an indication of the certainty that an 
output will lead to the stated impact. (NESTA, 2012, p. 5) 
As can be seen in these definitions, the process of abstraction was by no means a walk in 
the park, and required significant intellectual investment and conceptual clarification in 
order to make it operational. On the one hand, ‘impact’ seemed to simply signify a specific 
degree of change that can be attributable to a designated action, and not occurring as an 
epiphenomenon, an externality, or a spill-over of a separated event. But this created a 
further problem, because the presence of a ‘designated’ action was by no means easily 
identifiable. Cue EVPA, which attempted to solve this issue by providing an even rounder 
and more sophisticated definition of impact:   
“to accurately (in academic terms) calculate social impact you need to adjust 
outcomes for: (i) what would have happened anyway (“deadweight”); (ii) the 
action of others (“attribution”); (iii) how far the outcome of the initial intervention 
is likely to be reduced over time (“drop off”); (iv) the extent to which the original 
situation was displaced elsewhere or outcomes displaced other potential positive 
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outcomes (“displacement”); and for unintended consequences (which could be 
negative or positive).” (EVPA, 2013, p. 46) 
This can be further simplified by saying that impact assessment had to adequately account 
for agency (is there some identifiable agent to whom the impact can be attributed?), time 
(how does the impact develop over time?), and space (how are other entities outside the 
scope of the intervention affected by it?). The only thing missing in this equation, which 
was required so that social value creation was abstracted in a clear and comparable 
fashion, was the practice of quantifying said impact – an act which was deemed rather 
costly, time-consuming, and elusive, but necessary. EVPA thus came with a 
recommendation to potential venture philanthropists in order to  
“measure impact that they calculate the outcomes of their investments while 
acknowledging (and where possible adjusting for) where other programmes could 
have contributed (e.g. the effect of the welfare state in developed countries) or 
where there may be negative effects, i.e. those factors that increase or decrease 
impact. In some situations comparing to potential control groups (for example 
based on research of comparable situations elsewhere) may also be feasible.” 
(2013, pp. 46–47)  
What EVPA was suggesting was that a certain degree of interpretative labour was required 
in order to undertake the abstraction process and resolve the inherent conceptual 
ambiguity present in the notion of ‘impact’. For this, a methodology was needed for 
approaching social value creation in a more rigorous and replicable way. And this became 
the task of the G8 Social Impact Investment Task Force (SIITF), the precursor of Global 
Social Impact Investment Steering Group (GSIISG). The SIITF was established by David 
Cameron in 2013 as part of his pledge to use the UK’s G8 presidency in order to promote 
the social impact investment agenda worldwide and extend the scope and depth of the 
impact investment market (more on this in the next chapter). In one of its subject papers, 
it divided the typical measurement process in four general phases (see Table 2), each with 
its own specific activity: Plan, Do, Assess, and Review (SIITF, 2014).  
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Table 2. Measurement process. Source: SIITF (2014) 
The ‘Plan’ phase was the most dynamic and flexible of all the phases. As such, it required 
the investors and the investees to agree upon two twin aspects: the impact to be achieved, 
and the instruments with which it will be evidenced. The articulation of the specific impact 
sought required the elaboration of an investment thesis or a ‘Theory of Value Creation’ 
(ToVC) in order to “form the basis of strategic planning and ongoing decision making 
and to serve as a reference point for investment performance” (SIITF, 2014, p. 8). There 
were no set criteria for establishing what counted in the ToVC; this was rather left to the 
latitude of the deciding parties. However, ToVC was crucial, because the desired impact 
to be achieved would form the reference point upon which the entire project will reflect 
back. The choice of impact metrics, also part of the Plan phase, was similarly flexible and 
open-ended, and it could involve either a choice of a measurement framework from the 
myriad of already existing frameworks, or the elaboration of a new one, tailor-made to 
suit the particular circumstances of the project at hand. The second phase, ‘Do’, included 
the gathering of data together with its validation. As such, it involved the mobilisation of 
processes for making sure that the streams of data collected flow from investees to 
investors in a transparent and organised manner, as well as the review of the collection of 
data in order to assess, by cross-checking calculations and assumptions, whether or not 
data is gathered in a complete and accurate fashion. Similar to the first phase, it also 
implicated communication, negotiation, and contestation between the parties involved. In 
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the third phase, the data gathered was reviewed and analysed with an eye for 
understanding and assessing to what extent the quality, scope, and depth of the impact 
was on track with the desired goal. Lastly, the review phase involved reporting data and 
making strategic management decisions. Thus, first, the progress of the impact investment 
project was shared with key stakeholders in order to inform their decisions regarding the 
effectiveness of the project, and, second, the feedback from stakeholders was taken into 
account with the purpose of delivering recommendations regarding the appropriateness of 
the investment thesis or the ‘theory of value creation’ established at the outset5.  
The phases of the impact measurement process were, therefore, highly dynamic and 
flexible, albeit within some limits and following some pre-set parameters:  
“performance measurement processes and the outputs of each step will interact 
and evolve continuously. The sequence, frequency, and timing of each activity 
will also vary. Implementation of these guidelines will be unique to every 
organisation, as they are likely to have their own measurement goals, resource 
constraints, and stakeholders to consider” (SIITF, 2014, p. 8).  
In many ways, then, in the context of social impact investment, impact seemed to have 
been construed as the long-term measurable net social change that could be attributed to 
the service operators’ designated programme scope. Attribution appeared as a crucial 
aspect, given that whatever residual impact appears, whether positive or negative, whether 
crucial to the beneficiaries of the programme or not, was less important when it came to 
the social investors. As long as it did not decisively change the initial impact goals, it did 
not figure in the return calculations. What really mattered was the efficiency of the 
abstraction process – the conceptual agreement and stability regarding ‘impact’, where 
the ToVC played a crucial part, and the metric extraction and application upon the social 
value development – and the manner in which this correlated with the pre-established 
financial return. Together with the dimensions of social entrepreneurship or innovation, 
leverage, outcome focus, and metrics, this process of abstraction constituted a major step 
                                                 
5 It was unclear, though not unconceivable, if this would affect the return profile established at the outset. 
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in the concretisation and crystallisation of social investment as a practice with defined and 
specified means and ends. But in order to flesh out the abstraction process a bit more and 
illustrate how it was conceived to work in practice, the next section will look at Social 
Return on Investment (SROI) as the most exemplary and popular measurement 
framework utilised in social investment.  
 
5. Social Return on Investment 
 
SROI has slowly become one of the most popular approaches to measuring social value 
added, given its emphasis on three types of return: economic returns, socio-economic 
returns, and social returns. The use of the term ‘return’ is no accident: while these three 
dimensions can be expressed either in a monetary, quantitative, or qualitative language, 
or a combination of the three, there is a clear propensity – despite claims to the contrary 
(see, e.g., REDF, 2000) – for employing monetisation as the reference of choice. This 
purportedly clear-cut and transparent manner of expressing impact has the double benefit 
of satisfying the increasing demand for accountability that social enterprises and non-
profits more generally face when attempting to draw on the financial resources of grant-
making entities, as well as the need for understanding, in a self-explanatory way, not only 
how, but also how much their social intervention results in a specific impact (Nicholls, 
2009). In doing so, SROI attempts, essentially, to solve a particular predicament: what to 
do in order to estimate the value of an item when there is no available market price for it 
(Krlev et al., 2013)? This foundational quandary makes SROI appealing not only to social 
investors driven by the drive for returns beyond impact, but also to states in their quest 
for introducing markets at the core of social policy delivery. 
SROI was first launched by the Roberts Enterprise Development Fund (REDF) in the US 
in 1996, and was picked up and developed in the UK by the New Economics Foundation 
(NEF) (NEF, 2009; REDF, 2000). As such, its use is most evidenced in the Anglo-
American world, especially in the UK where there is less hesitation to employ 
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performance measurement tools in the social field, but it has recently made headway in 
continental Europe as well. In the original proposal that REDF made, SROI was meant to 
capture a spectrum of value ranging from economic to social, with the interposing referent 
called ‘socio-economic’ value. The economic value was simply the financial return that 
an enterprise produced, i.e. the revenue generated by engaging in an economic activity. 
The socio-economic value was construed as the savings to society or the state that a social 
investment programme generates by stepping into an activity or domain that diminishes, 
for instance, transfer payments or social risk more generally. Social impact bonds are the 
epitome of this form of added socio-economic value. Lastly, the social value indicator 
was meant to capture a more immaterial dimension – the improvement in individuals’ 
wellbeing or society’s cohesion. These can span a number of indicators from confidence 
or self-esteem to knowledge or skills. While the first referent, the economic return, is quite 
straight-forward and easy to capture by employing specific well-established econometric 
tools, the socio-economic return is dependent on the specificity of the project: if it is a 
question of a programme that promotes job integration, then it is quite easy to calculate 
the reduction in social transfer payments and the increase in employee tax payments; if it 
is a question of a programme that attempts to decrease discrimination, the pursuit for 
monetising savings to social costs is much more elusive. The third dimension, social 
return, which represents, in the end, the rationale of social impact programmes, is even 
more evasive. In fact, the social aspect, in particular more subtle dimensions of social 
value such as self-assurance, feelings of belonging, or contentment, is the most 
underdeveloped factor in SROI methodologies and is usually treated as a residual, abstract 
category that does not have a clearly definable meaning or purpose. 
Despite this, SROI has been hailed as the most suitable methodology for translating 
certain aspects of social impact into financial terms (Krlev et al., 2013). By utilising 
indictors from across the three dimensions of impact, SROI methodologies develop a 
coefficient that captures the ratio between social benefits and investment costs, and 
express this in monetary terms (NEF, 2009): 
SROI coefficient = 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
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Essentially, this equation calculates how much social benefit expressed in monetary terms 
has resulted for a given amount of invested capital. For instance, a SROI coefficient of 
3:1 implies that an investment of £1 delivered a £3 return of social value. This coefficient 
is then utilised as a purportedly rigorous tool to measure and account for the change that 
a specific project has brought about. In order to undertake such a SROI analysis, specific 
steps must be followed (NEF, 2009). Table 3 summarises this process.  
 
Table 3. A typical SROI analysis. Adapted from NEF (2009) 
The first four steps share many things in common with other metrics that are subsumed 
under the critical theorist and interpretative banners (which will be discussed in the next 
chapter). Thus they can include drawing up a boundary of what is feasible to be measured 
and what is beyond the purpose of the programme, what the main audience is, how 
communication with the audience will be done, how the object of the intervention will be 
understood, what human and monetary resources will be mobilised for the project, the 
period of time that will be considered, who are the relevant stakeholders and who are the 
excluded ones, how each stakeholder might be affected by the activity, how and how 
much they should be involved, establishing the inputs, identifying the non-monetised 
inputs (this is a pre-requisite in SROI – monetising, for instance, volunteer time or 
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contributions in goods and services), clarifying the outputs, describing the outcomes for 
each stakeholder involved, developing outcome indicators (e.g. for decreased social 
isolation: to what extent beneficiaries have built new friendships, to what extent they are 
participating in new social activities such as sports or group travel, to what extent they 
have developed new social skills, to what extent they take advantage of public services 
such as public transport, etc.), collecting the outcome data, establishing how long the 
outcomes may last, calculating deadweight by making reference to comparison groups or 
benchmarks, establishing attribution, estimating the amount of drop-off or to what extent 
the attribution declines over the years, etc. Finally, the last step involves reporting to and 
debriefing with stakeholders, something that SROI also shares with most other metrics. 
All in all, most of these aspects involve a high degree of reflection, negotiation, and 
decision-making regarding what to include in the analysis and how; they are by no means 
strict indications of the proper paths to revealing the social impact that a programme might 
have.  
Where SROI really differs from other methodologies of calculating social impact is in the 
monetisation of outcomes, which happens in step 3, and, of course, in the calculation of 
the SROI coefficient, which happens in step 5. As mentioned above, the issue with 
assigning social outcomes is that they are not tradeable in markets, therefore they do not 
have a market price, nor can they be a party in processes of ‘price discovery’. In order 
that this limitation be overcome, a financial proxy is used (Social Value UK, 2013). The 
financial proxy estimates the value that stakeholders assign to a particular good or service. 
By engaging directly with them, service providers mediate between the distinct values 
that people attach to different things, and so arrive at a financial estimate of the social 
value that an intervention create that is at the same time more complete than, say, a stock 
price:  
“Share prices only reflect the valuations of a very limited group of stakeholders 
(institutional and retail investors), while an SROI analysis, if done properly, 
captures the different types of value relating to an activity, intervention or 
organisation, as seen from the perspective of those that are affected – i.e. the 
stakeholders.” (NEF, 2009, p. 46).  
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Some of the financial proxies utilised are fairly easy to capture and they do not require 
deep stakeholder engagement. When it comes to, for instance, cost saving interventions 
such as employment or health programmes, it is not difficult to estimate how much was 
saved by the state not having to subsidise healthcare or transfer unemployment payments 
while at the same time bringing in new tax receipts. On the other hand, when it comes to 
estimating the value of more elusive things, which are normally left out of mainstream 
economic valuations, SROI uses several techniques. The technique of contingent 
valuation, for example, approaches the issue of monetisation by simply asking individuals 
directly what monetary value they assign to, say, decreased aircraft noise, or how much 
monetary compensation they would require to accept, say, for an increased occurrence of 
crime. The technique of revealed preferences looks at related or similar things that already 
have a monetary value and are tradeable on markets, and infers stakeholders’ valuations 
from their prices. The travel cost method similarly infers the price of a specific thing, but 
this time by translating into monetary value the willingness of people to travel distances 
to access specific goods or services. Another alternative would be average household 
spending on things such as leisure in order to estimate how much individuals value these 
things as compared to others. Some examples here are given in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Value estimation process in SROI. Adapted from NEF (2009) 
These and other techniques make SROI a more holistic approach to assessing, 
quantitatively, how much people value a specific outcome that an intervention might have. 
But at the end of the day, “there are no hard and fast rules as to which you would use in 
given situations” and they require “creativity and research” together with “consultation 
with stakeholders to identify the most appropriate values” (NEF, 2009, p. 48). In other 
words, the choice of indicators and the monetisation process are determined by relatively 
subjective and inter-subjective mechanisms that to some extent render SROI and the 
valuation dynamics that rely on SROI methodologies open to collaboration, arbitration, 
or contestation. 
Finally, the monetised data recorded in the previous steps are encoded into the SROI 
coefficient in order to summarise the financial information and generate the total 
monetised value of the social investment. This plays the function of encapsulating into 
one single telling figure the entire investment potential and the social benefits that accrue 
from it. The way this is done is by first calculating total value of the outcomes (quantity 
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of each outcome multiplied by each outcome’s financial proxy); deducting for deadweight 
(what would have happened anyway, expressed in percentages); accounting for attribution 
(how much is attributable to other inputs, also in percentages); finally, adding everything 
up. The second stage involves projecting the impact value into the future and subtracting 
the drop-off from each year that the project will be undertaken. In the third stage, the net 
present value (NPV) will be calculated. This is done normally by using an established 
discount rate that accounts for the time value of money (the idea that money today is 
preferable to money tomorrow due to risk or opportunity cost); however, in the field of 
social impact investment, this is still a matter of contention and subjective choice: “until 
the field has enough data to calculate a discount rate that more accurately reflects the true 
degree of risk undertaken by such programs, there seems no other choice than that of 
applying a range of discount rates for present use in SROI calculations” (REDF, 2000, p. 
154). The discount rates (r) used can range from the benchmark of HM Treasury’s public 
sector rate of 3.5% to venture philanthropists’ rate of 24% (REDF, 2000). The present 
value is then calculated by discounting the future value output, for example: 
Present Value =  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 1
(1+𝑟)
+  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2
(1+𝑟)2
+  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 3
(1+𝑟)3
+  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 4
(1+𝑟)4
+  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 5
(1+𝑟)5
 
After calculating the present value of the impact, the value of the input (the investment) 
is subtracted to calculate the NPV:  
NPV = Present Value – Investment Value 
Finally, the SROI coefficient is calculated either in a gross or a net form: 
SROI ratio = 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
Or 
Net SROI ratio = 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
As mentioned above, this ratio will express the monetary value of the project in terms of 
‘for each £1 of investment, SROI ratio x £1 worth of social value has been generated’. 
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The image of a single, palpable number has the power to express in a shorthand way the 
fact that the project has added social value and also show how much in a universal 
language, that of money. Of course, SROI’s main ambition is not simply to assign a 
monetary value to things; rather, monetisation is a means that incentivises stakeholder 
engagement, better understand value creation, collect evidence in a more robust manner, 
and increasing accountability to all stakeholders, from beneficiaries to service providers 
and investors.  
That being said, the strength and selling point of SROI – its capacity for monetisation – 
is also one of the most abused aspect of this methodology. A meta-study of SROI practices 
found that the majority of SROI studies conveyed the idea that the SROI ratio was a robust 
figure that accurately reflected social value creation, with 75 per cent barely reflecting or 
not reflecting at all on the limitations that their choice of methodology might present, 54 
per cent not reflecting at all on what kind of social value, if at all, was created beyond the 
monetised one, and 53 per cent not including any information regarding the choice of 
indicators and how slightly different choices might have affected the study (Krlev et al., 
2013). At the same time, the temptation of forceful monetisation led to reported cases of 
adventurous results, such as assigning the monetary value of an adventure trip to a 
challenging job environment, or that of a two-day self-esteem course to the value of 
personality formation. Databases such as IRIS do attempt to make metrics and the process 
of monetisation more comprehensive and homogenous across programmes, but the fact 
that monetisation is so malleable and specific to each particular intervention means that, 
at this point, estimation of social impact projects is a highly relative enterprise. It depends 
to a considerable degree on the latitude of the service providers and their choice of 
indicators and overall understanding of the theory of change, together with the to some 
degree spontaneous consensus regarding impact that emerges in the interaction between 
stakeholders.  
Lastly, it should be noted that, by and large, it is not financial actors that are driving the 
push for using methodologies such as SROI in delivering social services, but the state and 
non-profit organisations. Only 8 per cent of entities commissioning SROI studies are 
private companies, 37 per cent are NGOs and 35 per cent are public agencies (Krlev et 
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al., 2013). Especially in the case of Social Impact Bonds, where SROI-type methodologies 
play a major role, the state has been actively involved in fostering their use, but it has also 
co-opted non-profits such as the New Economics Foundation in the UK and has 
established networking platforms and task forces such as the SIITF or the Social 
Investment Forum for the promotion of social investment and SROI-type metrics. In 
consequence, by receiving support from across the board, SROI is becoming increasingly 
popular and refined, but it is unclear whether or not this will crystallise into a homogenous 
methodology which can be applied uniformly and irrespective of the specificity of the 
social intervention.   
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6. Conclusion 
 
After the two state-sponsored Task Forces, SITF and CoSA, provided the groundwork for 
the creation of a social investment market in the UK, the scene was set for the launch of 
the world’s first social impact bond at Peterborough Prison in 2010. But before that could 
be accomplished, a couple more bridges needed to be crossed in order to establish more 
clearly what it was that the project itself sought. And this had to do with figuring out ways 
of making an SIB operational and implementable. As such, the two steps deemed 
necessary were, first, the ordering of the actors involved into patterns of interaction that 
made sense most for maximising social value creation understood as an inclusive, quasi-
democratic outcome of cross-societal input gathering, and then the abstraction of impact 
through conceptual delineation and quantification, in order to link it to financial return 
and create blended value.  
This chapter has therefore analysed these two median steps in the novel valuation process 
that is the foundation upon which the social investment market was erected: ordering and 
abstraction. It has shown how, for instance, without the former, the unfolding of a social 
investment project would transmogrify into a decisional free-for-all which would hinder 
or even render impossible the sort of novel manner of value creation that is essential to 
the ideals of this new field. Indeed, the ordering process ensures that input collection is 
made from across the stakeholder board in a collaborative and horizontal fashion, and that 
continuous feedback loop channels are maintained open among the latter. This, of course, 
is made possible not least due to the introduction of network-like features that were 
shown, in the previous chapter, to be a consequence of NPG reforms occurring both in 
the UK but also worldwide.  
Despite the fact that the many institutions that promoted SIBs employed differing 
definitions that emphasise some actors at the expense of the others (usually, the investors 
at the expense of everyone else, most likely because they are the providers of capital), the 
structure of an SIB was relatively clear-cut: it involved commissioners (local or national 
governments or foundations), investors (trusts, foundations, institutional investors, high 
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net worth individuals, etc.), service providers (social enterprises, charities, civil society 
organisations, etc.), and service users (the target population). The ordering process was 
constructed in such a manner that, in theory, all of the entities involved had a more or less 
equal say in the undertaking of the impact project. That said, this chapter has pointed out 
that there were also some variations in the construction of SIBs and some potential 
imbalances of powers at times that were noticed, which implies that the ordering had a 
margin of error where the quasi-democratic nature of social value creation was distorted 
and some actors’ inputs weigh more than others’. Regardless of this fact, the main 
accomplishment of the ordering process was the alignment of incentives, which was 
indeed a main feature and advantage of social impact programmes like SIBs.  
Similarly, without abstraction, social value creation would have been, as argued, if not 
meaningless, then at least unaccountable. Achieving impact would be, in a sense, an 
exercise in wishful thinking, were it not for the metrics and methodologies for grasping it 
conceptually and quantitatively. Abstraction is thus what gives social investment its 
tangibility. And abstraction was done in a two-stage process: first, the conceptual 
delineation of the field of impact investment from the sister field of socially responsible 
investment, and then a conceptual clarification of the notion of ‘impact’ together with the 
elaboration of a plan for gauging it numerically.  
This chapter has shown that the fundamental distinction between SRI and impact 
investment turns on the approach to social value creation: whereas the first seeks to 
negatively screen deleterious investments and thus indirectly and passively create social 
value via positive externalities, the second actively engages with the generation of social 
value. And even though both are mission-driven, it is only the second that has, through 
the notion of blended value, a metrological arsenal to measure impact and thus create 
accountability. It is only the second that also benefits from a host of new entities and 
instruments in its quest for social value creation, such as social enterprises, social 
innovation, social stock exchanges, SIBs, etc. This conceptual delineation was therefore 
essential as the founding act of the field of social investment.  
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The latter was followed by a conceptual clarification of the meaning of ‘impact’ itself and 
by an elaboration of ways of extracting impact data from the projects. This chapter has 
shown that early attempts at defining impact resulted not in a clear-cut and minute 
description of its meaning, but rather in a working definition that was employed by the 
various entities that were engaged in impact investment. But rather than constituting a 
shortcoming, this proved an advantage, in that this made it flexible and usable enough to 
allow the market to develop and expand. It was only later, in 2012-2013, that NESTA and 
EVPA generated a more detailed and rigorous definition that accounted for the many 
facets of impact creation. Furthermore, in 2014, the G8 SIITF built on this definition of 
created a four-part methodology for how the measurement process should proceed. At the 
heart of this rested the ToVC, which would serve as the unique stepping stone and 
reference point of each social impact programme.  
Ordering and abstraction are, therefore, the median stages in the valuation process that 
characterises finance’s advance in the social policy field. They play a crucial part in the 
creation and gauging of blended value, and they are the necessary pillars of any solid and 
accountable social impact project. They also gave birth to a myriad of metrics and metric 
frameworks, which are crucial for tying financial returns to social outcome and bring 
investors to fund and leverage social programmes. And as the next chapter will show, they 
are tied to the spread and promotion of the market for social investment, because they 
allow standardisation and institutionalisation, which are the last two missing pieces of the 
new valuation puzzle that characterises finance’s advance in the field of social policy.  
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Standardisation and institutionalisation: Policy delivery 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter rounds up the investigation of the valuation processes behind the expansion 
of finance in the field of the pursuit of social policy objectives, by focusing on the last 
two steps in the entrenchment of blended value and the of practice of social investment, 
namely standardisation and institutionalisation. The previous chapters analysed how the 
main parameters of blended value creation had been set through negotiation, selection, 
ordering, and abstraction. All that was separating social impact investment from 
becoming a truly transformative public policy practice as well as a legitimate market in 
itself was the final push for the standardisation of metrics and for the actual 
institutionalisation of impact investment through law and through international bodies.  
By 2009, social impact projects were slowly appearing on the investment horizon. But 
while at first they did so with considerable ado, their subsequent growth advanced at a 
decreasing pace. As discussed below, one of the main issues that investors fretted about 
was the overwhelming and chaotic mushrooming of metrics that appeared after each and 
every impact programme. To make matters worse, they did so without a sufficient degree 
of transparency, accountability, and commensurability. That is why, the investors argued, 
standardisation of the collection of evidence regarding social value and of the 
performance of social enterprises was a necessary cornerstone before the field of social 
investment could be institutionalised. In 2009, two such vehicles of standardisation were 
created: a reporting standard (IRIS) and a ranking system (GIIRS). One was meant to 
solve the problem of commensurability, the other of rating. But together, they helped 
standardise the seemingly heterogeneous metrics and increase their transparency and 
availability through online depositories and firms dedicated specifically to this task.  
In a sense, the institutionalisation of blended value was a consequence of all the previous 
steps taken together. But it was one single event – and this was stated explicitly by various 
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state and non-state actors – that anointed the field of social impact investment with 
legitimacy and credibility: the launch of the Peterborough Prison Pilot SIB. The launch 
of the latter was meant to be the state of the art when it comes to social investment 
programmes and an avatar of future SIBs and other social impact projects. Therefore, the 
launch of the Peterborough SIB and the promotion and entrenchment of the social 
investment market are inextricably tied. Furthermore, although the process of 
standardisation was not in itself necessary for the launch of the first SIB, it was certainly 
necessary for building up the credibility and sought-after track record that the launch of 
Peterborough announced. The two are essentially linked, as they are with the other four 
processes that constitute the valuation infrastructure that allowed finance to advance in 
the field of social policy. 
The noticeable thing about institutionalisation is that it was embedded in a wider political 
project, without which it might have at least looked different. That project was The Big 
Society agenda of the Conservative – Lib Dem Coalition that came to power as a result 
of the 2010 election in the UK. This agenda provided the institutionalisation process with 
a certain degree of ideological thrust, as social investment could be pitched as addressing 
purportedly urgent needs that the British electorate faced and demanded in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis. Though The Big Society agenda was rapidly jettisoned as a wider 
societal project, later, as part of the G8 summit that took place in London in June 2013 
under the UK’s presidency, David Cameron retained the social investment dimension of 
the agenda and made a case for its potential to be socially transformative, by:  
“using the power of finance to tackle the most difficult social problems, problems 
that have frustrated government after government, country after country, 
generation after generation […] like drug abuse, youth unemployment, 
homelessness and even global poverty.” (Cameron, 2013) 
As part of the pledge he made to also use the UK’s G8 presidency to institutionalise social 
impact investment, Cameron further announced three initial developments: a tax break for 
social investments, a Social Stock Exchange, and local community funding. At the same 
time, together with other global leaders, the UK Prime Minister established the Social 
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Impact Investment Task Force (SIITF), a platform that had the mission of extending the 
now global scope and depth of the impact investment market. process. The Task Force 
was incorporated in and succeeded by the Global Social Impact Investment Steering 
Group in August 2015, which opened to countries beyond the G8.  
This way, impact investment slowly made headway into the global political-economic 
agenda and was institutionalised as a legitimate practice of capital accumulation via social 
value creation. This chapter analyses this process through first looking at the 
standardisation of the chaotic and obscure profusion of metrics for social impact, and then 
by delving into the institutionalising role that the Coalition Government played through 
its Big Society agenda both domestically and globally. Finally, as it represented the apex 
of around a decade of many individuals’ work, a more detailed analysis of the Pilot SIB 
is provided.  
What this chapter finds is that, in order for the field of social impact investment to become 
a fully-fledged and legitimate investment practice with the notion of blended value at its 
core, the valuation process entered a final stage. This stage was comprised of 
standardisation and institutionalisation, with the former entailing the introduction of an 
appropriate degree of transparency, accountability, and commensurability at the centre of 
the collection of social value evidence through the creation of a reporting standard (IRIS) 
and a ranking system (GIIRS), and the latter encompassing the launch of the world’s first 
SIB at the Peterborough Prison in 2010, but also the enshrinement of social value into law 
through the Public Services (Social Value) Act of March 2012, as well as the promotion 
of social impact investment at the G8 meeting in the UK in 2013. Thus, the scene was set 
for this new field to become a legitimate and viable avenue for delivering, in an innovative 
manner, social policy projects.   
206 
 
2. High standards for metrics 
 
‘Impact’ emerged, as established, as a rather elusive concept subject to interpretational 
labour resolved dynamically and in a network-like fashion across the stakeholder 
spectrum. But this was not even what mattered most to the social impact investor. For the 
latter, what mattered was the long-term measurable net social change that can be attributed 
to the service operator’s designated programme scope. This is the case, of course, because 
the data regarding social return is correlated, contractually, to a specific degree of 
financial return accruing to investors. Impact metrics, thus, as far as the investors are 
concerned, are the bedrock of social investment. But when it comes to choosing a metric 
to gauge impact, what was striking was the diversity, specificity, but also malleability of 
metrics. Impact metrics are an integral part of the valuation process, but far from 
resembling the tools of mainstream financial valuation, they are generally minute, 
bespoke, recombinant, and irreducible to grand formulas.  
Indeed, during the past four decades, within and beyond social investment, a profusion of 
metric frameworks emerged, with reports quoting hundreds of rival methodologies for 
quantifying impact and social value added, with at times the third sector employing one 
particular set, governments another, and academia yet another one (Mulgan, 2010). With 
this mushrooming of metric frameworks came also the increased difficulty of choosing 
what methodology to utilise in what circumstances, given also the emergence of very 
distinct and specific metrics coming from independent evaluators. As expected, the 
confusion stemming from the multifarious metric options stifled the widespread use of 
metrics for calculating impact. With the development of the social impact market, 
increasing importance was attached by investors to employing calculative methodologies, 
due not least to accountability and financial return considerations. Indeed, an impressive 
96 per cent of investors stated that they made use of metrics for calculating impact when 
investing in impact projects, and 70 per cent claimed that standardisation of impact 
metrics is ‘important’ or ‘very important’, even though the same percentage reported 
using third-party ratings for social impact investment decisions (Saltuk et al., 2013). The 
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choice of metric from the abundance of available options was therefore not forthright, and 
this constituted a hindrance in the development and spread of the social investment 
market. 
Before 2010, there were a couple of initiatives, mainly market-driven but also receiving 
the support of some international organisations, to provide a push in the direction of metric 
standardisation (Nicholls, Nicholls, & Paton, 2015). Among them, the Global Reporting 
Initiatives (GRI) and the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) stand out. GRI was 
founded in 1997 by the US-based Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies 
and Tellus Institute (a non-profit focusing on sustainability), and received the blessing 
and support of the UN Environment Programme. Its mandate was to help businesses, 
governments, and other organisations to apprehend and report the impact that business 
has on sustainability issues such as climate change, human rights, and corruption, and thus 
it made the first steps towards emphasising the importance of metric standards. Later on, 
in 2007, GIIN was conceived with the remit of building critical infrastructure and 
supporting the expansion of a coherent and consistent impact investing industry, including 
by engaging in standardisation work. But it was really in 2009 that the issue of metric 
standardisation came to the fore and became the explicit focus of efforts to provide 
investors with the infrastructure required to easily navigate the nascent field of impact 
investment.  
And so, in a 2009 report, the Rockefeller Foundation identified satisfying investors’ needs 
as the steppingstone to building the market for impact investment (Barman, 2015). And 
what the investors required, above all, was for the market to overcome fragmentation and 
develop a single enabling infrastructure that would make it easy to gauge and compare 
investing opportunities along both the financial and the social dimensions. The 
conventional financialisation narrative suggested that, given that these were experienced 
investors thoroughly equipped with the valuation tools of mainstream financial theory, 
the valuation processes required in the field of social finance could simply be transplanted 
from mainstream finance to impact investment. However, the biggest concern of investors 
turned out to be precisely the nebulousness of the notion and value of social impact, and 
the inability of financial valuation instruments to provide an appropriate representation 
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and estimate of the latter. There was a perceived need for basic market instruments like 
the ones available for commercial investors, such as GAAP, Moody’s, or portfolio 
management tools, but these were deemed unsuitable for the nature and complexity of 
value which was encountered in social finance (Brandenburg, 2012). Therefore, a parallel 
market infrastructure needed to be constructed, structured around calculative tools or 
metrics specifically designed for the valuation of social impact.  
Two such tools were agreed upon as necessary in the process of standardisation of social 
value measurement: a reporting standard (IRIS) and a ranking system (GIIRS) (Barman, 
2015). IRIS was meant to solve the problem of commensuration: too many social 
enterprises were pursuing the same goals but in doing so they employed different 
measures of social impact, leading to a situation in which investment opportunities were 
not readily and easily available for comparison and selection. Similar to GAAP, it created 
a standardised framework through which entities operating in the field could file reports 
and information that was streamlined across the board and thus made comparable. As 
such, IRIS standardised the metrics utilised in gauging social impact, but it did so in such 
a way that it did not reduce the flurry of metrics to the lowest common denominator, but 
rather it maintained multiplicity in accord with the perceived plurality of value creation 
in the social field (IRIS, 2016).  
In other words, not only were the distinct regimes of value – financial and social – 
preserved, but the second contained its own plurality of meaning which was maintained 
in the corresponding calculative tools created to grasp it. IRIS now contains a freely-
available catalogue of impact metrics, which has already received three overhauls and it 
encompasses over 550 different metrics that span sectors as different as agriculture, 
education, energy, environment, financial services, health, housing, community 
development, land conservation, and water. The IRIS initiative states that the process of 
catalogue consolidation is in continuous development and open-ended, and it admits input 
from third party standards, expert working groups, and feedback from users and the public 
more generally, with updates in the pipeline to be expected every other year. Furthermore, 
the metrics are not set in stone nor are they mutually exclusive: the process of choosing 
the metrics that will evaluate impact is thus quite contingent and amenable to tinkering 
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and modification. Standardisation of impact metrics has not meant reduction to a common 
and homogenous denominator, but proliferation of consolidated and novel measurement 
frameworks.   
The second tool essential to the valuation infrastructure was GIIRS, a ranking system that 
was meant to evaluate and rate investment opportunities across the social finance 
spectrum according to the impact social enterprises created (GIIRS, 2010). Like credit 
rating agencies such as Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s, GIIRS provided arms-length 
judgements on the performance of social enterprises, which were evaluated and then 
ranked based on a specific scoreboard into clear hierarchical structures. Geared, again, 
towards investors’ needs, these hierarchies provided unambiguous information for 
reducing the uncertainty, complexity, and effort in investment decision-making (Barman, 
2015). However, due to the nature of this operation, GIIRS was unlike IRIS in that it did 
reduce the plurality of meaning to a few common denominators, which constituted the 
building blocks of the rating system: governance policies, status and treatment of 
employees, policy towards the environment, policy towards the community, and goods 
and services provided (GIIRS, 2010). These dimensions were believed to be flexible and 
encompassing enough in themselves to allow for multiple paths to impact. In other words, 
behind categorisation still laid multiplicity.  
Both IRIS and GIIRS safeguarded a certain degree of multiplicity behind their push for 
standardisation. That said, an unintended effect of this initiative was to bring into the 
limelight the existing plurality of metrics and reveal how behind the latter actually lied 
common assumptions, especially regarding the social reality subject to measurement. 
Based on the three main theories of accounting, measurement could be conceived as 
positivist, critical theories, or interpretative (Nicholls, Nicholls, et al., 2015). The 
positivist view of impact measurement assumed that the act of measuring captures and 
represents the experiential social reality without other hindrances beside the extent and 
complexity of the reality that it has to grasp. Impact is produced in a linear manner, 
stemming from a series of inputs to a series of outputs and eventually outcomes. The 
mechanics behind the link between inputs and outputs is one of causality, based on a 
stripped-down logic of ‘if…, then…’. This approach is also known as the ‘logic model’ 
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or ‘theory of change’ (SIITF, 2014), and is one of the most popular framework for 
measuring social impact. The evaluator endeavours to establish or uncover these 
positivistic relationships between inputs and outputs, and devise the most efficient 
strategies for collecting the data required to establish if the impact project is on track to 
achieving its target. These can range from participatory observation and interviews to 
surveys and official statistics. The positivistic and rationalistic approach was expressed, 
for instance, by the way in which ActKnowledge, a social enterprise based at City 
University of New York, defined ‘theory of change’:  
“At its heart, Theory of Change spells out initiative or program logic. It defines 
long-term goals and then maps backward to identify changes that need to happen 
earlier (preconditions). The identified changes are mapped graphically in causal 
pathways of outcomes, showing each outcome in logical relationship to all the 
others. Interventions, which are activities and outputs of any sort, are mapped to 
the outcomes pathway to show what stakeholders think it will take to effect the 
changes, and when. Theory of Change provides a working model against which to 
test hypotheses and assumptions about what actions will best bring about the 
intended outcomes. A given Theory of Change also identifies measurable 
indicators of success as a roadmap to monitoring and evaluation.” (Taplin, Clark, 
Collins, & Colby, 2013) 
The heavy insistence on logical relationships as well as its capacity for translating 
measurement into numerical figures or even monetise social value lends this approach a 
veneer of ‘objectivity’ and ‘scientific rigour’, which explains why it is, in the end, one of 
the investors’ most preferred frameworks for assessing impact (Nicholls, Nicholls, et al., 
2015). Under this category one can find methods as varied as:  
1. Cost-benefit analyses – as the name suggests, these calculate, in monetary terms, 
the ratio between the benefits and costs of a project, then apply a discount rate. 
Most often, they are used for large-scale public programmes. Acumen Fund’s 
BACO ration (‘the best available charitable option’) is a famous example: it seeks 
to quantify impact and compare it to existing similar charitable options by asking 
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“For each dollar invested, how much social output will this generate over the life 
of the investment relative to the best available charitable option?” (Acumen Fund, 
2007).  
2. Experimental methods of choice modelling – these use modelling to reconstruct 
decision processes of individuals when it comes to alternative goods. RCTs 
(‘randomised controlled trials’) are one example: they seek to compare the 
outcomes of a ‘trial’ cohort that benefits from an intervention with the outcomes 
stemming from a randomly selected ‘control’ cohort that does not, and compare 
whether preferences have thusly been modified.  
3. Behavioural models – similar to the previous, it privileges the notion of choice, 
thus they rely on stated preferences (asking people how much an outcome is worth 
to them) or revealed preferences (examining past choices in order to infer how 
much various options are worth to people) (Mulgan, 2010).  
4. Welfare economics models – the well-established branch of economics yields 
models that are utilised in social impact measurement: public value assessment 
(similar to the previous but at the aggregate level, it judges how much the public 
values a service); value-added assessment (how much, for instance, a school adds 
value to a pupil); QALYs (Quality-Adjusted Life Years) and DALYs (Disability-
Adjusted Life Years Assessment) (accounts for a patient’s objective health and 
subjective experiences); and LSA (Life Satisfaction Assessment) (assesses how 
much extra income would be required for achieved a specific level of life 
satisfaction) (Mulgan, 2010). 
5. Government accounting measures – in accounting for government spending, these 
use standardised pricing of welfare interventions to account, for instance, for how 
enterprises affect society (Nicholls, Nicholls, et al., 2015). 
This list only covers a handful on methods, with some of them being established in other 
fields and then lent to the social finance environment and others being very specific to the 
latter. However dissimilar, they all share the aforementioned positivist assumptions and 
veneer of ‘objectivity’, though in practice they are much more pliable and open to further 
modification and hybridisation. 
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The second approach of measuring social impact was that predicated on critical theorist 
assumptions. Although not as popular as the positivist approach that captured the 
imagination of practitioners in social finance, this approach did manage to produce one 
of the most talked-about and malleable frameworks for assessing impact: Social Return 
on Investment (Arvidson, Lyon, McKay, & Moro, 2010; Krlev et al., 2013; Millar & Hall, 
2013). SROI, analysed above, had originated as a positivist approach best suited to 
quantify changes into monetary terms by identifying financial proxies and heeding 
discount rates, but it subsequently evolved into a principle-based way of involving 
stakeholders into the calculation processes, thus providing a more well-rounded account 
of total impact. This way, it moved from a highly technical approach to a set of principles 
that sought to disclose and overcome the power relationships inherent to impact 
assessment (i.e. the idea that data collection and reporting ultimately serves more the 
interests of service deliverers than beneficiaries) and include grassroots stakeholder 
accounts (Nicholls, Nicholls, et al., 2015). Its development and complexity rendered it a 
very popular choice for many social investment projects, but it also attracted a lot of 
misunderstanding and condemnation, especially from the literature critical of the practice 
of social investment. SROI has been considered to be the motor behind which “the 
language of finance appears to be gradually invading public policies” (Chiapello, 2014, 
p. 30), or which transformed society into “a source of wealth to be harnessed” (Dowling 
& Harvie, 2014, p. 881), or which encourages “a simplistic ‘mechanical’ model of cause 
and effect, resting on the notion that an intervention is a singular ‘thing’ or event which 
results in a clearly discernible outcome” (McHugh et al., 2013, p. 249), or which, more 
generally, deepened the agenda of financialisation, which is to say, “not (or not just) that 
the finance sector is getting bigger, but that financial ways of calculating are becoming 
more pervasive socially” (Bryan & Rafferty, 2014, p. 891).  
Other methods that fell under this heading are ‘strategy approaches’ such as balanced 
scorecards and strategy maps, or dashboards (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Similar to SROI, 
these approaches are informed by a multidimensional view of the process of change, 
implicating not only the service providers but internal and external stakeholders, viewed 
as coalitions and networks formed through their interactions. Balanced scorecards, for 
instance, were initially conceived as a counterbalance to the dominance of financial 
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concerns at the top, and were meant to reinforce or ‘assail’ performance interpretation 
with data from the ground (Nicholls, Nicholls, et al., 2015). Similarly, dashboards provide 
a wide-ranging view of performance data from disparate sources. All in all, the so-called 
critical theorist approaches highlighted the foundational power relations that lie at the core 
of impact assessment and attempt to overcome it through, mainly, participatory methods 
and a more holistic approach to stakeholder inputs.  
Lastly, the third framework for approaching the measurement of social impact was the 
interpretative one. This approach abandons the assumption of power relationships and 
takes the participative drive of the previous one even further, integrating stakeholder 
involvement at an even earlier stage in the process, but also throughout. As such, it 
privileges communication and debate among concerned parties with regards to the goals 
of the project, the nature of the intended value creation, its extent, as well as the best way 
to grasp and represent it. This way, the grassroots participants can aid both in designing 
the intervention and constructing the appropriate metrics for accounting for it. At the same 
time, given ongoing stakeholder participation, this means that the methods associated with 
this framework also create feedback loops that can validate or contest the accuracy of the 
data being reported, or indeed create another layer of impact simply through this 
involvement (Nicholls, Nicholls, et al., 2015).  
The Outcomes Star model is one such example. It is a metric framework that maps desired 
outcomes in a star-shaped form with degrees of attainment (e.g. from 1 to 10) on each 
branch of the star. There are various iterations of the Outcomes Star model suited to the 
specific sector of which the impact programme is part (for instance, mental health, 
homelessness, or young people), but the mechanism behind it is the same: both the service 
deliverer and the service user (the beneficiary) plot how the latter is doing on their way to 
the stated goals. This is done in a collaborative manner, through the worker and the user 
deliberating and identifying together the step where the user is on the outcome ladder, at 
various times throughout the project (every three, six, or twelve months, depending on the 
project length) and by assigning a numerical score through which the tracking is made 
easier and more recordable (MacKeith, 2009). The data can then be used not only for 
tracking or measuring the outcome achieved by the entire project, but also for 
214 
 
benchmarking it with national or international averages or even modifying the strategy 
for achieving impact along the way.  
All in all, regardless of their variations in form, the measurement frameworks that 
transpired as standardisation was being constructed in the field of impact investment 
revealed an emphasis on grassroots stakeholder priority, engagement, and collaboration. 
Seeing the beneficiary’s judgement of the service as one of the main sources of legitimate 
knowledge, they attempted to extract as much data as possible from this level. That said, 
some flexibility was visible here as well. For instance, some of these measurement 
frameworks could be seen as more participative or more technocratic (for instance, SROI, 
Outcome Star, and Theory of Change are more participative than the technocratic 
Randomised Control Trials, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Statistical Regression). Other 
could be looked at through the extent to which they integrated more indicators into the 
measurement or they focus on a single one (SROI, again, together with Multi-Criteria 
Dimension Analysis are more integrative than the disparate Balanced Scorecards and 
Extended Intermediate Outcomes), the extent to which they leaned more towards 
outcomes or towards outputs (Pattern Recognition and Rating System, for instance, do 
not account for changes in outcome, whereas Before and After Analysis does assess 
changes in outcomes), or whether or not they sought to assign a monetary value, as SROI 
did (Reeder & Colantonio, 2013).  
Irrespective of the choice of categorisation, there was certainly no lack of metrics for 
quantifying the amount of impact a specific project has had on a target population. At the 
same time, this diversity also implied that, beyond the need to create bespoke metrics to 
suit particular situations, there was no one metric that was as flexible, encompassing, and 
adaptable so as to be utilised in each and all circumstances. The only one that came close 
to fulfilling this ideal is SROI, which attempted to transgress the assumptions the 
positivist, critical theorist, and interpretative perspectives made regarding the nature of 
social impact, and borrowed insights and methods from each one in a more holistic and 
adaptive approach to measurement. More generally, though, behind the lure of 
standardisation, impact assessment – collecting data, measuring, and reporting it – 
transpired as a relatively fluid, dynamic, and shifting process.  
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IRIS and GIIRS were the first outfits that pushed standardisation on this rather obscure 
and unaccountable corner of the market. But their work encourage other parties to 
complete this work: the non-profit B-Lab and the consultancy Engaged X, for instance, 
created the ENGAGEDX index – a benchmark set that aggregates historical performance 
data from across the board of UK social investment in a similarly comparable way – which 
aimed to deliver a transparent and easily accessible data set that aggregates and make 
comparable various information from across the anonymised portfolios of existing social 
investors that engaged in social investment over the period 2002-2014, including, for 
example, investment performance, default and recovery rates, risk and return profiles, 
impact pricing discounts. Not least, academia has been a force in direction of 
standardisation: noteworthy are the Government Performance Lab, Social Impact Bond 
Lab, and Social Enterprise Initiative at Harvard; the Oxford Impact Investing Programme; 
or the Centre for Social Innovation at Cambridge.  
All in all, through standardisation, the novel valuation process that allowed finance to 
expand in the social policy field inserted a degree of rationality, transparency, 
accountability, and choice in the measurement of social value creation, and it did so, 
paradoxically, by shunning the valuation tools and methodologies available to the same 
investors that were involved in this field, but that were using, whilst in the mainstream 
finance environments, comparable but by no means interchangeable valuation instruments 
in their quest for capital accumulation.   
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6. The SIB as a zoon politikon  
 
No aspect of the novel valuation process that finance utilised in its advance in the social 
policy field required the institutionalisation stage to be a political act. On the contrary, 
due to the myriad of non-state actors jumping aboard of the social investment train 
(foundations, philanthropists, high net worth individuals, charities, social enterprises, 
etc.), and encouraged by NPG reforms which sought to shift the stress of public policy 
design and delivery from the state to the private and third sectors, the odds were that 
institutionalisation would be a bottom-up, private act of legitimation and support. 
However, it turned out to be precisely the opposite: a political baptism embedded in a 
wider agenda. But instead of constituting a shortcoming, this political hijacking (and to 
some extent it was precisely that, given that the Peterborough SIB was in the works for a 
longer time and constituted the brainchild of a different governing party) represented a 
boon, because not only did social investment become institutionalised at the state level 
with the full support of the governing coalition, but it was also institutionalised, though 
rather less profoundly, at a global level. This section looks at how this final valuation 
stage unfolded.  
 
1. The Big Society – big expectations 
 
In 2009, as part of the Hugo Young lecture series, David Cameron, then running for the 
position of prime minister, claimed with candour that a Conservative government would 
unleash an ‘age of austerity’ and usher in a ‘government of thrift’ by clamping down on 
the public sector: “our plans for school reform, welfare reform and strengthening families 
plans which might once have been seen as just socially desirable in the age of austerity 
become economically essential” (Cameron, 2009a). How would the age of austerity 
translate into public policy? By a fourfold plan of ‘delivering more for less’: ‘public 
spending control’; ‘a new culture of thrift in the government’; curing, not just treating ‘big 
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social problems’; and ‘imagination and innovation’ in the manner in which public policy 
is fashioned. Given that deep and unprecedented cuts in public spending implied a 
shrinking state and a central government less capable of delivering social cushions, a new 
method or idea had to be envisioned that would take up the role of fulfilling public policy 
objectives: that idea was Cameron’s ‘Big Society’. While essentially about retrenching 
the state, The Big Society vision also implied a renewed role for non-state actors, 
particularly social entrepreneurs, non-governmental organisations, and local communities 
(Cameron, 2009b). The government’s function, at least in theory, would thus shift from 
that of a provider of social goods to that of a mere formal initiator and mediator between 
a myriad of other actors that would work together to deliver on their own social needs. In 
other words, Cameron jumped on the social impact investment bandwagon and integrated 
blended value into The Big Society project as a founding dimension, though with a 
renewed understanding of the role of the state in the process.  
In between the time the idea was launched at the Hugo Young lecture in November 2009 
and the coalition government came to power in May 2010, the vision of The Big Society 
managed to conquer public minds, so much so that the New Economics Foundation had 
to expand on the briefing it had produced in July 2010 and publish an extensive response 
in November in which it wrote that:  
“Far from being a temporary buzz-phrase, as some suspected, the ‘Big Society’ 
seems to have taken off and taken hold – in a big way. Across national and local 
government, across considerable chunks of the business world and great swathes 
of the third sector, it is a hot topic of discussion and the driver of a massive re-
branding exercise, as the phrase is swiftly bolted to countless projects, events and 
documents.” (NEF, 2010)  
And social impact investment was thusly part and parcel of The Big Society agenda. But 
five years onwards, the vision was virtually bankrupt, with no mention of it either outside 
or inside the government. That said, while The Big Society disappeared from the public 
imaginary as a discourse, the core implications for public policy reigned on, and reforms 
ensued. Indeed, the ‘political economy of the Big Society’, as opposed to the mere ‘Big 
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Society narrative’ or ideology, survived and in some respects even thrived (Dowling & 
Harvie, 2014). And thus the door to institutionalisation was wide open. 
What made The Big Society such an appealing programme for the Coalition Government 
was the relative ease with which it could have been coupled with the austerity agenda. 
The rolling back of public spending, in order to be effective and convincing to the 
electorate, had to be coupled with at least a narrative of keeping social policy and welfare 
objectives on top of the priority list, but reforming them in such a manner that they would 
become at the same time more efficient than they previously were and less cumbersome 
on the state budget. Thus the perceived headline problem was to be the ‘Big Government’, 
a wasteful, irresponsible, and uncompetitive giant harboured by years of political 
malpractice: “as the state continued to expand under Labour [1997-2010], our society 
became more, not less unfair” (Cameron, 2009b). Rather surprisingly, the solution was 
not simply to retrench the state, but also – pace Thatcher and her declaration that ‘there is 
no society’ – to foster The Big Society, that is, to devolve the responsibilities of 
conceiving, putting together, and delivering social policies from the government to a 
network of local community activists, councils, philanthropic and non-governmental 
organisations, big business, and other interested actors, and thus rekindling feelings of 
belonging, generosity, solidarity, responsibility, empowerment, and empathy, which had 
been “squeezed out by the work of the state” (Cameron, 2009b).  
In concrete terms, this translated to three main policy shifts: reducing public spending, 
decentralising decision making, and opening up and transferring social policy design and 
delivery to a host of new actors (the last two much like the NPG reforms ushered in by 
the previous government) – see Table 5. With regards to public spending, The Big Society 
integrated the austerity agenda and proposed spending cuts to services as various as 
childcare, homelessness, leisure programmes, third-sector programmes, and local 
councils. Welfare spending worth £7 billion was scrapped in addition to the £11 billion 
already announced in the June 2010 budget (NEF, 2010). These cuts would help reduce 
the deficit and improve the fiscal responsibility and sustainability of the state under the 
coalition programme. With regards to decision-making and the role of the state in society, 
the Conservative Prime Minister reckoned that the dire social state in which Britain found 
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itself was due to a highly centralised and burdensome state, inhibiting progressive social 
aims, atomising society, and leading to feelings of apathy and irresponsibility (Cameron, 
2009b). By decentralising decision-making and devolving power to local communities 
and individuals – for instance, by letting parents take over a school or communities 
establishing a local school – it would re-enfranchise civil society, open decision making 
to horizontal structures and re-kindle ‘long-lost British virtues’ such as responsibility, 
solidarity and duty (Ashton, 2010). With regards to the social policy and the public sector, 
it was considered that the distanced and hierarchical manner in which social policy was 
designed hampered adaptability and efficacy, that the sheltered and monolithic nature of 
implementation rendered it uncompetitive and devoid of vision, and that the heavily 
bureaucracy characteristic of a centralised structure inevitably led to impersonal and 
unserviceable policies. Contrary to this, transferring and opening up social policy making 
to networks of various actors would modernise and improve the design and delivery of 
social services by encouraging social entrepreneurship, stimulating social capital, and 
putting together the resources of actors as various as volunteers, communities, charities, 
businesses, and other local actors in order to create hitherto unprecedented capabilities for 
bespoke and flexible action and innovative collaboration. The affinity of this political 
agenda with the social investment sector was reason enough to give the latter pride of 
place in The Big Society programme and engage in a process of institutionalisation that 
proved in the end more consequential for the impact market itself than for the political 
odds of the Coalition Government.  
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Table 5. Coalition Programme 
In order to get the ball rolling – so ‘that The Big Society advances as Big Government 
retreats’ (Cameron, 2009b) – a host of new institutions were put into place, including The 
Big Society Bank (to provide start-up for social enterprises), The Big Society Network 
(to promote The Big Society ethos), a national Citizens’ Service (to instil the virtue of 
voluntarism in 16 year olds), the Office for Civil Society (to replace the Office of the 
Third Sector), and others (NEF, 2010). While some of these institutions were indeed 
established, others remained at the level of rhetoric, only to be whitewashed a couple of 
years after. The Conservatives’ programme, picked up by the Coalition Government, 
encompassed thus a strong ideological component (The Big Society) that represented both 
a deepening of Thatcherism (in the form of the idea of devolving power from the state) 
and a move away from it (in the form of the idea of harbouring social sentiments and 
curing the twin ills of atomisation and disempowerment), together with a restructuring 
plan for social services that had at the core precisely the goal of creating a grassroots 
social investment network and market. Thus, the institutionalisation of blended value and 
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social investment was conceived as being an integral part of a grander political vision that 
should materialise within the lifetime of the Conservative-Lib Dem government.   
 
2. The Big Society – final act  
 
For all the excitement and debates that The Big Society vision sparked soon after it was 
announced, in the longer term it proved to be quite an ephemeral agenda and yielded few 
concrete policies. Before long, the media and public opinion response to The Big Society 
became mixed at best, within academia the reaction was almost unanimously negative and 
vehement. That said, when stripped of its fleeting ideology, the political economy of The 
Big Society did make its mark on the public sector in one single but essential area – the 
institutionalisation of the social investment market (Dowling & Harvie, 2014).  
No wonder, though, that the wider societal project of The Big Society agenda did not pan 
out. There were quite a few explanations for this. One academic article, for instance, 
looking specifically at the aforementioned ‘inhibiting’ effect of centralised decision-
making, constructed a powerful three-fold argument that showed that a withdrawal of 
material and professional government support of the volunteering sector did not lead to 
less atomisation and social apathy, but more (Bartels, Cozzi, & Mantovan, 2013). By 
constructing an ideal(ised) Big Society classical economic model of a balanced budget, 
full employment and rational individuals, and looking at optimal time allocation between 
working and volunteering in an environment of dynamic public spending and inversely 
dynamic taxation (in order to maintain the budget balanced), it showed that decreasing 
public expenditure has the consequence of decreasing the likelihood of employed 
individuals to take up volunteering (given the ensuing utility function). Similarly, by 
undertaking an econometric analysis of two data sets (British Household Panel Survey 
and European Values Survey), it concluded that agents decided to volunteer most 
frequently when public spending was available and/or increased. These two perspectives 
were finally corroborated with a qualitative analysis of 19 interviews that brought to the 
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fore the importance of the availability of a volunteering infrastructure and a feeling of it 
being a worthwhile, collaborative activity between local authorities and volunteers. All in 
all, the grand conclusion of the study was that “in contrast to the crowding-out effect 
underlying The Big Society, the analysis shows that more government expenditure 
actually increases the probability of volunteering” (Bartels et al., 2013, p. 349). 
Other scholars addressed another essential characteristic of The Big Society programme, 
namely localism. Localism, the proposition that local individuals and communities should 
take charge of decision-making instead of central authorities, was an aspect of Cameron’s 
vision that was enshrined in the Localism Act of 2011, and was supposed to be the legal 
backbone on which the policy package would unfold. Though adopted, it failed to produce 
the assumed deliverable, as the mayor of Hackney made clear in an article published in 
the Guardian (2013a). One of the reasons provided was the fact that The Big Society 
programme was driven more by political expediency rather than by ideological 
commitments. Indeed, even though Big Society drew on an eclectic mix of political values 
– from one-nation Conservatism (the emphasis on building virtuous and strong society 
and promoting integration), from Thatcherism (the importance of market mechanisms, the 
suspicion towards the state and the entrepreneurial role of the individual), from New 
Labour (the importance of civil society in empowering communities), from the Liberal 
Democrats (local community liberalism) – the Liberalism Act and the Spending Review 
of 2011 made it clear that decentralisation and liberalisation were the corollary of the deep 
spending cuts to which the Conservatives committed themselves: “while local authorities 
and other bodies at the local level will not have as much money, they will have much 
greater freedom to be innovative in the way that they work and support their communities” 
(Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012, p. 25). The fact that the consequences of the localism 
narrative were not as self-explanatory and intuitive as the coalition government made 
them sound was further proven when Liverpool dropped out of Big Society vanguard 
community pilot due to lack of funding (BBC, 2011).  
A more profound explanation looked at the socio-philosophical foundations of The Big 
Society vision in the form of social capital, a theory that emphases networks of trust and 
reciprocity that arise within communities and reflect back upon them in a self-reproducing 
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manner, as developed by Putnam in his influential article (Putnam, 1995). The 
Conservative programme, while it tried to build on this body of research, missed out on 
two essential aspects of the theory: one, the importance of bridging (inclusive) social 
capital as opposed to bonding (exclusive) social capital, which was the remit of The Big 
Society narrative; and two, the fact that where social capital is lacking, it cannot simply 
spontaneously re-emerge, particularly in a context of cuts to local services (Westwood, 
2011). What the article was suggesting was that The Big Society had been bound to fail 
from the outset given that it did not support nor guide local communities towards the 
global economy and towards the new media as means of harnessing social capital and 
unleashing what it called the “local multiplier effect” (Westwood, 2011, p. 700).  
In many ways then, The Big Society’s transformational horizon was doomed to fail. That 
said, while at the start of 2012 even the Occupy London movement and related protests 
started making a mockery of Cameron’s vision, causing him to slowly begin dropping the 
idea at the discursive level, The Big Society engineers continued pushing through with 
reforms and enshrining Big Society values in public acts, albeit with a narrower focus 
now. And thus began the institutionalisation of the social investment market. In a sense, 
the latter survived or even thrived despite the demise of The Big Society agenda. Or 
because of it, depending on the perspective. 
Still, with great fanfare, on the 10th of September 2010, the market for social impact 
investment was institutionalised via the launch of the world’s first SIB at the Peterborough 
Prison in the presence of the Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke and the Prisons Minister 
Crispin Blunt (FT, 2010). All of the valuation work put in the processes of negotiation, 
selection, ordering, abstraction, standardisation, and institutionalisation had their 
culmination in the inauguration of the Pilot SIB, which received much media coverage 
and was expected, at all cost, to run smoothly and successfully. The next section will look 
into more detail at how this unfolded exactly.  
Suffice it to say, though, that the launch of the Peterborough SIB, in which so many state 
and non-state actors invested (financially and beyond), did not exhaust the process of 
institutionalisation. On the contrary, a project that was meant to run for about seven years 
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and was pitched as a pilot ring-fenced for building credibility and track-record, was not 
even superseded, but indeed supplemented with other forms of institutionalisation. Thus, 
not even close to the completion of the first SIB, the UK government enshrined the Public 
Services (Social Value) Act of March 2012. This Act required anyone who was 
commissioning public services to take into account questions not only of efficiency of 
delivery, but also of the wider social impact, and to include, when possible, all 
stakeholders into the decision making and delivery process, in order to secure ‘more value 
for money’. Social value would be a necessary (positive) externality in any public service 
procurement following the coming into force of the Social Value Act, engaging more of 
the concerned actors and ultimately providing, in theory at least, more tailored, effective 
and innovative services.  
At the same time, social value would not restrict itself to being a mere communication 
prescription of engaging the multiple stakeholders involved and musing upon the myriad 
of ways in which a service delivery could improve social issues beyond the narrow goal 
of that particular service, but it would also be a blueprint for quantifying social value 
added and monetising it in order to incentivise private investment. In other words, it was 
clear that the political economy of The Big Society was advancing in the operation of 
public services provision. And while the coalition government inherited some 30 years of 
public services reform that resulted in a motley mix of hierarchical, market, and network 
governance structures (Painter, 2011), the austerity agenda provided a legitimising 
opportunity for further revamp and a solid impetus for developing the social impact 
market programme that would result in the proliferation of financial institutions and 
innovations such as the SIB or the Social Stock Exchange.  
In fact, the latter is an example of how the institutionalisation process marched on, 
incentivised not by the (as yet) non-existent track-record of SIBs, but simply by the 
opportunity of capital accumulation that new valuation processes opened up. Indeed, the 
Social Stock Exchange was announced by the same David Cameron at the G8 summit that 
took place in London in June 2013 under the UK’s presidency. Heir to The Big Society 
legacy, the Prime Minister made the case for the societally transformative potential of 
finance, and announced, in front of G8 countries, a tax break for social investments, the 
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aforementioned Social Stock Exchange, and local community funding. Furthermore, it 
institutionalised social investment globally, by establishing, together with other global 
leaders, the Social Impact Investment Task Force (SIITF), a platform that had the mission 
of globally extending the scope and depth of the impact investment market. The Task 
Force was incorporated in and succeeded by the Global Social Impact Investment Steering 
Group in August 2015, which opened to countries beyond the G8. But on a global level, 
the cherry on the institutionalisation cake was neatly placed by the US in 2014, which 
followed suit and introduced the Social Bond Act, an Act that would require the Secretary 
of the Treasury to seek proposals from states for SIB projects that produced measurable 
outcomes, and that provided funds for feasibility studies.  
It is no surprise that due to all of these efforts at institutionalisation the market for social 
investment and SIBs grew exponentially over the past seven years. That said, it is still the 
Peterborough Pilot that had the biggest impact upon institutionalisation, given that it is 
the one that is generally provided as a reference point for most impact projects pitched to 
investors. In consequence, the last section turns to it.  
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3. Show time at Peterborough  
 
The Peterborough Prison SIB was the world’s first Social Impact Bond, and was meant, 
besides, of course, addressing the social issues it was constructed to help overcome, to 
establish a track-record for a financial instrument that was deemed game-changing for the 
manner in which welfare would be delivered. In other words, it was a clear metonymy 
meant to illustrate the state-of-the-art in social investment and provide the sufficient 
credibility and legitimacy necessary for its institutionalisation. The social area that was 
chosen to be part of the first social impact bond was that of criminal justice. The choice 
made by Social Finance, as mentioned, was a simple one: based on a number of reports 
from across the UK, it turned out that short-sentenced prisoners (serving a sentence of 
less than one year), displayed a very high degree of reoffending, with almost 60 per cent 
being re-convicted of at least one offence in the twelve months pursuing their release 
(Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). Social Finance thus partnered with the Ministry of Justice 
(MoJ) and HM Treasury to design a pioneering social impact bond in the area of criminal 
justice. In doing so, Social Finance brought together a multitude of actors from across the 
social spectrum, including criminal experts, staff working in prisons, relevant voluntary 
organisations, local stakeholders, and last but not least, investors. What emerged from this 
collaboration was the model SIB structure that would inform all the subsequent iterations 
at a global level, and that rested on a value form – blended value – that was a decade into 
making and that became foundational to the entire social investment field.   
 
Contractual design 
 
The Peterborough SIB started its operation in September 2010, but the contracts had been 
signed half a year beforehand. At the centre of the structure lied Social Impact Partnership, 
a form of special purpose vehicle or limited partnership that would function as the 
contracting entity of the entire SIB. In charge of managing the service delivery agencies 
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was The One* Service, a multi-agency partnership comprising, among others, St Giles 
Trust, SOVA (organisation providing community-based volunteers), MIND (a mental 
health organisation), and The Ormiston Trust (a local charity). At two ends of the SIB 
were the governmental commissioners (The Ministry of Justice and The Big Lottery 
Fund) who would provide payments in case social outcomes meet the targets established 
at the outset, and the investors who provide upfront working capital, take on the risk of 
the project not meeting those targets, and receive a variable rate of return depending on 
the degree of success. The MoJ-commissioned report (MoJ, 2011) identified an ordering 
of the actors that was divided into six contractual relationships between: 
1. MoJ and Social Impact Partnership 
2. Social Impact Partnership and investors 
3. Social Impact Partnership and service providers 
4. MoJ and independent assessors  
5. MoJ and Peterborough Prison Management ltd.  
6. Social Finance and the Big Lottery Fund 
Figure 7 attempts to provide a stylised overview of the SIB structure.  
 
Figure 7. The Peterborough Social Impact Bond. Adapted from Nicholls and Tomkinson (2015) 
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The MoJ report notes that “there was consensus among the interviewees from Social 
Finance, Ministry of Justice Procurement and HM Treasury that the SIB represented an 
entirely new funding model for service provision” (2011, p. 13). Not only the contractual 
arrangement, but also the financing and commissioning involved the in the SIB were 
perceived to be different from the traditional manner in which governments operate in 
service delivery. This aspect translated also into the fact that the SIB was perceived as 
being very complex and time-consuming to develop analytically, which also led some 
small foundations to imitate and adopt the investment decisions of larger ones in a logic 
of ‘if it’s good enough for [them], it’s good enough for us’ (MoJ, 2011, p. 15). Especially 
complex was considered to be the development of the benchmarks for measuring 
outcomes and the payment model.  
Through the contractual arrangement, financial risk was transferred from the government 
and service providers onto social investors. The MoJ and the Big Lottery Fund were 
required to only honour the payments in case reoffending was reduced to pre-established 
levels, while service providers were paid upfront by the investors, independent of final 
outcomes. The risk that many parties involved did acknowledge was reputational: due to 
the widespread media coverage, domestically but also internationally, a great deal of 
reputational pressure was inherent to the project. The entities delivering the services were 
particularly concerned about this aspect, but it was also considered that in their case this 
would replace the issue of lack of incentives due to upfront payment. The investors 
considered that this did not really apply in their case, as their feeling was one of having 
fulfilled their mission, regardless of the outcome, by investing in the SIB. Of course, 
financial risk was a crux of the matter in their case.  
All in all, the report pointed out that while the contractual arrangement was tailor-made 
to address the specific issue of reoffending, many aspects of its design were transferable 
to future SIBs, particularly expensive and time-consuming activities such as specialist 
legal and tax advice. Of course, different policy domains require different approaches, but 
the backbone of the contractual arrangement appeared to be malleable and imitable. 
Lastly, it seemed that the fact that the SIB project would take place in a prison did not 
229 
 
pose additional challenges, suggesting that implementation, regardless of the area of 
social policy, was not a noteworthy obstacle to the proliferation of SIBs (MoJ, 2011). 
 
Investment and repayment structure 
 
The rationale behind the use of SIBs to fund public services, as mentioned before, includes 
the gathering of funds for preventative projects that would otherwise not be available from 
the state budget. In this regard, Social Finance managed to attract a pool of investment of 
around £5 million from 17 investors, mainly from charities and foundations6 such as: the 
Barrow Cadbury Trust, the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, the Friends Provident 
Foundation, the Henry Smith Charity, the Johansson Family Foundation, the Lankelly 
Chase Foundation, the Monument Trust, the Panahpur Charitable Trust, the Paul Hamlyn 
Foundation, and the Tudor Trust (HM SSJ, SIP, & Social Finance, 2010). The investment 
managed to attract more funding than is usually available, given that more than half of the 
value of the investment as well as half of the number of investors in the SIB structure 
utilised their endowment or invested in the area of criminal justice for the first time.  
Investment in the SIB project was open ended, meaning that while the project commences 
with upfront funding, additional raising of funds is possible throughout the lifetime of the 
SIB. Not all the funding provided by investors would yield a return, given that some 
investors funded the SIB through grants (for which no return was expected), while others 
provided endowment capital (which seeks a return). Some of the issues that were reported 
by the investors in the SIB structure was that there was no track-record as yet and that 
there was no exit possibility, given the absence of a secondary market (MoJ, 2011). 
Evidently, overcoming these issues was precisely the mission of the pilot SIB.  
                                                 
6 As mentioned above, because the Peterborough SIB was considered a pilot project intended to build a 
track-record for a novel asset class, it was established from the outset that the investor outreach would only 
encompass charities and foundations. That said, the MoJ report notes that: “some high net-worth individuals 
also had invested in the SIB, but they had not been identified” (MoJ, 2011, p. 25).  
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The repayment structure was tied to the outcome achieved and could therefore vary. The 
threshold that would trigger a repayment was a reduction in re-offending of 10 per cent in 
any of the three cohorts of 1,000 ex-offenders chosen for this project, or an overall 
reduction of 7.5 per cent across the total of 3,000 ex-offenders. If the minimum 
improvement were attained, then a minimum payment equivalent to a return of 2.5 per 
cent per year would be made by the MoJ and the Big Lottery Fund to the Social Impact 
Partnership SPV and through it further to investors (MoJ, 2011). If the SIB achieved 
greater outcomes beyond the threshold, this would materialise in gradually increasing 
returns of up to £7 million in real terms, which would amount to 13 per cent annual IRR 
(internal rate of return). Total payments to investors from the Ministry of Justice and the 
Big Lottery Fund were capped at £8 million, with the possibility that, if the intervention 
did not cross the threshold, investors would lose their entire pledged capital (Nicholls & 
Tomkinson, 2015). The value per each reduced reconviction event was negotiated 
between the MoJ and Social Finance before the start of the project, but it remained 
undisclosed (MoJ, 2014b).  
While the contract stipulated one particular return profile dependent on the outcomes 
achieved, the investors funding the SIB were driven by varying investment rationalities. 
To reiterate, as they were coming from all corners of the social investment spectrum, some 
investors expected zero return and 100 per cent capital loss (foundations making grants), 
others expected repayment of pledged capital together with a varying degree of return (a 
smaller figure for more mission-driven endowment capital, a higher one for venture 
philanthropy capital and high net worth individuals). Some reported that, in this particular 
case, a choice of blended return was preferred instead of conventional grant making (MoJ, 
2011). In other words, the fact that a financial return was available for a project that was 
meant to address and reduce a specific social risk (re-offending or criminality) was reason 
enough for some investors (foundations especially) to switch from grant-making to 
seeking a profit. That aside, the Peterborough Pilot SIB consolidated a funding structure 
that brought together a consortium of investors with different investment rationalities and 
risk-return expectations. While some were traditional financial actors, others came from 
the newly-emergent practice of venture philanthropy and social investment more 
generally. In the end, this implied that the rationalities behind the various investments in 
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(at least) the first SIB were heterogeneous and impossible to pin down to one specific 
denominator.  
 
Service delivery 
 
The social intervention part of the first SIB was delivered under the auspices of The One* 
Service, an organisation driving the project and managing the relationships between the 
various service providers involved. In its turn, The One* Service was managed by Social 
Finance and, of course, was funded through the first social impact bond (Social Finance, 
2011). It started its operations in September 2010 and was targeted at all short-sentenced 
men leaving HMP Peterborough. As part of its intervention programme, it offered help 
with things such as: accommodation, accessing benefits, acquiring an ID, mental and 
physical issues, substance abuse, family relationships, education and training, and career 
and work experience. The One* Service was also in charge of collecting outcome data 
and reporting it further in order to measure impact and assess the appropriate financial 
return that investors were due. The manner in which The One* Service envisaged and 
conducted the programme made the social intervention flexible and fluid, which 
ultimately led it to support various changes throughout its lifetime. New actors were thus 
involved in the programme, old actors changed their conventional methods, and new 
parameters were included the quest to achieve impact. All these factors contributed, in the 
end, to the palpable impact that the service delivery attained. 
The One* Service did not develop or employ a specific theory of change. The service 
delivery was “pragmatic and client-led with the mix of activities for each cohort member 
determined by caseworkers” (MoJ, 2014b, p. 21). It was therefore not driven by an explicit 
overarching framework for understanding how social change comes about. On the 
contrary, there was a great deal of scope for learning as the project went along. That said, 
at the basic level, there was an agreement as to how the intervention would develop. There 
were three steps in which the intervention model would advance: initial contact while the 
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offender is in prison; upon release from prison; and during the weeks following release 
and in the longer term. To deliver the core activities, The One* Service initially contracted 
four organisations: the St. Giles Trust7 and the Ormiston Trust8 would focus on the period 
before release and immediately after, while SOVA9 and YMCA10 would focus on the 
longer term needs of the ex-offender (Social Finance, 2011). The contract was due to last 
seven years, but the sub-contracts with the service providers were subject to annual 
renewal, which meant that either the contracts could be reformulated, or the providers 
could be changed. Indeed, this did occur when providers or the services they delivered 
changed along the way. For instance, the contract which stipulated that YMCA was 
required to provide local volunteers was not renewed (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). That 
said, the flexibility ingrained in the contract was meant to ensure impact attainment more 
than anything else. 
Despite the lack of an explicit theory a change, the manner in which the service delivery 
would unfold disclosed an implicit understanding of social value creation. Within the 
prison, the offenders were individually met by a Connections Worker who introduced 
them to The One* Service (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). The Connections Workers 
amounted to a total of four, and were themselves prisoners serving a long-term sentence 
who had volunteered to participate in the project and undertook training to become peer 
support workers by completing the three-month long Level 3 NVQ Certificate in 
Information, Advice, and Guidance delivered by the St. Giles Trust. After they introduced 
the offenders to the work of SIB intervention, if found eligible, the latter went through an 
interview which became the foundation for all future interactions. The interview was then 
scanned and sent to a One* Service caseworker, who conducted a more in-depth interview 
with the offender and discussed with him the needs that he might have upon release and 
the sort of services the programme could deliver. The programme provided a mentor as 
well: a volunteer managed by SOVA in the case of low risk/need, or a caseworker working 
for St. Giles Trust in the case of higher risk/need. Upon release, the caseworkers helped 
                                                 
7 A charity working with ex-offenders and disadvantaged people to reintegrate them into society.  
8 A charity working to improve the life chances of children and young people. 
9 A charity focusing on helping English and Welsh communities prevent crime and live healthier lives.  
10 Oldest charity in the world working to help young people play an active and fulfilling role in communities.  
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ex-offenders attend meetings and find accommodation. During the second year of 
delivery, The One* Service commission MIND to provide mental health support at the 
release stage as well, initially as a spot-purchased block of six appointments (as was the 
service delivery model of MIND), and later in the third year as one-day weekly meeting 
both with offenders serving and ex-offenders (MoJ, 2014b, 2015). This need was 
identified and addressed as the programme was developing. Similarly, Ormiston’s after-
release interventions were expanded to include while-in-prison support for family 
members. Furthermore, a position for a landlord liaison caseworker was created by 
SOVA, as well as a residential construction and highways training centre established with 
the help of Job Deal and a former trainer from John Laing Training. Finally, during the 
third year, The One* Service became a Jobcentre Plus ‘approved activity’, which implied 
that if any of the offenders engage in the SIB programme, they would be eligible to receive 
benefits. Throughout, values such as the right to housing, benefits, an ID, mental and 
physical health, family, education, training, and work were prioritised and were implicit 
aims of re-fashioning ex-offenders into functioning citizens as part of the goal of reducing 
social risk and creating social value.  
The flexibility and fluidity that underpinned service delivery were complemented by the 
design that aimed at maximising the efficiency of the intervention. For instance, the 
service providers were grouped together in the same building next to the Peterborough 
Prison, making the experience of interaction with The One* Service easier and more 
straight-forward. Furthermore, it was established from the very start that data sharing was 
to be completely transparent (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). This was done through the 
use of the same data system, Meganexus, which attached all the information to a client’s 
individual record, and it made it available, upon permission, to all actors involved in the 
programme. The result was that this streamlined the interaction with ex-offenders and 
facilitated collaboration between service providers, while building up transparent 
evidence and record for future reference.  
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The Peterborough SIB Impact Metrics 
 
The methodology for calculating the impact of the intervention – or, in other words, the 
abstraction process – was developed by QinetiQ and the University of Leicester (MoJ, 
2012). QinetiQ is a multinational defence technology company, formed in 2001 when the 
UK Ministry of Defence split its Defence Evaluation and Research Agency into two, and 
privatised the larger part under the name of QinetiQ11. QinetiQ mainly provides 
technology-based products and services, but it also has a large research and development 
department and provides tests and evaluations. The team at the University of Leicester 
was led by Darrick Jolliffe, a criminology expert whose main focus area is the application 
of quantitative data analysis on the evaluation of reoffending-reduction programmes. Now 
a Professor of Criminology at University of Greenwich, he has been involved in projects 
assessing the impact of probation on reoffending, reoffending amongst females at risk, 
and has been a consultant for the Home Office on the issue of domestic violence protection 
orders. Together, QinetiQ and the team from University of Leicester formed what was 
called the ‘Independent Assessor’, and developed a methodology to assess impact tailored 
to the Peterborough SIB intervention, called propensity score matching (PSM) (MoJ, 
2014a). As the financial reward due to investors was tied to impact achieved, the 
Independent Assessor bore the brunt of measuring outcomes. 
The purpose of the PSM methodology was to provide the groundwork for the creation of 
a Comparison Group against which the Treatment Group (the Peterborough cohorts) 
could be compared. It rested on the assumption that, had it not been for the SIB 
intervention, the two Groups would be quasi-identical. The choice of utilising a 
Comparison Group had already been made by the MoJ and Social Finance and it presented 
the following mechanism: first, the reconviction frequency would be calculated (the 
number of reconvictions per the 1,000 ex-offenders cohorts over the 12 months following 
release, calculated by using data from the Police National Computer); second, the data 
                                                 
11 https://www.qinetiq.com/about-us/our-history 
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will be compared to data from a Comparison Group; third, payment will be made 
according to the contract established (HM SSJ et al., 2010). The Independent Assessor 
was in charge of calculating the latter, using the PSM methodology. As such, it was 
required to create the Comparison Group, develop the baseline reference number of 
reconvictions using that Group, and, finally, compare and calculate the payment according 
to the formula provided by the MoJ and Social Finance.  
Utilising a data set from 2008, the Independent Assessor developed the PSM methodology 
between February and October 2011 (MoJ, 2012). The methodology worked by 
employing logistic regression to model group membership, and was thus used to generate 
the Comparison Group and control for the observable differences between the Treatment 
Group and the Comparison Group. The latter comprised over 9,000 ex-offenders from 
across the UK, which means that a matching ratio of almost 10:1 was utilised throughout 
the calculations, as required by the MoJ. That said, the ratio and the numbers were slightly 
relaxed in order to prioritise closeness of match over the rigidity of the ratio number. 
Throughout, though, the objective remained to expand as much as possible the number of 
comparison elements.  
In order to extract the data for the first cohort, two databases were used. One came from 
the Police National Computer, and comprised information regarding individuals who have 
been recently cautioned, convicted, or arrested, together with fingerprints and DNA, as 
well as information regarding vehicles, drives, or property. The second database was the 
Prisons Data Store, which was comprised of information that included personal details, 
offence description, and sentence or disciplinary facts. The data set relevant was to include 
all the prisoners released after serving less than 12 months in the same time period as the 
cohorts. After the extraction of the data, a process of quality assessment followed together 
with the application of data restriction in order to appropriately create the Comparison 
Group. Thus, from all the resultant 31,207 (MoJ, 2014a) individuals, the ones who would 
not be comparable with the HMP Peterborough cohorts on criteria of age, released on date 
of sentence, time in custody, prison type, and data availability were eliminated from the 
data set (MoJ, 2012). The relevant prisons from which the Comparison Group was formed 
were all-male prisons from across the UK and totalled a number of 35.  
236 
 
After the data set was established, logistic regression was applied in order to create the 
PSM model. For this, 36 variables such as following were included: nationality/ethnicity, 
age at first offence, number of previous offences, convictions, or incarcerations, copas 
score (speed of convictions across a criminal career), length of sentence, time served, type 
of offence (24 types were included), and others. Geographical information was not 
considered as relevant as all the other variables so it was excluded. Nationality was 
included, due to the fact that HMP Peterborough had an unusually high proportion of non-
British nationals, but it was conflated with ethnicity (defined as white, black, or other), 
rather than incorporated alongside it. This made it possible to account for different 
ethnicities under the same nationality. The categories ended up containing a minimum of 
16 individuals. To make sure that each individual was comparable to up to ten others, a 
standard of closeness was established (or a ‘calliper’) at the level of 0.05. Matching was 
done without replacement, meaning that each member of the Comparison Group could 
match only one individual from the Treatment Group.  
After data restrictions were applied, the PSM model was created and the Comparison 
Group defined. This resulted in a number of 936 individuals released from HMP 
Peterborough (out of the proposed first cohort of 1,000), matched with 9,360 ex-offenders 
from the other 35 UK prisons. The resulting re-conviction ratios after the intervention 
were 1.42 court convictions per person for the SIB cohort, as compared to 1.55 per person 
for the Comparison Group. This meant that the intervention achieved an 8.39% reduction 
in re-convictions, which was below the 10% agreed with the SIB Partnership to be 
considered a legitimate outcome, thus a payment to investors was not triggered. At the 
same time, this made reaching the minimum average figure of 7.5% (for the three cohorts) 
a promising possibility (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). However, as mentioned above, 
the programme proved appealing as at the state level, thus it was nationalised, and the SIB 
was interrupted at the end of June 2015. That said, the Pilot SIB was almost unanimously 
considered a success, and so was the process of institutionalisation which it represented.    
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7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the last two stages of the novel valuation processes that streamlined 
finance’s advance in the social policy field, namely standardisation and 
institutionalisation. The two processes represent the final steps in the creation, 
legitimation, and promotion of blended value and of the social impact investment market 
itself. Together with the previous valuation processes, they help not only entrench this 
field domestically, but also promote it internationally, so much so that it now spans the 
global varieties of contemporary capitalism.  
The issue that made standardisation such a salient factor for the impact market was that, 
before the actual inauguration of the first SIB, a profusion of metrics for assessing social 
value creation had already sprung up, but they did so in a rather chaotic manner, without 
an appropriate degree of transparency, accountability, and commensurability. Investors 
fretted that this not only hinders the scope of the market, but also prevents them from 
making efficient and rational investment choices, and thus discourages them from 
entering the market. That is why they argued that standardisation of the collection of social 
value evidence was paramount to the field before it could be institutionalised. And thus, 
IRIS and GIIRS were created.  
What IRIS and GIIRS accomplished was essentially to introduce standardisation across 
the metric board. They did this in two ways. First, IRIS solved the problem of 
incommensurability: the many social enterprises that were operating in the market 
pursued the same overarching goal – creating various degrees and forms of social value – 
but were utilising different measures of value creation, which often enough were 
proprietary and unavailable. Similar to what GAAP is for accounting, IRIS was 
established as a standardised framework for enterprises operating in the field to file reports 
and metric information that was streamlined across the board and thus made comparable. 
IRIS standardised existing metrics, but not by reducing them to a handful, rather by 
maintaining multiplicity in accord with the perceived plurality of value creation in the 
social field. Furthermore, it created a freely-available catalogue of metrics, which now 
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encompasses over 550 different metrics spanning sectors as different as education, energy, 
health, or community development. Second, GIIRS was created as a benchmark for social 
enterprises by establishing a standardised scoreboard against which social enterprises 
would be ranked. Not unlike credit rating agencies such as Moody’s or Standard and 
Poor’s, GIIRS attended to investors’ need for easily-accessible information regarding 
service deliverers’ performance in order to make capital allocation more efficient. Unlike 
IRIS, GIIRS reduced plurality to a few common denominators: governance policies, 
status and treatment of employees, policy towards the environment, and goods and 
services provided.  
This process of standardisation also had the effect of casting light upon the approach of 
social enterprises to social value measurement. It surfaced that some of them utilised 
positivist frameworks emphasising linear causality, others critical theorist frameworks 
which underlined the need for surpassing hidden but foundational power relations, and 
other still interpretative frameworks focused on communicative action. All in all, what 
standardisation revealed was that there was a profusion of different metrics employed in 
the field, with most being created for relatively unique and bespoke project, and with none 
coming close enough to SROI in terms of flexibility, adaptability, and scope.  
Once standardisation was resolved, the scene was set for the institutionalisation of the 
social investment market alongside its core notion of blended value. Institutionalisation 
represented the culmination of the novel valuation process that underpins finance’s 
advance in the field of social policy, and it was most potently expressed through the 
launch of the world’s first SIB at the Peterborough Prison in 2010. The reason for saying 
this is that the pilot SIB was not simply another social impact instrument among many, 
but in fact represented the epitome and state of the art in the field, and it was promoted 
and undergirded by a significant degree of supportive political capital. The Peterborough 
SIB was meant essentially to provide credibility and legitimacy to the field of social 
investment, and create an incipient track record for a novel avenue of social policy design 
and delivery. 
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That said, instead of it unfolding as a simple market baptism event, the Peterborough SIB 
launch and the idea of SIBs more generally were embedded in a wider political vision 
with which the Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition came to power in 2010 – ‘The Big 
Society’. The latter was in direct contradistinction with the outgoing New Labour 
government that implemented many of the new NPG reforms that led to the creation of 
the social investment market and from which the Coalition Government benefitted. The 
main difference between the two turned on the vision regarding the state’s role in society, 
which New Labour saw as a mutually reinforcing one. The Coalition Government 
condemned this as reckless, wasteful, and inhibiting, and proposed a retrenchment of the 
state, together with the ushering in of an age of austerity, decentralisation, and 
voluntarism. Because it became much maligned and criticised, the Coalition Government 
shunned the overarching project, but the vision survived in practice through its emphasis 
on social impact investment, which seemed to vindicate some of the values espoused in 
proposed through The Big Society agenda: localism, social entrepreneurship, and fiscal 
responsibility.  
And thus, the Conservative-Lib Dem duumvirate launched the Peterborough SIB with 
much fanfare, and through it institutionalised blended value and social investment more 
generally. Moreover, before long, the UK government enshrined social value into law 
through the Public Services (Social Value) Act of March 2012, requiring anyone 
commissioning public services to conform to the principles of blended value and include 
into the design and delivery processes stakeholders from across the board. Finally, in 
2013, in front of an international audience composed of G8 heads of state, David Cameron 
played his final act as headmaster of the impact investment vision and announced a social 
stock exchange, tax breaks for social investment, and local community funding. To make 
sure that his belief in the transformative power of social finance was perpetuated 
internationally, he established, together with other global leaders, SIITF, a platform with 
the mission to extend the global reach of the social impact investment market. After more 
than a decade of valuation work, social finance was finally anointed as a legitimate, 
worthwhile, and viable avenue for delivering innovative social policy programmes.  
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Conclusion 
 
1. Restatement of the argument 
 
The guiding aim of this thesis was to investigate the expansion of finance into areas 
usually relegated to the state’s role as a provider of welfare. Change is the norm in all 
things human; but the last three to five decades have arguably seen, at least in the 
economic arena, change on a faster scale: from the recession of the early 80s, the ‘new 
economy’ of the 1990s, to the dotcom crash of the early 2000s, the housing bubble of later 
2000s, and its aftermath in the financial crisis. These transformations were mirrored also 
by changes occurring in the state’s function of delivering safety nets for individuals to 
weather the pernicious consequences of these and other economic infelicities. The 
privatisation or downsizing of some of these state-provided safety nets is one example; 
another one is precisely the emergence of social impact investment as an alternative and 
more efficient route to pursue social policy objectives. 
Many authors have singled out one particular development that stands as the backdrop to 
these events, and in some cases acts, arguably, as an enabling factor: financialisation. It 
is the latter that has been identified as the motor behind the advent of social impact 
investment. Seeking a financial return out of programmes intended to create social value 
added does indeed seem to be a conspicuous instance of financialisation. Impact 
investment seems to be creating new frontiers of capital accumulation for actors coming 
from the financial sphere. And innovative financial instruments like social impact bonds 
or social stocks contribute to the accrual of more profits in the financial sphere, thus 
vindicating one way of understanding financialisation (Krippner, 2005). In a sense, then, 
it is true that social investment is a specific iteration of financialisation, but most if not all 
of the extant studies that claim this only look at social investment as simply more of the 
same – another field that is simply integrated or created for the integration into a financial 
logic. They omit looking at how this process of financialisation actually occurs and what 
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are the mechanics behind the co-imbrication of the social and the financial. They mostly 
look at the end product and at the consequences it has for the expansion of the financial 
sphere. This thesis went out on a limb and analysed what it is that underlies this 
development. 
Of course, various perspectives have been outlined to understand financialisation and the 
growing role of finance in contemporary society (see van der Zwan, 2014). But the 
approach adopted here is, as argued, more encompassing and ‘more’ explanatory, at least 
in the sense that it can account not only for the end product of financialisation and its 
operation, but also for the undergirding causes and connexions allowing this process to 
occur. The approach was first proposed by Chiapello (2014), though that first attempt was 
criticised above for falling short of its ambitions due to the under-utilisation or indeed 
mis-utilisation of its own premises. Nonetheless, on the basis of that proposal, this thesis 
adopted the valuation framework described in Chapter 3, which seeks to look at the 
valuation processes sustaining the expansion of finance, particularly through the 
purported replication or introduction of financial actors, instruments, and models in non-
financial realms in order to gauge non-financial value as financial. So far, this mechanism 
has been understood in a unidirectional manner, with financial entities simply capturing 
or extending over the latter process. The perspective sketched here emphasised that this 
narrative is found wanting in explaining the financialisation of social policy. That is the 
case because what can be encountered in the field of social impact investment is a new, 
hybridised value form – blended value – that is the result of an entire valuation process 
involving a new governance structure, a more complex fauna of actors, and a proliferation 
of endogenous tools, models, metrics, and protocols, which are tasked with grasping and 
accounting for social value creation as distinctly separate – though not independent – from 
financial value creation. This valuation process has been shown to follow a six-step path 
on the way to the entrenchment of a new value form: negotiation, selection, ordering, 
abstraction, standardisation, and, finally, institutionalisation. These steps are distinct and 
involve different actors and processes, though they might overlap chronologically. 
Regardless, the result is still the same: financialisation, in this case, occurs by providing 
the impetus for the creation and safeguarding of limiting spaces to which the financial 
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imagery cannot provide satisfactory answers. And the outcome is distinct from traditional 
valuation processes undertaken in the financial field.  
As opposed to the financialisation paradigm, which suggests that social investment is a 
form of the encroachment of financial forms of valuation, the findings of this thesis imply 
that the valuation processes created and mobilised here are the result of the multifaceted 
and multivalent labour undertaken at the initiative of the UK state and with the aid of 
trans-societal actors, all of this happening against the backdrop of a particular 
epistemological approach to the reality to be intervened upon – the social – and of 
established practices of governing the social and pricing social risk. It is the combination 
of these aspects that leads to the emergence of the new field of social impact investment.  
The idea that social investment is a result of the extension of a ‘calculative logic’ to the 
field of social policy has been an important feature in understanding the financialisation 
of this area. For instance, the insight that financial expansion is underpinned by the 
expansion of the ‘derivative form’ to other spheres of social existence (Bryan & Rafferty, 
2014) has been especially salient because it opens up new avenues for thinking through 
the link between the financial and the social. This thesis has jumped on that wave and has 
taken the investigation further, by looking at the ramifications of this expansion upon the 
aforementioned spheres. The results have been surprising: what has occurred through the 
advance of financialisation is in fact the proliferation of non-financial spaces of valuation, 
as seen in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. The proliferation of non-financial spaces of valuation in the field of social impact investment 
That said, there is one sense in which the idea of the extension of a ‘calculative logic’ is 
not a novel insight. If what is meant by the latter is that statistical methods and other 
means possessing a veneer of objectivity or quantification are applied to social matters, 
then this is old news. On the one hand, it is old news in that the process of the 
quantification of social realities is in fact much older, spanning back to the advent of social 
policy itself. Indeed, social investment relies on an understanding of managing 
populations or social groups through the statistical and numerical apprehension of social 
dynamics and the pricing away of specific aspects of those dynamics. At the time of the 
inception of forms of welfare states, this took place through practices of social insurance, 
which identified the ‘norm’ within social dynamics, and relegated deviations from the 
norm as social risk, which cannot be eliminated but can be priced away. In the field of 
social impact investment, this takes place through the quantitative apprehension of 
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potential degrees of social impact upon social ‘realities’, and, similarly, their pricing away 
to financial actors.  
On the other hand, the framework outlined here reveals that it is indeed a new practice 
which is predicated on new forms and processes of valuation. Just to illustrate, take the 
ordering process: as outlined above, the infrastructure that organises actors’ interaction in 
this new social policy delivery arrangement is one based on horizontality and network-
like forms of collaboration that rely on feedback loops, and with the state only concerned 
with the parameters of interaction, thus, in other words, tasked simply with the overseeing 
of the process of governance and not actual top-down administration. This, of course, is 
a feature that characterises not only impact investment as a new form of achieving social 
impact, but one that has to be linked also with secular transformations occurring in the 
fashion in which the pursuit of social policy objectives is undertaken. Indeed, it has been 
pointed out how there has been a discontinuity in the practice of administering public 
policy, with several succeeding framework being identifiable: an old, top-down, 
command and control, hierarchical model which came increasingly closer to obsolescence 
at the beginning of the 1970s; a newer model that replaced the older one and that was 
posited on the idea of the government working more ‘like’ business as well as ‘through’ 
business, thus replacing ‘command and control’ with ‘command, but not control’, via 
competitive tendering, disaggregation into semi-autonomous structures, and performance 
incentivisation; and the newest new public governance, which is as yet still in its infancy 
but whom has the trend in its favour, and which relies on a new understanding of 
governing – one that opens it up and takes place increasingly at the interstices between 
state, the third sector, and markets. 
During the UK Coalition Government of 2010-2015, this institutional component 
interacted with the ideological dimension of The Big Society agenda, which sought to 
solve the perceived problem of a wasteful, inadaptable, uncompetitive ‘Big Government’ 
fostering social apathy and irresponsibility by replacing it with the ethos of a responsible, 
sustainable, entrepreneurial ‘Big Society’ empowering local communities and social 
innovation. That said, many of these ideas and promises did not come to fruition, with 
one important exception: that of promoting the social investment market. Institutions and 
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initiatives such as Big Society Capital, the Localism Act of 2011, or the Public Services 
(Social Value) Act of 2012 – all essential to the field – are palpable realities still present 
in our time. Social investment, and SIBs particularly, gave materiality to the 
Conservatives’ agenda, which, in turn, supported the proliferation of the SIB model and 
provided institutional legitimacy for its entrenchment. The double narrative of the 
burdensome state and the age of austerity worked to not only open up the channels of 
social policy delivery to horizontal and network-like structures of governance, but also to 
facilitate the advance of finance in the arena.  
But while the coming of age of novel financial instruments such as SIBs could have easily 
tanked if not for The Big Society agenda, the story of their advent – and indeed of the 
very financialisation of social policy delivery – has been shown to be driven by different 
authors, and stretching to at least a decade before the launch of The Big Society agenda. 
Ever since the early 2000s, New Labour – who was not only quintessential in helping 
create and implement NPG reforms, but was also among the first to jump on the 
bandwagon and navigate the new linkages and channels created – was laying the 
groundwork for the development of a social impact investment market in the UK. The 
manner in which it did this was through the creation of two platforms that drew on a 
motley amalgamation of trans-societal actors: from the voluntary sector, media and 
academia, the business sector, banking and finance, and associations and co-operatives. 
SITF and CoSA mediated between the value plurality carried along by their members and 
worked to provide both moral legitimacy and institutional support for the idea and practice 
of impact investment. SITF focused more on conceptually delineating the field from its 
sister practices of philanthropy and socially responsible investment, but was also crucially 
involved in the writing of supporting legislation with the aid, through its 11 members, of 
multi-actor input, and in the creation of a host of channels for the fostering of social impact 
investment capital. CoSA, on the other hand, alongside conceptual and logistical work, 
concentrated most of its efforts on nurturing and promoting the idea of ‘social action’, 
which is the mainstay of social impact investment and which was operationalised also via 
the garnering of forces from its 15 trans-societal actors. CoSA also provided the gateway 
for the creation of a new funding model which eventually translated into the launch of the 
world’s first SIB at Peterborough in 2010.   
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SIBs, in fact, mimic the structure of NPG reforms, and rely on the principles of constant 
communication, (self-)reflection, and feedback loops as input-providing avenues in the 
decision-making and policy delivery processes. Most SIB projects rely on the elaboration 
of a Theory of Value Creation, which not only reflects how the actors involved construe 
social value creation in that particular case, but also becomes a guiding framework for the 
measurement and accounting of impact. This, as argued above, is decided upon at the 
level of the service providers or social enterprises, and less so at the level of the financial 
institution providing the capital, though the latter can be sometimes involved to a larger 
extent.   
The most important implication of these observations is that financialisation, in the field 
of social policy, occurs not so much through absorption into a financial logic, but more 
through the proliferation of non-financial spaces of valuation. Blended value, as described 
above in Figure 8, is thus a symptom of the creation of a novel socio-technical 
infrastructure for gauging social value as connected to but ultimately distinct from 
financial value. This is most visible in the panoply of metrics that are created for 
calculating impact. The most impressive fact about these is not that there already are more 
than 550 versions of them, but that the quest for institutionalising and standardising 
metrics – through platforms such as IRIS – has not resulted in the reduction in the 
multiplicity of approaches to quantifying impact, but, on the contrary, in an explosion of 
different metric frameworks and indicators. And this is to be expected, given that the 
process of gathering performance data is reliant on inputs from across a stakeholder board 
that is shifting and changing every single time a new project appears. Some metrics are 
more technocratic, some are more participative, but most of the time there is a clear and 
heavy-handed negotiation between all the stakeholders. This, of course, does not make it 
immune to imbalances of power, but the result is still the same: inputs regarding impact, 
which are tied to the financial rewards social investors reap, are cross-sectorial and 
negotiated, and this renders the valuation process much more complex and unique in its 
various guises, as well as potentially contestable.  
This ultimately leads to the emergence of a site in which a plurality of divergent values 
co-exist and are institutionalised through the practice of social impact investment. The 
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emergence of a market in financial instruments that fund social projects therefore does 
not necessarily imply the financialisation of that field and it does not necessarily preclude 
the development and consolidation of other forms of value within it. Financial innovation 
can be accompanied and supported by alternate and multiple forms of value. ‘Blended 
value’ is the perfect example of a foundational feature of a new sector that is not resolved 
simply through the extension of financial forms of valuations, but through the envisaging 
of new forms of non-financial valuation. The latter preserve the specificity of social (and, 
in some cases, environmental) value, and engender various socio-technical devices that 
allow said value to be evidenced and measured. Thus, various meanings and forms of 
value co-exist in the field of social investment, and actors operating in the field have no 
qualms in pursuing, to varying degrees, one alongside the other. Impact is, therefore, not 
evidenced through financialised forms of valuation, but through measurement processes 
following negotiated calculations relying on metric specificity and a form of policy 
delivery based on cross-sectorial interaction, feedback loops, and process governing. This 
aspect, though, should not be fetishised – after all, it is a social process subject to power 
struggles and imbalances – but neither should it be assumed that social impact investment 
is a priori a product of financialisation. Financialisation is a misnomer, but the 
quantification of social value, on which impact investment is predicated, is a reality; 
whether this is beneficial or detrimental is an important, albeit different, issue.  
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2. Avenues for further research  
 
While the main thrust of this thesis was to understand the manner in which financialisation 
expands into and engulfs the field of social policy, there are many ramifications of this 
analysis that can become steppingstones for further research. The framework outlined 
above can provide, on the basis of the pillars founding it, avenues for further 
understanding changes brought about by these new valuation processes. So, for instance, 
future studies can look at what kind of opportunities are created by the New Public 
Governance infrastructure crystallised by the New Labour government in the UK, what 
kind of inherent models of ordering and interaction are being thus created, and to what 
end; or they can look at what kind of actors are now populating this new infrastructure – 
not just in the field of social policy – and with what values and intentions, and facing what 
kind of power imbalances or struggles in their quest for achieving their aim; or they can 
analyse what kind of values the so-called ‘calculative devices’ entrench as per the outlined 
argument that any process of calculation or quantification belies a process of qualification, 
which ultimately comes to define and delineate a specific field as such. On the other hand, 
for the more theoretically inclined, research can move in the direction of unpacking what 
these new social impact instruments reveal about their originators’ understanding of ‘the 
social’, social risk, or social value creation, and what these conceptions reveal about a 
potential new form of managing populations, because, as described above, any 
epistemological enterprise is also an act of rendering reality amenable to change and 
transformation.  
But beyond these and similar ramifications of the main analysis, three grander issues 
tackled by this thesis can constitute particularly fertile entry points for further research. 
First is the valuation framework, which set the tone and direction of this research. As 
mentioned above, the study of value as constructed-in-action is still a nascent discipline, 
and the valuation studies undertaken so far have come short of providing the principles 
and stages that could come together to constitute a definite framework for the analysis of 
phenomena through the lens of their value construction. There clearly already was a 
feature stemming from the economic sociology origin of valuation studies which 
250 
 
emphasised the agencement or material-semiotic nature of value construction. In other 
words, and similar to actor network theory, individuals, ideas, processes, things, etc. were 
already put on the same plane and analysed with equal weight in accounting for the 
existence of a specific phenomenon. However, no systematised perspective had been put 
forth. This thesis has made an attempt to provide just that. 
The six-stage valuation framework presented here is a transferable heuristic tool, 
particularly when there is a need for understanding the value basis that underpins various 
phenomena. The explanatory power of this framework is encapsulated in its ability to 
account for value creation as a process occurring sequentially and being, at the same time, 
exploratory, systematising, and politicising. The valuation processes of negotiation, 
selection, ordering, abstraction, standardisation, and institutionalisation can take place 
separately or can overlap, can have equal power in making phenomena comprehensible 
or can afford more explanatory force to one stage or the other. Regardless, the crux of the 
matter is that it is only by following the entire process of worth attribution that a more 
comprehensive account of a phenomenon can be provided. Thus, first comes the analysis, 
then comes the explanation; first come the stages that allow particular actors to negotiate 
new value forms and select new arenas for their application or illustration, to establish a 
particular ordering and patterns of interaction which will characterise the latter, together 
with the means of evidencing its accomplishment, to standardise the latter so that they 
become replicable, accessible, and transparent, and institutionalise by force of example or 
perhaps law the new value form thus created, and it is only after this specific journey has 
been travelled that the particular imbalances and inequalities can be identified and 
evidenced.  
The power of this framework is that out of the complexity described previously emerges 
the simplicity of a six-step process which can be recycled into the analysis of other 
phenomena, particularly when we are facing a plurality of values which are not easily 
reconcilable but have to be combined for a variety of reasons. The interaction between 
environmental value and international development goals with financial value creation is 
one such example. The question here, like in the case of social impact investment, is not 
what new non-financial spaces are introduced in a financial logic, but whether or not we 
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are witnessing, as a condition of possibility of the expansion of finance, the creation, 
preservation, and eventually propagation of novel non-financial values? If so, what do 
those values stand for? Who are the actors involved? And what channels of interaction 
and communication are available for them? This way, a more encompassing and 
explanatory account of financialisation can be provided.  
The second avenue that this analysis opens up is the one described in the introduction: the 
role of the state in the process of financialisation. One of the insights coming out of the 
valuation perspective applied upon the case study of contemporary social policy delivery 
is that the state was quintessential in the process of financial innovation that resulted in 
the creation of novel financial instruments such as social impact bonds. State actors were, 
of course, not the only ones involved in this process; they were aided by actors coming 
from the different professional backgrounds summoned together by the opportunities 
opened up by the new governance infrastructure. That said, it was ultimately state actors 
that provided the impetus for the harbouring of a social investment market, especially the 
New Labour Government under Tony Blair and then Gordon Brown, but also the 
Coalition Government of David Cameron and Nick Clegg. But more than the mere 
impetus, it was the brainstorming platforms of trans-societal actors – the Social 
Investment Task Force and the Council on Social Action – set up by New Labour with 
the remit of fostering a market in social investment that were consequential in developing 
appropriate legislation, institutional support, and linkages across civil society, business, 
and governmental offices, and that provided the groundwork for the blossoming of the 
impact investment field in the UK, and indeed, by example, worldwide. 
This insight has important consequences for discussions regarding the intersection 
between finance and the state. Too often, this relationship is either systematically ignored 
or construed in a such a manner so that it appears that the state only has a passive role in 
financial matters, thus either as a rule-setter or as a consumer or manager of financial 
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products. These issues are insightful: deregulation or, more so, re-regulation12 goes a long 
way in explaining how states bring about financialisation via changing the legislation 
governing the scope of finance; similarly, the increasingly important role of sovereign 
debt and debt management offices, ever since the 1980s, in macroeconomic governance 
can explain the increasing quantitative mushrooming of financial entities, as can the 
profusion of sovereign wealth funds as strategic state investment funds gobbling up 
equities and securities of all colours, and thus contributing to the demand for investables13.  
But what this study has shown is that research on financialisation can also benefit from 
moving in the direction of looking at the state as a prime mover and as directly involved 
in the process of financialisation, through looking at it either as an innovator itself or as 
an active purveyor of the means for expanding the reach of finance via different channels. 
Social impact investment is precisely an example of the latter, and what this study has 
                                                 
12 There is an argument that ‘deregulation’ might not be the most adequate description for what happened 
during the period that has led to the current state of globalisation and global state competition. Indeed, the 
globalisation literature has been accused of being fraught with a semantic misunderstanding regarding 
deregulation: “People tend to use the term ‘deregulation’ indiscriminately to refer both to the introduction 
of more competition within a market (what I shall call liberalisation) and the reduction or elimination of 
government regulations (what I shall call deregulation) – as if these two were naturally associated” (Vogel, 
1996, p. 3). Cases of deregulation, understood in the second sense, have been very rare; in fact, what 
happened throughout the world in the past couple of decades falls under the former category, of 
liberalisation accompanied by re-regulation, which can take the form of even more regulation (see also 
Vestergaard, 2008). This re-regulation can sometimes undermine government control over the industry (by 
handicapping incumbents or helping competitors; adding regulation to facilitate the efficiency of markets; 
reinforcing antitrust legislation) or enhance it (by providing domestic firms with regulatory advantages; by 
taking away, through regulation, advantages for foreign firms; by protecting domestic firms in the face of 
liberalisation). 
13 The idea that the state can do more in markets than merely shape them or structure their foundations has 
recently been highlighted in an article analysing how governments in emerging markets act increasingly as 
financial market players (Datz, 2008). States are engaging in supplying and consuming financial innovation 
and they increasingly employ private valuation methods to achieve public goals. That said, what is 
understood here through this purported new practice is the manner in which governments increasingly adopt 
market-like behaviour regarding their debt management activity and regarding the way in which they 
diversify their assets. Thus, debt management offices, which proliferated especially in advanced countries, 
increasingly operate as autonomous entities in a specialised manner and according to transparent risk 
preferences, thereby resembling private funds. At the other end there are the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
set up by capital exporting countries, which operate through strategic long-term investment, and not simply 
as a fund for rainy days (see also Helleiner & Lundblad, 2008). SWFs, in the build-up to the financial crisis, 
but also in the deflation aftermath, gradually started moving away from investing in long-term, low-interest 
rate, low-risk assets to higher risk and higher yield equities and securities. This way, (some) states have 
become yield seeking investors. That said, this still only touches upon the demand side, that is, governments 
as consuming financial innovation, not producing it. The issue with this perspective is that it does not take 
the argument far enough: states also produce financial innovation.  
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shown, among other things, is that the state can harbour financialisation as means or as a 
result of pursuing public policy. But this direction of research should not stop here; there 
are other examples of this process which are under-explored. One such example that has 
been touched upon but which still lacks a definitive account, as mentioned before, is the 
role of the state in the production of the very process of securitisation, whose by-products 
were so crucial in the build-up to the financial crisis. There are only a handful of studies 
that acknowledge the role that government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) played in the 
design and promotion of mortgage backed securities (MBSs), not as an initiative of 
developing financial markets, but precisely as means of pursuing public policy. And 
securitisation is the backbone that channels capital not just for fulfilling housing policy, 
but also for other things ranging from student loans (thus education) to solar photovoltaic 
assets (thus environmental goals). Research can thus benefit from looking at instances in 
which through the pursuit of public policy objectives the states engages, actively, in 
financialisation.  
Finally, and connected to the issue of financial innovation, another fertile avenue for 
further research is an aspect mentioned also in the introduction: the relationship between 
social investment and austerity. As is well-documented, the sustained expansion of the 
financial sector was ground to a (temporary) halt by the US credit crunch of 2008 and the 
subsequent international banking crisis and global recession of massive proportions. 
While the initial response to the crisis was rapid and equally massive, involving 
internationally coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus, the bailout of banks and other 
financial institutions quickly morphed, in Europe, into a full-blown sovereign debt crisis 
with the prospect of defaults and various national exits from the EU or the Eurozone 
looming high in the old continent. As opposed to the US, where the Federal Reserve 
embarked on a massive programme of quantitative easing that eventually repaired banks’ 
balance sheets, the Eurozone, due to (initial) institutional constraints as well as issues of 
popular legitimacy, used as its response-policy of choice the adoption of continent-wide 
austerity measures, reviving thus quaint ideas of moral rectitude and dubious economic 
theories.  
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One of the questions that were posed as a result of these developments was what should 
now be the relationship between state and finance when it comes to welfare provision? 
This was asked in an environment in which the default response was to withdraw state 
support from welfare and channel it towards healing the financial sector with the hope of 
eventual trickle-down economics, though the need for extra support for social policy in 
the context of austerity, which reinforces welfare demands, was pending. One seeming 
answer to the question of the ideal arrangement between state, finance, and welfare was 
given in the UK: social impact investment. And the most powerful case for engaging in 
social investment was made by the UK Coalition Government of 2010-2015, in which 
David Cameron associated the idea of The Big Society – fitting as it was with the trans-
societal, multi-input, limited governmental intervention ethos of social impact bonds – 
with the new contemporary situation characterised by the advent of an age of austerity. 
The solution to that was that social investment would make up for the depleted coffers of 
the exchequer by channelling funds from capital markets in areas with high social risk. 
That said, while this ideological component acted as a dynamo for the spread of financial 
instruments like social impact bonds in the UK context, it is surprising to find that many 
other countries that refused or did not need to implement austerity measures jumped on 
the bandwagon of social impact investment straight away and not just as a result of private 
sector initiative, but as a state-promoted project of drawing resources from financial 
markets into social policy programmes. Some examples include Australia, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and even the US. These countries did not engage in widespread austerity 
policies, yet they wholeheartedly adopted social impact bonds as legitimate and efficient 
means of funding social programmes. Comparative projects on why this occurs are scarce, 
and while austerity has a great degree of explanatory power in the UK, it makes less sense 
in countries with a budgetary surplus. The idea that they potentially are a harbinger for 
austerity is also improbable, thus a comparative project spanning the varieties of 
capitalism that SIBs cut through could provide a great deal of clarification on this matter.  
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3. Concluding thoughts 
 
Seven years into the state-sponsored launch of the very first social impact bond globally, 
SIBs have assumed a life of their own. They seem to have accumulated sufficient a track 
record to propagate worldwide and motivate ever more countries to implement legislation, 
create institutions, and attract organisations that would facilitate and hasten up their 
adoption. Furthermore, ever more slices of social existence – from criminal justice and 
homelessness to mental health and earthquake rehabilitation – are being touched by this 
model of achieving social policy objectives via financialisation as an avenue for reducing 
social risk. To the already existing 74 impact bonds a further 70 bonds in development 
are to be added which puts SIBs on track to doubling in size in a time span as short as a 
couple of years. This means that the advent of social investment as a mature asset class 
with a potential secondary market and exit options is indeed nigh.  
This study has explained the consequent financialisation of social policy delivery through 
tracing a six-stage valuation process divided into three parts:  
1. A more exploratory part comprised of negotiation and selection, where the 
meaning and purpose of a new value form is negotiated, followed by the selection 
of a slice of social reality where the new value form should be adopted, 
implemented, or circulated. 
2. A more systematising part consisting of ordering and abstraction, where ordering 
the interaction of actors participating in the creation of the new value form is 
decided upon, after which the methods for abstracting the value creation are 
established, in order to provide evidential data.  
3. A public act of standardisation, which could include the creation of classifications, 
benchmarks, and performance indicators in an accessible, homogeneous, and 
transparent fashion, followed by an essentially political act of institutionalisation 
through the adoption of national and international acts or treaties for entrenchment 
and promotion of the new value form.  
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It is the unfolding of these processes engendering a new value infrastructure that facilitates 
the advance of finance in the field of social policy, and this study has shown that this 
advance would not have been possible without the concomitant proliferation of non-
financial spaces of valuation. Regardless of the latter, social investment can still easily be 
construed as an instance of ‘financialisation’, and, more often than not, this latter term is 
construed in a pejorative manner, as denoting an anomaly of economic systems in which 
speculative or money managing activities take precedent over the imperatives of the ‘real’ 
economy. But there is nothing that indicates that financialisation is inherently pernicious; 
rather, financialisation is much easier understood, in a pragmatist vein, as a political-
economic strategy fulfilling specific functions in particular varieties of capitalism. In 
other words, it is its uses that make the difference. The same is the case with social 
investment – there is arguably nothing to indicate that it is inherently detrimental to 
society at large. Rather, it should be seen as an outgrowth of a specific valuation process 
which creates opportunities as much as it creates risks. Social investment is then an odd 
beast, predicated as it is on being mission-oriented and on the having the ability to serve 
as a complementary instrument or all-out surrogate to more traditional means of 
delivering public policy. It can indeed design preventative and early intervention 
programmes, which are politically unpalatable and generally circumvented as part of run 
of the mill programmes because of their more elusive, long-term, and risky nature. It can 
also provide a more innovative model of policy delivery, with a more stakeholder oriented 
implementation and a more outcome intensive accountability.  
That said, as much as social investment is predicated on social value creation, so it is – 
maybe to a lesser extent, in some cases, but still as a foundational feature – on financial 
value. The notion of ‘blended value’ turns precisely on this balancing game between 
social return and financial return, and while in many cases public social return is 
prioritised, private financial return always lurks in the background as a sine qua non of 
this new form of social policy delivery. And when the fact that rates of financial return 
can reach 30 per cent or even more is taken into account, the ‘background’ dimension 
becomes a blatant euphemism, especially in an environment of ultra-low interest rates and 
prolonged deflation. It is unclear why a society should maintain the social pact when 
exorbitant profit – coming, ultimately, from the taxpayer – is made out of programmes 
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that were – and still are, to some extent – the remit of the state as a safety net and welfare 
provider. Why should global banks such as Goldman Sachs, Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch, or JP Morgan Chase and Co. be the recipients of these financial flows when state 
agencies could have easily stepped in and did the exact same job with no additional costs? 
How is this even different from mere privatisation? The value added of bringing upfront 
funding from capital markets is yet to be proven, particularly in an environment where so 
far risk has not really been borne by capital providers, that is, when accounting for the 
grants, subsidies, and guarantees bequeathed on these project by governments. It is 
actually hard to believe that these guarantees will vanish any time soon, given that the risk 
is too high and politically sensitive for governments to let SIBs fail. And a powerful case 
can be developed that the eventual creation of a secondary market that would create exit 
options for investors in the potential absence of state guarantees is morally repugnant 
when people’s livelihoods or wellbeing are at stake. The solution of cherry-picking social 
needs that are easily cosmeticised and monetised is equally reprehensible. How can all of 
these contradictions, and many more lingering at the corners of social investment, ever be 
reconciled? 
Perhaps they will indeed never be reconciled. In some ways, what this research shows is 
that when one opens the black-box of the valuation processes at play in the field of social 
impact investment, a surprising fact emerges: the issue of ‘hostile worlds’ can simply be 
bypassed. Social impact creation can be given pride of place, can be stimulated and indeed 
brought about by staffing social impact projects with competent and mission-oriented 
people, can make real, positive changes in people’s lives, all the while new capital is 
extracted and accrues in the background. Impact can then hit the headlines, and everyone 
can take credit, as long as the investors do not disclose or boast about their profits.  
It is perhaps even more so the case with SIBs, which are grander in scale, involve a higher 
degree of risk, and therefore require more capital and greater returns than, say, a simple 
investment in a local social enterprise employing ex-offenders or in a social bank 
extending micro-credit to the financially excluded. SIBs in many cases rely on investment 
from HNWIs, which are notoriously risk-adverse but also yield-seeking, and thus require 
various forms of guarantees that their hard-earned cash will be judiciously spent. So far, 
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governments or government departments found themselves hard-pressed not to cater to 
these standards, either by guaranteeing a specific degree of return or cherry-picking easily 
treatable social ills. Unless an insurance/derivative market in SIBs emerges, it is hard to 
believe that this practice will discontinue. And if or when it does, then that poses other 
issues, as the financial crisis showed: moral hazard, adverse selection, predatory lending, 
etc. And last but not least, social indignation at these ramifications can be expected.  
Ultimately, as narrated in this study, SIBs emerged as a state-sponsored project. But we 
could also ask, as an exercise in counterfactual history, what if the state steered clear of 
this avenue? What would have we been left with then? The answer is rather simple: ESG 
standards negatively screening ‘sin stocks’, a marginalised and most likely withering 
social investment sector funding small and local projects, and austerity eating away at the 
public purse and gradually dismantling social safety nets. SIBs and the institutionalisation 
of blended value emerged really due to the latter. The imperative of accruing return on 
social programmes nominally appeared as a result of the scarcity of funding for achieving 
social policy goals and the purported necessity for these funds to be repaid in order to be 
reinvested in other projects with social impact. Austerity thus cast us in a double bind: on 
the one hand, we now have to rely increasingly more on the beneficence of private wealth 
to create social value – at a discount of course, and on the other hand, we now have to be 
prepared to face the deleterious consequences of austerity, which perversely creates 
precisely the conditions for the former to flourish. One might wonder then whether it is 
not time to rethink austerity or at least ring-fence state funding for social security in order 
to prevent these paradoxical developments from occurring. And if we see that it has the 
effect of actually winding back the whole universe of blended value, then maybe we 
should presume that we are better off without it.   
Social investment, therefore, represents both an opportunity and a curse. For now, it is 
here to stay; the future will only show whether or not the advantages thwart the 
shortcomings, and whether or not the democratic mandate of governments as well as the 
social pact at its centre will be respected and will thrive in the midst of financialisation.    
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